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Can international peacebuilding efforts in war-torn societies have positive influence on demo-
cratic outcomes at the grassroots level? Does any such influence occur through military
channels (e.g., security provision) or civilian channels (e.g., democratic education)? How
do different local settings respond to various activities carried out by outside interveners?
A key objective of contemporary peacebuilding interventions is to transform war-torn
societies into stable, liberal democratic polities, based on the premise that democracy is the
best way to achieve stable and self-sustaining peace because democracies are more respectful
toward their citizens and peaceful toward their neighbors (Barnett 2006). Toward this end,
in addition to providing security, international interveners typically undertake a wide range
of activities to democratize existing structures both at the macro-level and micro-level.
There are important variations in local settings in which peacebuilding activities tend to
be carried out. Surprisingly, there have been few systematic efforts to investigate whether
and how differences in local settings shape the performance and outcomes of peacebuilding
interventions, in particular to ascertain the effectiveness of efforts to promote democratic
norms and liberal values at the grassroots level.
This dissertation attempts to fill this gap–theoretically and empirically. It draws on
social science theories to outline specific hypotheses about when and how various activities
carried out by outside actors may be effective in promoting liberal democratic outcomes
in different local settings. These hypotheses are tested empirically through a nine-month
field experiment carried out in 142 villages in postwar Liberia, in partnership with a United
Nations peacekeeping mission and two local civil society organizations. Empirical findings
reveal that the effects of outside interventions on democratic outcomes at the grassroots level
critically depend on context types, but the saliency of local contexts is more pronounced
for some outcome areas (e.g., political participation) than others (e.g., social cohesion).
Theoretical and policy implications of these results will be discussed.
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Can international interventions to build peace after civil war have positive influence on
democratic outcomes at the grassroots level? Does any such influence comes from these
interventions’ military component or civilian component? What are the mechanisms gov-
erning these interventions in postwar processes at the grassroots level? Do such mechanisms
operate the same way in different outcomes areas (i.e., political; social)? How do different
local settings respond to various activities carried out under the auspices of peacebuilding
interventions? These are important questions for our understanding of the effectiveness of
peacebuilding and democratization efforts at the grassroots level. Surprisingly, the exist-
ing literature has not addressed these questions adequately. This dissertation attempts to
provide answers.
Peacebuilding interventions are central to efforts by the international community to es-
tablish stable and self-sustaining peace in war-torn societies (Tschirgi 2004). Often–but
not always–carried out within the context of UN multidimensional peacekeeping opera-
tions, they typically encompass military and civilian components and seek to resolve con-
flicts through a holistic approach that link security priorities with broader aims of good
governance, democratization and social inclusion (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Cousens and
Kumar 2001). Crucially, peacebuilding interventions follow a liberal orientation, with an ex-
plicit aim ”to remake war-shattered societies as liberal democracies–with popularly elected
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governments and civil liberties such as freedom of association and expression, which are
presupposed by the idea of free and fair elections.” While liberal democratization efforts
have mainly focused at the macro-level, namely the national level institutions or processes
and actors, the foundations of liberal change are actually at the micro-level (Baranyi 2008:
18; Manning 2003).
In other words, liberal transformations, presumed to be sine qua non conditions for self-
sustaining peace, cannot take root unless the masses embrace the reform necessary for such
transformations (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Stedman et al. 2002: 20). To this end, peace-
builders have attempted to extend democratic liberal reforms at the micro-level through
a wide range of programs, including direct efforts to reform local structures presumed to
be conflict prone to make them more inclusive and legitimate; setting up new governance
structures through Community Driven Development (CDD) programs that are supposed to
operate democratically; and targeting the citizenry directly with education on democratic
norms and liberal values (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Pouligny 2006; Russett and O’Neal 2001).
However, peacebuilding initiatives at the grassroots level remain ad-hoc and fragmented,
with unclear links to the overall peacebuilding strategy (Autesserre 2010; Tschirgi 2004).
More problematically, however, peacebuilding and democratization efforts tend to be
carried out in diverse local contexts –broadly defined to refer to a wide range of factors
related to local structures, cultures, institutions, and histories as well as the socioeconomic
and political dynamics–and yet this diversity is typically overlooked in the current peace-
building approach (Richmond 2011; Autesserre 2010; Gizelis and Kosek 2005).1 Specifically,
from a micro-level perspective, the current approach is premised on unwarranted assump-
tions and false monoliths about local contexts, at both the institutional and ideational
level. At the institutional level, international interveners tend to portray a monolithic view
of local power structures and institutions as uniformly undemocratic, abusive of the local
population and illegitimate. Because they view such institutions as illegitimate, they do
not rely on them to reveal communities’ social preferences and see them rather as hurdles
or obstacles (Donais 2009).
At the ideational level, peacebuilders tend to view local norms and local customs and
1In this dissertation I use local context(s) and local setting(s) interchangeably.
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practices as antithetical to universal ones, even though they might be subscribed to by
the communities themselves (Ponzio 2011). For instance, a frequent rationale underlying
interventions such as CDD programs that seek to establish new democratic governance
structures in war-torn communities is that previous structures either no longer fulfill their
functions, having been destroyed during civil war, or lost their legitimacy and that they
should therefore be transformed because local people have disavowed them (Richards 2005;
Hanlon 2005). Yet, case studies from many postwar societies such as Afghanistan, East
Timor or Liberia suggest that there is, in actuality, significant variation in existing struc-
tures’ ability to provide public goods as well as in local people’s attachments to them (Ponzio
2011; Sawyer 2005; Hohe 2002a).
In the case of Afghanistan, for example, Brick (2008) argued that despite persistent
weaknesses of the central government a mix of customary organizations–from village execu-
tives (maliks), village councils (shuras/jirgas), and religious arbiters (mullahs/imams)–have
provided, under certain conditions, public goods to the local communities. Mushi (2011)
makes a similar observation in the case of DRC. He argues that a web of multi-layered
networks in the South Kivu province–from traditional systems to militias to social clubs of
various kinds–”continued to provide a degree of governance response after the central state
apparatus disappeared.” Moreover, as a growing number of studies revealed (Sandefur and
Siddiqi 2013; Harper 2011; Dale 2009), these traditional and informal systems and mecha-
nisms enjoy high levels of legitimacy, even in cases where rival formal systems might exist
(Isser et al. 2009).This is not peculiar to post-conflict settings, however. Recent surveys of
traditional systems in a wide range of African countries revealed that these systems enjoy
considerable legitimacy and support from the majority of their people than local government
officials, with 58% of respondents agreeing that ”the amount of influence of traditional lead-
ers have in governing your local community should increase,” while only 8% of respondents
felt it should decrease (Acemoglu et al. 2013, citing Logan 2011; 2009).
What this suggests, then, is that there is important variation in local settings in terms of
the types of existing structures and the utility that local people derive from them and these
differences are likely to have implications for the performance of peacebuilding interven-
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tions and the extent to which liberal objectives they pursue are achieved (Sawyer 2005).2
Understanding this variation is important because distinguishing contextual factors such
as prevailing cultural practices and traditions play an important role in people’s life (e.g.,
Rubenstein 2008 2003; Hohe 2002a; Duffey 2000). Yet, the current peacebuilding approach
has not paid adequate attention to variation in local settings, owing in large part to this
approach’s focus on macro-level and formal phenomena and processes.3 A key premise of
this dissertation is that variation in local settings has important practical and theoretical
implications for our understanding of the effectiveness of peacebuilding. From a practical
point of view, failure to take this diversity into account can be a recipe for misdiagnosis of
salient issues and to unwarranted expectations about local responses to interventions (Tal-
entino 2007; Chopra and Hohe 2004; Clapham 2000). This is especially true with respect to
democratization efforts, which typically seek to displace/transform local structures and to
bring local norms into conformity with liberal norms and values (Richmond 2011; Donais
2009). Thus, a reasonable expectation is that different local settings will present peace-
builders with different challenges and opportunities for successful promotion of democratic
norms and liberal values.
A related theoretical question is how and why different local settings respond to liberal
reforms promoted within peacebuilding interventions. We know from social science theories
that promotion of new ideas or values is not automatic. As Crawford (2002) argued with
2This is an uncontroversial claim to students of comparative politics, including those focusing on civil
war and postwar processes (Autesserre 2010; Kalyvas 2008; 2003). There is a rich tradition of scholarship
in comparative politics (see, for example, Moore 1966; Popkin 1979; Scott 1976 1985; Migdal 1989) that
has long stressed a complex picture of local settings, with a great deal of variation in social and political
dynamics.
3Both peacebuilding practice and research have typically been carried out at the macro-level, focusing
almost exclusively on national-level processes such as constitution-making or elections, and on processes
involving high-profile elites, especially those affiliated with armed factions. In contrast, local level processes
and actors have generally received scant attention (Ginty 2011; Richmond 2011). Focus on national-level
processes and the elites is not necessarily misplaced, as effective national institutions and processes are
essential for stable political and social order. Yet, excusive focus on macro-level phenomena and trends may
not provide an accurate picture of what might actually be happening on the ground–that is, it can mask
important variations that may ultimately the sources of peacebuilding success or failure.
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reference to new belief systems, ”the transmission of beliefs does not necessarily guarantee
their adoption. Members of cultures often resist new beliefs, and why any new belief is
adopted must be explained since some beliefs and practices are adopted, while others are
not” (74). Democratic norms and liberal values promoted through peacebuilding interven-
tions are no exception. Thus it is imperative to clarify the conditions under which these
norms and values can be promoted and adopted successfully at the local level. Based on
the foregoing discussion, I hypothesize that local setting types–in particular the degree to
which the local population values such structures–may be one operating condition of suc-
cessful peacebuilding promotion of democratic norms and values, dictating when, and how
the local population adopts or rejects them.
In this dissertation, I investigate–both theoretically and empirically–when and how vari-
ous peacebuilding activities carried out at the grassroots level may be effective in promoting
democrac outcomes in different local settings. Theoretically, I begin by laying conceptual
foundations for my arguments. Using an existing culture as the most salient feature of lo-
cal context, I introduce the concept of cultural strength, intrinsic to the distinction critical
to my claims, between culturally established settings characterized by particular features
associated with stability and predictability in patterns of social interactions, and culturally
fragmented settings lacking in such features. My claim is that these differences are impor-
tant because they suggest different degrees of predispositions or susceptibility to change,
suggesting and therefore opportunities and challenges for promoting democratic outcomes.
In addition, I categorize different peacebuilding activities in two broad types: (i) status-quo
transforming strategies (e.g., democracy and human rights activities) explicitly designed to
alter at least some aspects of the existing sociopolitical order; and (ii) status-quo preserving
strategies (e.g., military peacekeeping ), which provide certain services without necessarily
challenging the existing structures. I argue that these two strategies make different assump-
tions about important barriers to peacebuilding and entail different mechanisms and, as a
result, they will tend to elicit different responses in different settings.
These conceptual foundations allow me to develop a micro-foundational theory of peace-
building interventions and democratic outcomes at the grassroots level, re-assessing the
premises and logic underlying specific strategies in light of social science theories and for-
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mulating specific hypotheses about the effects of these strategies in different setting types.
My general claim is that different peacebuilding strategies will have differential influences
on democratic outcomes in different local settings. Specifically, I argue that the strength of
an existing culture plays a key role in moderating the influence of peacebuilding strategies
on political participation. In established settings–where locals likely have strong valuation
of the existing culture–strategies that seek to transform aspects of the status-quo social
order will be less likely to have positive influence on democratic outcomes as the result
of local resistance, whereas status-quo preserving strategies will tend to have positive ef-
fects by working through more subtle channels (e.g., elite socialization). In contrast, in
fragmented settings–where locals likely have weak valuation of existing cultures, status-quo
preserving strategies will tend to be ineffective, whereas status-quo transforming strategies
will tend to have positive influence on democratic outcomes as they entail mechanisms to
solve information problems pervasive in these settings.
Empirically, I test these claims using a nine-month field experiment titled ”Peacebuilding
and Democracy Promotion in Liberia” (PBDPL) carried out across 142 rural communities,
in partnership with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and two local civil
society organizations. Unique in its breath and depth, this trial was designed to mimic as
closely as possible two key components of today’s peacebuilding operations, namely: (i)
status-quo preserving strategies represented by a security committee program that entailed
monthly meetings between representatives from selected villages and UNMIL peacekeepers
to discuss security and other issues of concern to local communities; and (ii) status-quo
transforming strategies represented by a civic education program that entailed a 13-theme
democracy promotion curriculum covering a wide range of issues including nationhood and
citizenship, human rights and rule of law, democratic governance, inclusive political par-
ticipation to name a few. At the end of the 9-month intervention period empirical data
were gathered on a wide range of democratic outcomes at the grassroots level, particularly
political participation and social cohesion.4
4Peacebuilding interventions target too many societal dimensions to be investigated properly within
the confines of a single dissertation. This dissertation focuses on political participation and social cohesion
because they are the most important aspect of postwar reconstruction (Papagianni 2008; Doyle and Sambanis
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Statistical analyses reveal two sets of findings. With respect to political participation,
the results confirm theoretical expectations: the effects of the two peacebuilding strategies
are indeed linked to the cultural strength of local context. In areas of strongly established
local cultures, my village security committee program had strong positive effects on overall
measures of political participation, but no meaningful effects in culturally fragmented lo-
calities. In those fragmented areas, the civic education program has strong positive effects
on the overall measures of political participation, but adverse effects in areas of strong local
culture. With this heterogeneity, average effects of the peacebuilding strategies examined
look no different from zero, as found in some of the macro-level empirical studies discussed
earlier. These results help reconcile two seemingly contradictory views on the prospects of
postwar democratization: on one hand, optimists who tend to make positive assessments
of the influence of peacebuilding operations on postwar democratic outcomes; and, on the
other hand, pessimists who hold the view that local settings may simply be too resilient
to respond to any kind of outside intervention. They suggest that democratic change is
possible in various types of local settings, provided that the right type of intervention is
utilized. However, the results on social cohesion do not support my hypotheses, suggesting
that cultural strength does not necessarily exhibit the same degree of saliency or significance
when the focus of outside interventions is on social issues. Taken together, these findings
are counterintuitive and suggest the need to further investigate how local context shapes
different strategies to promote peace and democracy in war-torn societies.
1.2 Scope and contributions
This dissertation makes important contributions, both substantively and methodologically,
to the peacebuilding literature. From a substantive standpoint, this dissertation put forth
a new microfoundational theory of peacebuilding that incorporates important variation in
local settings and clarifies the conditions under which different components of the peace-
building strategy can achieve positive influence on democratic outcomes at the grassroots
level. The arguments and empirical findings presented herein suggest that a number of
2006; Orr 2002; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Kumar 1998).
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seemingly opposite theoretical views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, this
dissertation argues that many of these views are different sides of the same coin and must
be addressed in the same theoretical and empirical framework.
For instance, arguments and findings of this dissertation underscore the importance to
move past the tendency in the current peacebuilding scholarship and practice to portray
local settings as monoliths. By stressing the importance of variation in local contexts, this
dissertation helps reconcile the disagreement between proponents of mainstream peacebuild-
ing who tend to view local contexts as malleable and receptive to outside interventions and
critics who tend to view local contexts as resilient and less susceptible to outside inter-
ventions. In other words, this variation highlights important features of postwar settings
that co-exist, albeit in different geographic contexts. Hence the relevant debate and research
question shift from whether one type of local settings is more or less favorable to democratic
development to under what conditions local contexts matter for democratic development at
the grassroots level.
In the same vein, this dissertation’s arguments and findings question the merit of the
current peacebuilding approach’s tendency to give transformative aspects of the approach
precedence over the more facilitative aspects of the approach on the ground that they
offer the best prospect for democratic change. They suggest that both facilitative and
transformative aspects do entail democracy promotion logics and stress the important of
considering not just the mechanisms underlying a specific strategy, but also the peculiarities
of local settings targeted by the strategy. Thus the main contribution here is to nudge the
mainstream scholarship and practice to shift away from the tendency to find an ”optimal”
strategy that can promote democratic outcomes under any circumstances and instead to
focus on understanding when and how different strategies might be effective in addressing
the constraints to democratic outcomes facing different local settings. In other words,
successful promotion of democratic outcomes depends on the extent to which interveners
are able to leverage in specific local settings the strategies that elicit positive response and
to rely at minimum on strategies that elicit local sensitivities.
Furthermore, this dissertation investigates a wide-range of democratic outcomes, espe-
cially the local and informal mechanisms of social and political participation that are often
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overlooked by international peacebuilders. This is an important contribution because the
tendency in the peacebuilding scholarship and practice has been to put more emphasis on
activities geared towards participation in national and formal politics under the presump-
tion that these are more ”civic” and crucial for the restoration of state legitimacy, whereas
informal and local mechanisms of participation are often regarded as parochial and lacking
liberal underpinnings (Pouligny 2006; Sawyer 2005; Pouligny 2000). Yet as a number of
scholars (e.g., Harper 2011; Sawyer 2006; 2005; Manning 2003, etc.) pointed out, in many
war-torn societies traditional and informal mechanisms tend to be the most meaningful
forms of engagement with politics and institutions for the vast majority of citizens either
because they are most accessible and affordable or because they are perceived to be more
legitimate (Sandefur and Siddiqi 2013; Isser et al. 2011; Sawyer 2025).5
Absent an understanding of traditional and informal mechanisms of social and political
engagement, it may be difficult to promote democratic change effectively, for effectiveness
depends on creating appropriate incentive structures that align local people’s interests (if
not preferences) with the reforms. Thus by identifying patterns of political and social
participation that prevail at the grassroots level and the extent to which they are influenced
by outside interventions, this dissertation’s findings contributes to a better understanding
of how traditional and informal mechanisms can provide a strong foundation for successful
democratization efforts at the grassroots level.6
5In the case of El Salvador, for example, Pouligny’s research revealed that the relative political apathy
noticed in surveys conducted after the civil war in the late 1990s was merely a change in the nature of
political engagement whereby political life for El Salvadorians was being ”reorganized around community
life,” which in turn was becoming ”more valued than the idea of delegating representatives at the state
level.”
6In addition, this dissertation brings the issue of ”traditional and informal” systems and processes back
into the field of international relations. While there has been perennial debate among the major International
Relations paradigms (i.e. realism, neoliberalism and constructivism) about the effects of institutions on
cooperative and conflictive behavior of domestic and international actors (Baldwin 1993), this debate has
been limited to formal institutions and mechanisms. Yet today international actors are dealing with these
other institutions on a daily basis, and a proper understanding of them can make a difference in the efforts
to help establish self-sustaining peace in these distant societies. I hope this dissertation provides a window
into some of these interactions.
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Methodologically, this dissertation uses a micro-level approach that has several advan-
tages. First, this approach offers a more nuanced understanding of the nature and extent of
the social and political transformations at the grassroots level than has been possible with a
macro-level approach. Second, experimental methods used in this dissertation provide rig-
orous empirical evidence to disentangle the channels of influence underlying the relationship
between peacebuilding interventions and democratic outcomes and to investigate the role
of culture in the process. Third, the micro-level approach helps provide a middle ground
on the thorny issues about the timing necessary for democratic outcomes to take hold: On
one hand, there is a consensus in the literature that the sought-after postwar social and
political transformations are longer-term processes that may not fully consolidate until long
after the departure of interveners (Paris 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Paradoxically,
much of the empirical literature evaluates the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions
within a timeframe that many argue is not long enough for the changes to take hold–let
alone consolidate (Call and Cook 2003; Miall et al. 2011). Furthermore, macro-level studies
are often fraught with a pervasive twin identification problem. Peacebuilding interventions
are by definition multidimensional, in which military strategies are carried out alongside a
wide range of social and political programing. This multidimensional character makes it
difficult to discern the individual contribution of specific programs to the overall success of
the intervention, since it is nearly impossible to control for all potential factors (Humphreys
and Weinstein 2007). The micro-level approach I use in this dissertation mitigates this
shortcoming. The micro-level outcomes I investigate tend to be under the direct control of
peacebuilding interventions. At the same time, experimental methods enable identification
of causal effects of specific aspects of these interventions in a more precise way. In addition,
intermediate outcomes may make it possible to determine what about peacekeeping works
and what does not.
Finally, from a policy standpoint, the findings in this dissertation provide insights into
how international interventions can be designed and implemented more effectively. The lack
of theoretical guidance in current peacebuilding interventions often leads to misdiagnosis
of the problems, which can in turn lead to bad policy responses. Moreover, while many
studies in the existing peacebuilding literature tend to highlight dilemmas in peacebuilding
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processes, frustratingly few provide real insight into how those dilemmas can be overcome.
The theory I develop in this dissertation goes beyond pointing out the obvious and pro-
vides a framework to identify relevant institutional and cultural dimensions that can help
overcome the dilemmas that so often undermine peacebuilding efforts. In the end, peace-
building interventions achieve self-sustaining peace only with the active cooperation of the
local population, the ultimate beneficiary. When all is said and done, peacebuilders may
not always be able to incentivize all local actors to peace, but they can at the very least
avoid squandering any existing opportunities for peace. Finally, it should be obvious that
micro-level approach I employ in this dissertation is a complement, rather than an alterna-
tive, to the macro-level approach. Therefore, extrapolation from micro- to macro-level is
not automatic While finding of positive effects will strengthen the micro-level mechanisms
presumed in the current peacebuilding approach, negative findings will not necessarily sug-
gest that peacebuilding operations are not effective. Such findings will simply rule out the
micro-level as plausible channel through which these operations influence democratic out-
comes. This raises the obvious question about external validity of the results to which will
be addressed in the conclusion.
1.3 Dissertation outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized around three parts comprising five chapters and a
conclusion. Part one lays out conceptual and theoretical issues this dissertation addresses
in two chapters. Chapter two provides a background on the context of peacebuilding inter-
ventions, highlighting the security priorities and legitimacy issues that confront the postwar
state as well as pervasive local incapacities to address these issues autonomously. The chap-
ter also discusses key aspects of the peacebuilding strategy and their rationales, emphasizing
in particular the liberal underpinnings and microfoundations of these interventions as well
as variation in local settings in which these interventions are carried out. Chapter three
introduces a microfoundational theory of peacebuilding interventions that takes into ac-
count variation in local settings and formulates specific hypotheses about how different
peacebuilding strategies influence democratic outcomes in different local settings
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12
Part two focuses on empirics in three chapters. Chapter four discusses my research
strategy, describing the field experiment and various data I use to test hypotheses developed
in chapter three. Chapter five investigates my hypotheses and presents findings with regard
to political participation, while chapter six presents findings with respect to social cohesion.
Each of the two empirical chapters include: (i) a discussion the strategy used to measure
the relevant outcome variable; (ii) a discussion of the empirical framework and presentation
of the results; and (iii) a detailed discussion of the results. Part three comprise a sole and
final chapter that provides a conclusion and a discussion of research and policy implications








The aim of this chapter is to clarify the rationales underlying international peacebuilding
interventions in war-torn societies and implicit hypotheses linking these interventions demo-
cratic outcomes at the grassroots level. It provides a brief discussion of the peacebuilding
context in which international actors intervene, emphasizing in particular security chal-
lenges and legitimacy problems that confront postwar states, and discusses strategies used
to address these issues. The chapter argues that a key shortcoming in the current peace-
building strategy is that it tends to overlook important variation in local contexts, which
may shape the performance of peacebuilding interventions and influence their outcomes.
2.1 The peacebuilding context
Peacebuilding concerns creating conditions for stable and self-sustaining peace after civil
war (Cousens and Kumar 2001). Sustainable peace is achieved not only when the issues that
gave rise to civil war are resolved, but also when there are mechanisms and procedures that
allow groups to negotiate and resolve future disputes without resorting to violence (Fortna
2008: 99; Cousens and Kumar 2001). As Doyle and Sambanis (2006) write: ”peacebuilding
is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the source of
present hostilities and build local capacities for conflict resolution” (22). A survey of the
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peacebuiding literature suggests that the challenges confronting countries emerging from
civil war are of two broad types: (i) those related to civil war consequences and legacies;
and (ii) those related to the very causes of the civil war (Barnett and Zurcher 2009).
With respect to the former, security–both ”national” and ”physical” or ”human”–is
arguably the most immediate and critical priority confronting postwar countries (Rubin
2008; Stedman et al. 2002).1 By definition, civil war means that the state has lost its
ability to provide basic services such as law and order to at least a portion of its population,
either because state security institutions are no longer trusted as a credible provider or
because they have been strained to fulfill their functions effectively (Suhrke and Berdal 2012;
Kumar 1998). Therefore reclaiming the ability to provide security credibly is a necessary
prerequisite for sustainable peace, for without it some individuals and groups will continue
to seek protection from private organizations (Woodward 2007; Barnett 2006; Lake and
Rothchild 1996). Furthermore, security is an important prerequisite for recovery in other
domains such as social, economic, political realms (Call and Wyeth 2008; Del Castillo 2008;
Russett and O’Neal 2001).
The second set of challenges facing postwar states concern the ’root causes’ that gave
rise to civil war in the first place. The literature on civil war points to a a wide range
of such causes, including socioeconomic inequalities, political exclusion, accountability and
democracy deficits, among others (Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).2 A common
denominator to all these causes, however, is a state’s loss of legitimacy or right to rule
over at least a segment of the population (Barnett and Zurcher 2009; Woodward 2007).3
There are two aspects to legitimacy issues. The first aspect concerns the loss of ”capacity”
of state institutions to deliver basic public goods and in this sense the challenge is similar
to that of security provision discussed earlier. Here legitimacy loss can be viewed as a
1See also Collier 2011; 2009 for a more general treatment of the importance of security for development
and the inability of fragile states to supply it.
2See Sambanis (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) for a useful review.
3I use legitimacy here broadly in reference ”both to the normative acceptance and expectation by a
political community that the cluster of rules and institutions that compose the state ought to be obeyed, as
well as the degree to which the state is seen as neutral provider of core goods and services” (Call and Wyeth
2008:14).
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consequence of the state’s inability to credibly provide public goods to its citizens (Barnett
2006). presumably the state may regain legitimacy once it has recovered its capacity.
The other side of legitimacy issues is what Woodward (2007) calls the ”moral aspect,”
which goes beyond efficient administration and directly concerns an authority to rule or
in Barnett’s (2006) words, ”the organizing principles that structure the state’s rule over
society.” From this perspective, legitimacy problems are rooted in domestic structures that
tend to be characterized by socioeconomic inequalities, political exclusion, accountability
and democracy deficits, among others, and might be a key contributing factor (if not the
main source) of civil war (United Nations 2012; Krasner 2002; Stedman et al. 2002; Kumar
1998). We know that the state does not necessarily regain legitimacy once the war is over
(Lake 2007). As Barnett (2006) argues: ”Domestic conflict usually erupts in illegitimate
states, and the subsequent conflict rarely invests the postconflict state with legitimacy.”
There is a consensus among peacebuilding scholars and practitioners that sustainable
peace cannot be achieved unless security challenges and legitimacy issues, especially of the
later kind, are resolved (Woodward 2005). This in turn requires having a legitimate state
that is able to mobilize public support from a wider set of actors (Papagianni 2008; Cousens
and Kumar 2001). As Doyle and Sambanis (2006) write: ”to achieve peace and reconcili-
ation...we need some combination of (1) reconcentrating central power (the powerful must
recognize as legitimate–or the legitimate made powerful); (2) increasing state legitimacy
trough participation (elections, powersharing); and (3) raising and allocating economic re-
sources in support of peace...” (30, citing Zartman 1995). Participation and inclusiveness
are especially important because, as the UN Secretary General remarked, ”an inclusive
process builds the confidence among participating parties that their core objectives can be
achieved through negotiation rather than violence. It is also more likely to address the root
causes of conflict...” (United Nations 2012).
In sum, building stable and self-sustaining peace after civil war requires (i) establishing
an effective and functioning state–one that is a credible provider of security and other
essential public goods to the majority of its population; and (ii) establishing legitimacy
of the postwar state in the eyers of society by addressing the causes of its loss and by
putting in place new mechanisms and processes to negotiate and resolve future disputes
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peacefully (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Zartman 1995). It is against this backdrop that many
peacebuilding scholars and practitioners have argued that the most important determinant
of effective peacebuilding is the extent to which an effective and legitimate state exist or can
be established (Call and Wyeth 2008; Barnett 2006; Woodward 2007). But unfortunately
this is what many postwar states do not have. As Orr (2002) writes: ”In many cases
after a conflict, a country has neither a legitimate government in place nor agreement on
how to arrive at a process to determine what constitutes a legitimate government. Even
if a government is in place and many of the country’s citizens deem it legitimate, war and
the attendant chaos often render its ability to deliver services to the population virtually
nonexistent.” Thus the concern is that postwar states are not able to create the conditions of
sustainable peace autonomously, without outside assistance, increasing the likelihood that
conflict will breakout again (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 30; Collier et al. 2006).
Increasingly, the international community has played a central role in an attempt to
makeup for local capacity gaps through peacebuilding interventions (Newman et al. 2009;
Tschirgi 2004). In the last two decades, such operations have been established in war-
ravaged countries–such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Sierra Leone,
among others (United Nations 2008; Tschirgi 2004). In the next section, I briefly discuss
the rationales underlying international involvement in peacebuilding processes and provide a
description of the key functions and activities carried out under the auspices of peacebuilding
interventions, highlighting in particular the micro-foundations and important aspects that
have been overlooked.
2.2 The peacebuilding strategy: rationales and key features
There is no agreed peacekeeping strategy or doctrine (United Nations 2010; Tschirgi 2004).
As Collier et al. (2006) pointed out, however, the various peacebuilding activities carried
out in practice share sufficient commonalities that can be summarized into a few rules of
thumb. In general, two rationales motivate the international community’s interventions in
war-torn societies: (i) to achieve sustainable peace, security priorities need to be addressed
alongside broader issues of legitimacy, governance, democracy and social inclusion, among
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others, through a holistic approach (Cousens and Kumar 2001); and (ii) postwar states
are neither capable nor legitimate to address these issues without outside help (Paris 2004;
Barnett 2006). Peacebuilding interventions are typically–though not always–established as
part of a UN multidimensional peacekeeping operation to provide various forms of assistance
to help stabilize and consolidate peace in war-torn societies (Paris 2010; United Nations
2008).4 They frequently and directly perform functions such as providing security and
other public goods–functions which were once the preserve of domestic governments–while
also helping postwar states regain the capacity and legitimacy necessary to provide these
functions autonomously (Paris 2010; Barnett and Zurcher 2009; Lake 2007).
A key common characteristic of contemporary peacebuilding interventions is that they
are multidimensional, both in terms of a wide range of goals they seek to accomplish and
the array of activities they carry out to achieve prioritized goals (Tschirgi 2004). There are
two elements to this. On one hand, a key premise is that the root causes of conflict that
must be addressed are diverse in their nature and source, and therefore to achieve stable
peace requires ”a multi-faced approach, with attention to a wide range of social, economic,
and institutional needs” (Newman et al. 2009). On the other hand, peacebuilding inter-
ventions are multifaceted, encompassing both a military component that provides security
functions–such as monitoring ceasefires or conducting the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration for former combatants–and a civilian component that carries out a wide range
of activities such as repatriating and resettling refugees and internally displaced popula-
tions; organizing elections; creating job opportunities; strengthening state institutions such
as courts and the police, among others (Paris 2010; Russett and O’Neal 2001; Boutros-Ghali
1995).5
At the abstract level, the different functions and activities carried out under the auspices
of peacebuilding operations are of two broad categories. One type concerns functions and
activities that are primarily designed to alter the incentives of the local actors through a
wide range of threats and inducements (Fortna 2008; Stedman et al. 2002). A key feature
4See Boutros-Ghali 1995 for a distinction between UN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles.
5For a full listing and detailed description of various peacebuilding components under UN auspices and
specific activities carried out under each component, see United Nations 2008; 2003).
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of these functions is that they rarely target domestic political and social arrangements
directly or attempt to change actors’ preferences. Rather their primary objective is to
mitigate security threats in the environment so that local parties have a space to work out
solutions to their own problems (Doyle and Sambanis (2006; Russett and O’Neal 2001).
Included in this type are traditional peacekeeping functions such as observing ceasefires
between armed groups or providing security through disarmament and demobilization of
former combatants.6 These strategies also tend to operate at the elite level, where key
decisions are made (Fetherstone and Nordstrom 1995). Doyle and Sambanis (2006) refer to
these functions as facilitative because tend to be characterized by low levels of intrusion on
domestic sovereignty or arrangements. For this reason, international activities or functions
of this type will be referred to as status quo-preserving strategies (SPs).
The second category encompasses functions and activities that are more intrusive in
and explicitly designed to challenge domestic political and social arrangements. These
functions cut across a wide range of dimensions–from security to economic development, to
governance and rule of law, among others–and tend to have broader aims to influence not
just incentives of local actors, but also to change their preferences(Newman et al. 2009;
Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Cousens and Kumar 2001). While diverse, the functions and
activities under this category share one key common denominator: they are grounded in
a conceptual framework that explicitly emphasizes that promotion of democratic norms
and liberal values (Newman et al. 2009; Lake 2007; Paris 2010; 2004). As Barnett et
al. (2009) noted, ”the core of the liberalization processes favored by peacebuilders is the
building of a democratic, non-violent polity.” Along a similar reasoning Tschirgi (2004)
writes that ”promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of
law, property rights, good governance, and neoliberal economics have become part and
parcel of the international peacebuilding strategy.” Doyle and Sambanis (2006) refer to
peace operations that entail these functions as transformative due to their high degree of
intrusiveness on domestic sovereignty and sociopolitical arrangements. I call these functions
6Arguably, a prime target of these strategies, especially military peacekeeping, is insecurity, broadly
defined to encompass military activities among armed groups, which has long been recognized a key source
of political participation problem (Collier and Vicente 2011; Russett and O’Neal 2001.)
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status-quo transforming strategies (Ramsbotham et al. 2011).
The logic underlying the current peacebuilding strategy is that SPs are necessary to
achieve stability, which is a prerequisite for all other peacebuilding activities (Call and
Wyeth 2008). STs, on the other hand, are key to resolving the root causes underlying the
conflict, thereby ”helping to build long-term foundations for for stable, legitimate govern-
ment” (14-15). From this vintage point, STs are the essence of contemporary peacebuilding
interventions, as they provide the mechanisms to remove the root causes of conflict–the
ultimate goal. As Barnett and Zurcher (2009) write:
Peacebuilders seek to remove the root causes of violence and create this
pacific disposition by investing these postconflict societies with various qualities,
including democracy in order to reduce the tendency toward arbitrary power and
give voice to all segments of society; the rule of law in order to reduce human
rights violations; a market economy free from corruption in order to discourage
individuals from believing that the surest path to fortune is by capturing the
state; conflict management tools; and a culture of tolerance and respect.
Part of democracy’s appeal to peacebuilders is that it provides contending social forces
with a forum to address the root causes of conflict and to articulate interests and resolve
disputes without resorting to violence, thereby putting the goal of self-sustaining peace
within reach (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Reilly 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 19).7 In
addition, democratization is central to the creation of legitimate political authority, which
is presumed to be a prerequisite for stability (Call and Wyeth 2008; Zartman 1995). As
Barnett (2006) argues: ”In recognition of the intimate connection between legitimacy and
stability, international peacebuilders have pushed for elections and liberal values, believing
that this represents the surest and best way to invest the state with legitimacy.” In short,
7As Kofi Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), remarked: ”At the center of
virtually every civil conflict is the issue of the State and its power–who controls it, and how it is used. No
conflict can be resolved without answering those questions, and nowadays the answers almost always have
to be democratic ones, at least in form...Democracy is practiced in many ways, and none of them is perfect.
But at its best, it provides a method for managing and resolving disputes peacefully, in an atmosphere of
mutual trust” (cited in Jarstad and Sisk 2008: 4).
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democratization is the centerpiece of peacebuilding efforts in war-torn societies (Paris 2010;
Newman et al. 2009; Barnett and Zurker 2009).
Operationally, both SPs and STs have typically been targeted primarily at the macro-
level–that is, the formal national level institutions and processes–such as rebuilding the
capacity of the central government, making constitutions and supporting elections–and the
elite, especially those formerly associated with military factions (Autessere 2010; Manning
2003). Part of the rationale for this is that sustainable peace depends on establishing a le-
gitimate state that can pursue peacebuilding efforts autonomously and avoid the resurgence
of violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Tschirgi 2004; Orr 2002). In contrast, until recently,
the societal or micro-level has not been the focused of peacebuilding action (Maning 2003).
However, a central premise underlying these activities and liberal transformations they aim
to achieve is that the masses will embrace and enforce liberal reforms even if these are not
in the interest of the elites (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Russett and O’Neal 2001; Pecey and
Stanley 2001). As Stedman (2002) remarked, the power of the transformative strategy is
that it appeals ”beyond elites to the masses who want to make peace and need assistance
in changing political and social institutions” (in Stedman et al. 2002: 17). In other words,
while the focus of the current peacebuilding approach is at the macro-level, its viability rests
on strong micro-foundations. Proper understanding of these micro-foundations require: (i)
understanding the micro-level implications of peacebuilding initiatives at the macro-level;
and (ii) ascertaining the efficacy of initiatives carried out at the grassroots level.
We poorly understand either of these two issues. Nonetheless, given that the founda-
tions of liberal peacebuilding–and thus the viability of the current strategy–rests on the
presumption that citizens in war-torn societies will embrace liberal norms and values, a
closer look at the micro-level implications of this strategy is warranted.
2.3 Micro-foundations of the peacebuilding strategy
Two questions underlie the issue of micro-foundations of the current peacebuilding strategy:
(i) Do barriers to sustainable peace at the macro-level have the same level of significance at
the micro-level? And (ii) can peacebuilding interventions designed to address the root causes
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of conflict have the same effects at macro- and micro-levels? I argue that the assumptions
and logics underlying the current peacebuilding strategy are, at best, incomplete, owing in
part to false monoliths about local contexts and to failure to structure interventions in a way
that aligns local people’s preferences and interests with the reforms being promoted. Specif-
ically, as with peacebuilding dynamics at the macro-level, conventional wisdom frequently
views social structures–broadly defined to encompass customary systems, institutions of
power and authority, cultural practices and tradition–as illegitimate and conflict prone and
therefore deserving of wholesale reform (Fanthorpe 2006; Pouligny 2005). But there is, in
actuality, significant variation in existing social structures from setting to setting, as well
as in local people’s orientations to them (Sawyer 2006; Gizelis’ and Kosek 2005; Chopra
and Hohe 2004). This suggests different local settings may be differentially susceptible to
change, especially change sought from outside, implying different patterns of response to
peacebuilding interventions.
With respect to the first question, a survey of the peacebuilding literature suggests a
positive answer. The barriers to peace–both security challenges in the immediate aftermath
of war and the root causes of conflict–have the same salience at macro- and micro-levels.
The issue of postwar security challenges and gaps in addressing these challenges has received
a great deal of attention (Muggah 2011; Rubin 2008; Call and Stanley 2002). The limited
reach and penetration of the state into society means that its capacity to provide security
to its populations and maintain public order is often weak or nonexistent. In many cases,
Tschirgi (2004) argues, large-scale violence may have ended, but only to have ”mutation of
political violence into criminal and common violence.” As experiences in countries such as
DRC and Liberia suggest, pervasive insecurities are perhaps most severe in local communi-
ties, especially in rural areas where the state and security institutions are less likely to have
adequate presence (Mushi 2013; Fayemi 2005). Thus in addition to reforming the state’s
security institutions, peacekeepers are typically deployed in various parts of the country to
provide security to local communities, at least until the government is able to take over
(United Nations 2008).
As for the root causes, the view that democracy deficit and legitimacy problems are
the root of conflicts, both nationally and locally, is popular in many accounts of postwar
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processes (Ponzio 2011; Donais 2009).8 In Sierra Leone, for example, a number of schol-
ars (e.g., Jackson 2006; Richards 2005; Hanlon 2005) have argued that civil war was a
form of revolt by resentful young farmers against the undemocratic and abusive custom-
ary authority.9 ”The lack of opportunity for public debate of these issues,” according to
Napiier (2004), ”meant that they were neither managed nor resolved, the consequence be-
ing increasing social tension, eventually resulting in conflict.” In addition, scholars tend
to point to certain cultural traditions and customs as the source of legitimacy problems.
The claims is that some social structures such as those favoring patriarchal leadership may
be inherently unequal and abusive–dominated by male elders, and the exclusion of women,
youth and minorities–or embody values that are inimical to universally shared human rights
standards (Ponzio 2011; Hanlon 2005; Richards 2005).
Thus, in response to the second question, contemporary peacebuilding interventions
rely on the same strategies they use to address the root causes both at the macro-level
and micro-level, namely STs, democratization in particular, the assumption being that
local communities face the same capacity problems as the state to address these problem
autonomously (Sawyer 2005). In other words, peacebuilders attempt to democratize local
structures and institutions in an effort to make them more inclusive and legitimate, at
least as part of broader efforts to create a legitimate state. An array of democratic reform
programs have been used to this end. In some cases, peacebuilders engage local structures
and institutions directly, often as part of broader, legally mandated reforms. This was
8This despite an emergent line of research (e.g., Autesserre 2010; Kalyvas 2003) challenging this view.
As Autesserre argued forcefully in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the causes and
other drivers of local conflicts were not the same as those driving the civil war. Locally, conflict over land
and political power were much more salient, whereas top-town causes included governance issues, but also
regional pressures.
9Anthropologist Paul Richards documented numerous and detailed accounts of the abuses rural Sierra
Leoneans suffered at the hand of customary authority before the war’ including levying ”heavy and unjust
fines,” often with customary law or other local traditions serving as a pretext; forcing people to work on
chief’s farms without pay; escalating minor disputes; using intimidation and violence to extort compliance;
excluding women and youth from participating in community affairs; forced young girls to marry against
their will or setting arbitrarily high dowries that it was impossible for young men to marry and so forth
(Richard 2005).
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the case of the ”Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme,” carried out by the United
Kingdom’s Department of Foreign and International Development (DFID) (Fanthorpe et
al. 2002). In others, reforms entail setting up new governance structures that are supposed
to operate democratically, without attempting to challenge existing structures directly. This
is the case with many Community Driven Development programs such as the ”Tuungane
Program” carried out by the International Rescue Committee in the DRC (Humphreys et al.
2013) or the ”GoBifo” Program in Sierra Leone supported by the Government of Japan and
the World Bank (Casey et al. 2013). The theory behind these initiatives is that ”exposure
to democratic procedures and accountability practices leads to domestic adoption even in
the absence of changes in structural social relations” (Humphreys et al. 2013).
However, the most common intervention to promote democracy and liberal values at
the grassroots level is democratic education targeting the citizens directly on a wide range
of issues–such as nationhood and citizenship; human rights and rule of law; democratic
governance and political participation; the electoral process, social cohesion, among others
(Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Stedman et al. 2002). Part of the aim in carrying out democratic
education at the grassroots level is to bring to the political scene, through the process of po-
litical participation, a new set of actors–voters, political parties, civil society groups–who can
provide a democratic counterweight to the elites (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 313; Pouligny
2006).10 As Russett and O’Neal (2001) noted in the case of Mozambique, democratic ed-
ucation activities carried out by the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (UNUMOZ)
were instrumental in the emergence of an electorate that stood up to the elite: ”a politically
aware and mobilized electorate becomes an effective counterbalance to the elite. This is,
after all, the essence of democracy (210).”
Theoretically, democratic education activities operate a coordination mechanism to mo-
bilize citizens for collective action (Collier and Vicente 2011)–a significant point since the
greater the number of people mobilizing for political action, the lower the individual cost to
10Such was the aim of the Timap for Justice Program, which offered free justice services in communities
across Sierra Leone in an attempt to promote access to justice and peaceful conflict resolutions (Dale 2009).
Trained paralegals use ”a combination of mediation, negotiation, education, advocacy, and occasionally
litigation to attempt to resolve disputes, promote community activism and agency, and develop equitable
and responsive institutions” (ibid).
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each (Kuran 1989).11 Beyond mobilization, democratic education can also change prefer-
ences or reorder normative priorities by instilling new liberal values–such as tolerance and
non-violence, that underpin liberal democracy (Belloni 2008; Paris 2004)–thereby raising
the value of their political beliefs to such an extent that they become willing to take costly
political action to defend those beliefs. The resulting increase in political participation
might in turn increase state legitimacy (Papagianni 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2008: 30).
Clearly, the viability of the current peacebuilding strategy as an effective mechanism for
establishing self-sustaining peace in war-torn societies hinges on the prospects of successful
democratization, which in turn rests on the premise that mass publics in these societies will
rebuke existing structures and embrace liberal norms and values (Stedman et al. 2002).
Part of the reasoning for this is that existing social structures genuinely lack legitimacy, or
may have suffered severe damage during wartime, so that if given the opportunity, local
people will embrace a viable alternative. As Moore et al. (2003) write in their recent report
recommending liberal reforms in postwar Sierra Leone: ”...Catastrophic changes prime
society for major institutional transformation. Society is in a plastic state, like half melted
wax out of which anything can be moulded. The war has provided an opportunity for Sierra
Leoneans to rethink fundamental issues relating to their national dynamics and identity”
(cited in Fanthorpe 2006). Moreover, there seems to be abiding belief in the intrinsic
peacefulness of liberal norms and values, making them universally appealing, especially to
populations traumatized by violence and civil war (Roberts 2008; Clapham 2000).
In considering the above discussion, the promise of the current peacebuilding approach
depends on achieving liberal transformations both at the national and local levels. To
this end, peacebuilders typically carry out a wide range of STs encompassing a variety of
activities such as civic education and information campaigns. These activities aim to: (i)
either transform or displace local structures presumed to be the locus of root causes of
conflict; and or (ii) promote new liberal norms and values. Arguably, these peacebuilding
11This is the analytical angle that Collier and Vicente use in their Nigeria study on the effects of civic
education campaigns on political violence and electoral participation. The ideas is that by mobilizing for
electoral activities in sufficiently large numbers communities will be able to deter or withstand aggressions
from would-be violence perpetrators.
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initiatives have a dual aim: both to transform societal actors at all levels and to increase the
state’s legitimacy. Whether either or both aims are achieved, however, depends critically
on citizens’ embracing liberal norms and values being promoted. Viewed from a micro-level
perspective, such a vision and strategy of building stable peace can seem too ambitious and
perhaps unrealistic.
A growing number of scholars and practitioners have been critical of the current peace-
building strategy in general and some of these can be extended to the micro-level.12 My
concern, however, is with another set of critical issues, namely important variation in local
contexts where peacebuilding interventions take place, which have been overlooked in the
current peacebuilding strategy (Sawyer 2005). I defined local contexts or settings broadly
to refer to a wide range of factors related to local structures, cultures, institutions, and
histories as well as the socioeconomic and political dynamics (Richmond 2011; Autesserre
2010; Gizelis and Kosek 2005). Variation in local settings is important because it can help
clarify the conditions under which the local population might be predisposed to rebuke ex-
isting structures and institutions targeted for change and/or to embrace new liberal norms
and values being promoted. Thus our understanding of local context is important for our
understanding of the performance and outcomes of peacebuilding interventions.
2.4 The missing link
An implicit presumption in the current peacebuilding approach is that formal state institu-
tions and mechanisms are essential for the provision of critical public goods such as security,
accountability and legitimacy, among others. As a result, greater focus of peacebuilding
12For instance, some scholars have raised questions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of promot-
ing liberal democracy in polarized societies (Paris 2004); the top-down orientation that does not sufficiently
incorporate consultation with local stakeholders (Newman et al. 2009); potential tensions inherent peace-
building goals and strategies–such as between security and democracy (e.g., Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Call
and Cook 2003 ); between short-term and long-term measures; and between highly intrusive international
presence and unobtrusive presence; between external and indigenous peacebuilding approaches (Curtis 2012
and Dzinesa; McGinty 2008b); and between statebuilding and peacebuilding (Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris
and Sisk 2008)–to name a few.
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efforts in war-torn societies has been on resurrecting or creating for the very first time for-
mal institutions and mechanisms that can provide these goods (Barnett 2006), overlooking
the potential of non-formal systems or actors, including traditional and informal systems
(Sawyer 2006; 2005).13 Yet experiences in many war-torn countries suggest that this as-
sumption is not always warranted. The vacuum left behind by the decay of the state tends
to be filled quickly by a variety of non-state actors, some legitimate others less so, who step
in to provide public or private goods such as access to justice, security, health and education
(Ponzio 2011; Harper 2011).14
In the case of Afghanistan, for example, Brick (2008) argued that despite persistent
weaknesses of the central government a mix of customary organizations–from village execu-
tives (maliks), village councils (shuras/jirgas), and religious arbiters (mullahs/imams)–have
provided, under certain conditions, public goods to the local communities. Mushi (2013)
makes a similar observation in the case of DRC. He argues that a web of multi-layered
networks in the South Kivu province–from traditional systems to militias to social clubs of
various kinds–”continued to provide a degree of governance response after the central state
apparatus disappeared.” Moreover, as a growing number of studies revealed (Sandefur and
Siddiqi 2013; Harper 2011; Dale 2009), these traditional and informal systems and mecha-
nisms enjoy high levels of legitimacy, even in cases where rival formal systems might exist
13The terms ”traditional institutions/systems” and ”informal institution/systems” are often used inter-
changeably, as I do in this dissertation, and are inter-related in practice. But they do not mean the same
thing. In Webber’s conceptualization of authority, traditional institutions are contrasted with ”modern” in-
stitutions in the sense that the former lack complexity and rationalization, while informal institution usually
connotes shared expectation and shared values.
14As the UN Secretary General remarked in a recent report, ”When conflict has eroded a State’s core
functionality, local organizations, non-State actors and informal institutions are often essential in providing
security, delivering services and building trust. Informal institutions– comprising socially shared rules that
are created, communicated and enforced outside formal channels–can be remarkably resilient during or
after crises and can coexist with, or even be more influential than, formal institutions...The building of
informal institutions is frequently neglected in the immediate aftermath of conflict, yet it is at this level
where communities may most effectively manage disputes and prevent conflict from escalating into violence”
(United Nations 2012).
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(Isser et al. 2009).15
My purpose here is not to suggest that all local settings have traditional or informal
systems that provide public goods in the absence of the state or that such systems always
provide the necessary micro-foundation for self-sustaining peace. (That will be to swing the
pendulum far into the other direction.) Rather, my claim is that there is need to recognize
important variation in local contexts because such variation may shape the performance and
outcomes of peacebuilding interventions. Where traditional and informal systems do not
exist or have little utility for the local population (e.g., legitimacy; public goods provision),
a case can be made that outside efforts to displace them or to create new arrangements
will not meet significant local resistance. However, where traditional and informal systems
do exist and provide public goods, peacebuilding efforts to displace them or to bypass
them by importing new institutions and norms can be counterproductive. For example,
Hohe (2003 2002) argues that peacebuilding efforts to promote liberal reforms in East
Timor were undermined by a clash between international paradigms of legitimate power
and authority under the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)
and the existing indigenous paradigm of traditional political authority that prevails among
the majority of the population at the local level. Ponzio (2011) echoes this argument in
the context of Afghanistan, pointing to a widening gap between local and international
conceptions of legitimate power as a source of the international community’s faillure to
establish democratic authority. He writes, ”If the wide divergence of views is ignored or
deemed irreconcilable, it can result in a weak transition that is insensitive to local political
and social realities.”16
15This is not peculiar to post-conflict settings, however. Recent surveys of traditional systems in a wide
range of African countries revealed that these systems enjoy considerable legitimacy and support from the
majority of their people than local government officials, with 58% of respondents agreeing that ”the amount
of influence of traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase.” Only 8% of
respondents felt it should decrease (Acemoglu et al. 2013, citing Logan 2011; 2009).
16Simply put, it is not a given that in every post-war scenario people will reject existing structures and
customs and welcome alternative social arrangements as offering prospects for a better life. Fanthorpe
(2006) makes this very point in the case of Sierra Leone, arguing that while international interveners have
targeted the customary chieftaincy system for wholesale reforms on the ground that they are ”irredeemably
oppressive” towards the rural poor, many communities opposed such reforms because they ”continue to
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More generally, my claim is that pre-existing differences in local settings can shape
the performance and outcomes of peacebuilding interventions, especially those that seek
to promote democratic norms and liberal values. Indeed, in a recent study examining the
effects of UNMIL on political participation, Mvukiyehe (2013a) showed that while UNMIL
did have positive average effects on political participation, these effects displayed a great
deal of heterogeneity across a wide range of indicators of different setting types. Table
2.1 below shows how UNMIL effects varied across a wide range of factors that capture
meaningful differences in local settings such as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, levels of
education, civil war-affectedness, among others.17
As shown in the table, some factors seem to have a negative interaction with UNMIL,
while others seem to have a positive interaction. For instance, the size of the effect seems
to be bigger in heterogeneous than in homogenous communities; in more literate commu-
nities than less literate ones; and in communities where the local chiefs do not belong to
traditional secret societies than those in which the chiefs do belong to such societies. The
differences in the other two measures (lost relatives in war and proportion of foreigners)
are mainly in terms of magnitude. Either way, these differential interactions beg for an
explanation and further systematic inquiry into the relationship between interventions and
contextual factors. This quest is especially important given that the various peacebuilding
activities may elicit different sensitivities and responses in different local contexts. Thus,
it is important not only to understand meaningful differences in local settings, but also to
understand how these differences matter for different intervention types. From this vantage
point, the central research question is: How do local different local contexts in terms of
existing structures and institutions respond to different peacebuilding strategies?
In the next chapter I draw on a wide range of social science theories to identify meaning-
value customary authority as a defence against the abuse of bureaucratic power.”
17The table summarizes results of multivariate OLS estimations of the interaction effects between UNMIL
and a number of contextual factors hypothesized to be meaningful. (+ sign indicates a positive interaction
and–sign an negative one): ethnic heterogeneity (+); presence of poro (i.e., male-dominated) traditional
society (-); proportion of foreigners (+); proportion of literate dwellers (+) and proportion of households
that lost a family member during the war (+). I have recoded each factor as a dummy in order to analyze
effects across higher and lower values of a particular measure. See Mvukiyehe 2013a for more details.
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Table 2.1: Heterogeneity of UNMIL effects on political participation
Yes No
Ethnic heterogeneity? .30** .34***
(.14) (.13)
N= 679 N= 424
Chef belongs to secret society? .16 .39***
(.15) (.15)
N= 642 N= 461
Chief was elected? .12 .72
(.11) (.17)
N = 659 N= 399
Proportion of foreigners? .37*** .31***
(.15) (.12)
N= 367 N= 724
Lost relative in war? .30*** .30**
(.11) (.12)
N=551 N= 498
Higher literacy levels? .40*** .10
(.15) (.12)
N=509 N= 594
Note:The effects on each outcome and variable of interest were estimated in separate
regressions, with same set of predictors as in the specifications on individual outcome indicators.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sampling locations: *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
ful variation in local contexts and to formulate hypotheses about when and how differences
in local contexts mediate the influence of peacebuilding strategies on democratic outcomes
at the grassroots level.
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Chapter 3
A Microfoundational Theory of
Peacebuilding
This chapter develops a theoretical account linking peacebuilding strategies to democratic
outcomes in different context types. I first introduce the concept of cultural strength, in-
trinsic to the distinction critical to my claims, between culturally established settings char-
acterized by particular features associated with stability and predictability in patterns of
social interactions, and culturally fragmented settings lacking in such features. The dif-
ference between these settings highlights challenges to peacebuilding and raises the issue
of whether specific strategies are appropriate to various local contexts. After laying the
conceptual foundation, I argue that the strength of an existing culture plays a key role in
moderating the influence of peacebuilding strategies on democratic outcomes at the grass-
roots level. In established settings, strategies that seek to transform the status-quo order
(such as democratic education) will likely meet with local resistance and be ineffective,
whereas less intrusive strategies (such as peacekeeping) will tend to have positive effects by
working through more subtle channels (e.g., elite socialization). In contrast, in fragmented
settings, neither status quo-transforming strategies nor status quo-preserving strategies will
be likely to trigger local resistance, but only the former will likely have a positive influence
on democratic outcomes.
The chapter is organized in two main sections. I start in section one by clarifying
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the concept of culture in order to appreciate its role in enabling or hampering political
and social change. I also introduce the concept of ”cultural strength” and discuss its
implications for the prospect of political change. Section two discusses implications of
cultural strength for peacebuilding interventions and formulates testable hypotheses about
how different strategies influence democratic outcomes in different context types.
3.1 The Role of Culture in the Process of Political and Social
Change
3.1.1 Nature and importance of culture
According to Rubinstein et al. (2008), culture ”consists of learned systems of meaning,
communicated by means of natural language and other symbols systems, having represen-
tational, directive, and affective functions, and capable of creating cultural entities and
particular sense of reality.” Along similar lines, Vertzberger (1990) writes, ”Culture repre-
sents a unified set of ideas that are shared by the members of a society and that establish a
set of shared premises, values, expectations, and action predispositions among the members
of the nation that as a whole constitute the national style” (267). The literature differen-
tiates between ”surface cultural differences,” which manifest at the level of symbols (e.g.,
verbal and non-verbal gestures), and ”deep cultural differences,” which emphasize explicit
aspects such as ritual practices or ceremonies or the cognitive and affective structures and
processes that motivate action (idem; Rubinstein 2004; Duffey 2000; Swidler 1986). The
latter involve internalized and shared understandings that people use to interpret their own
experiences and the experiences of others.
Significantly, culture provides a set of functions that organizes patterns of behaviors with
respect to individuals and social groups (Coyne 2008; Sen 2004; Swidler 1986). Sociologists
and anthropologists emphasize that cultural experiences and orientations form the basis of
valued social relationships, intrinsically or for instrumental reasons (Rubenstein 2008 2003;
Lin 2001; Bourdieu 1990). Economic studies (e.g., Platteau and Abraham 2002; Chwe 2003
2000) argue that culture acts as an information network, helping to facilitate coordination
and enable collective action by establishing common expectations, providing a solid platform
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for future dealings. Moreover, as culture allows similarly oriented individuals to better
understand each other and develop common expectations about future interactions, it brings
about stable relationships that constrain–but do not necessarily determine–the behaviors
of actors (Rubinstein 2008). Culture ”provides the floor or background of meaning on
which actors can construct other meanings and interpret each other,” thus enabling ”actors
within a community to understand each other without having to make everything explicit”
(Crawford 2002, 68-69). These incredibly important functions are sometimes so omnipresent
as to be taken for granted.1 Taking this to the next step, Wildvasky (1987) contends that
culture provides ”social filters”; when a new development occurs, people from cultures with
strong norms are likely to anticipate its effects on their existing way of life, and respond
predictably, because they draw cues from the same cultural filters or by observing what
like-minded people do.
Then again, cultures do not always fulfill these functions, raising the difficult question
of precisely when culture does shape behaviors. Constructivist scholars (e.g., Wendt 1999
[2004]) attribute the significance of culture on behaviors to the extent of shared knowledge.
Wendt, for example, argues that in the absence of a high degree of shared understanding, the
distribution of knowledge will be reduced to private beliefs, and is therefore inconsequential
(139-164). Wendt’s argument hints at the notion of cohesiveness among group members,
which also implies rigidity of a shared culture. Crawford (2002) makes this point more
explicitly, arguing that ”highly cohesive groups or cultures that are isolated from outside
influences and who hold rigid, self-reinforcing standards of proof for the adoption of new
beliefs may be most resistant to change.” (74). Along similar lines, An-Naim (1991) argues
that liberal norms such as human rights can only be adopted if there is a sufficient cultural
legitimacy for the proposed standards. Where these diverse scholars all agree is in their
suggestion that group members who share strong social ties and strongly value their culture
are more likely to resist incorporation of new norms and values. Thus cultural strength,
defined in terms of the extent to which a culture is established or shared among members of
1This point is well-captured in Kier’s (2000) discussion of the role of culture in shaping military doctrines,
which argues that culture contains ”many assumptions that are rarely debated and seem so basic that it
appears impossible to imagine things could be different” (cited in Crawford 2002: 65).
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a particular social group, is the epicenter of cultural influence on behaviors. To be specific,
I use the notion of ”cultural strength” to draw a conceptual distinction between cultures
that do and and not provide the afore-referenced functions to their members.2
The former (i.e. cultures that provide the valued functions) are typically associated
with peculiar features such as such as strong norms, which increase common knowledge,
enhance coordination and serve as focal point around which expectations converge (Chwe
2003 2000; Lin 2001; Hardin 1995); strong social ties, which constrain individuals to behave
in ways that are consistent with the prevailing goals or norms of the group (Ellemers et al.
1999; Wildavisky 1987); and institutional arrangement characterized by fewer, congruent
and internally coherent institutions, which generate regularities in social action and provide
a reliable guide for behaviors (Clemens and Cook 1999; Clemens 1997). As a result, patterns
of social interactions take on a high level of predictability and settle into a stable, socially
desirable equilibrium in which outcomes such as cooperation and successful collective action
prevail (Swiddler 2001). I refer to such cultures as ”culturally established local settings” or
simply ”established cultures” to emphasize the fact that stability is an important feature
of these settings.
By contrast, cultures that lack these peculiar features will typically be unable to provide
members with the valued functions and members’ utility for these cultures will be quite low.
Specifically, these settings tend to have severe information asymmetries, both vertical (i.e.
between the elites and the masses) and horizontal (among the masses themselves), which in
turn make cooperation difficult by preventing coordination and commitments. Platteau and
Abraham (2002) characterize these deficiencies as ”community imperfections,” where the
existing cultural resources lack adequate problem-solving capacities (low-cost information,
frequent interpersonal interactions, etc.). I refer to such cultures as ”culturally fragmented
local settings” or simply ”fragmented cultures” to emphasize their proneness to instability.3
2My argument about cultural strength makes no claims about ”cultural content.” In other words, the
difference I draw between established cultures and fragmented cultures does not imply that one has ”cultural
values that are consistent with liberal values, while the other has cultural values that are inimical to liberal
values. The main difference is in the degree to which group members value whatever system of values prevail
and there can be strong and weak valuation under both value systems.
3This distinction borrows from Swidler’s (1986) notion of ”settled” and ”unsettled” cultures. As with
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My claim is that these differences are important because they suggest different degrees
of predispositions or susceptibility to change, as I argue below.
3.1.2 Cultural strength’s implications for political and social change
As with any other social choice problem, political change entails two types of collective
action: (i) deciding whether to maintain or reject the status quo; and (ii) deciding on
an alternative arrangement (Lohman 2000). Different local settings not only have different
levels of predisposition to change–as a result of differential orientations to the status quo–but
also different capacities to undertake the actions that are necessary to achieve any socially
desired change, which suggests different challenges and opportunities as well as different
processes for political change. By definition, local settings that are culturally established
tend to be satisfied with the status quo, making any rapid shift to a new social arrangement
very unlikely. Change is possible, however, provided that it is part of an organic process of
social adaptation. Local settings that are culturally fragmented, for their part, are always
on the border line of different social arrangements. But pervasive incapacities make it
difficult to converge on a new order that is both stable and socially desirable.
3.1.2.1 Prospect of change in established settings
Abraham and Platteau (2010) argue that culturally established settings are by definition
close-knit groups, wherein ”members interact in a free atmosphere of trustful cooperation
based on well-accepted social norms.” They operate as informational networks and pro-
vide multilateral reputational mechanisms, enabling patterns of social interactions to settle
into a stable and socially desirable equilibrium in which outcomes such as cooperation and
my description of ”established cultures,” she uses ”settled cultures” to refer to a situation in which a set of
cultural materials has gained widespread and often unquestioned supremacy among individuals, and groups
are satisfied with existing cultural materials to the point of taking them for granted; whereas both her account
of ”unsettled cultures” and my own view of ”fragmented cultures” refer to those settings in which no one
single culture has gained supremacy among individuals, so that groups may be receptive to alternatives.
My analysis differs from Swidler’s in that I focus on how these different initial cultural conditions influence
(or not) adoption of outside cultural values, whereas she focuses on the causal connections between various
cultural aspects (not just the initial conditions) and behaviors.
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successful collective action prevail (Bowles and Gintis (20044 Swedler (2001) echoes this
argument and contends that cultural practices such as rituals not only enable group mem-
bers to reveal information about each other and expectations for collective action, but also
reinforce the bonds between them. Both this problem-solving capacity and its associated
stability in patterns of interactions are key sources of resilience in culturally established
settings.
Predictably, such culturally established settings are generally less susceptible to change,
particularly if the changes are externally driven and entail abandoning some aspect of the
existing culture. This is especially true when these settings have normatively unappealing
characteristics (at least as viewed from the outside) that motivate the need for change in
the first place. Thus Bowles and Gintis (2004) characterize established cultural settings as
”parochial,” not just in terms of harboring segregation tendencies toward other communi-
ties, but also in the sense of viewing members of stranger communities with suspicion and
considering them potential enemies (Platteau and Abraham 2002; Bourdieu 1990). The
very features that make them appealing to group members (ease of contract enforcement,
low cost information, etc.) often come at the cost of restricted interactions with stranger
groups. Abraham and Platteau (2004) make this very point with respect to the prospects
of community driven development (CDD) interventions in close-knit tribal communities, ar-
guing that ”problems unavoidably arise when external values and objectives, the fulfillment
of which is a condition of success of the new participatory approach, come into conflict with
the local culture” (in Rao and Walton 2004: 212).
It is clear, then, that externally-promoted political change will likely be resisted in estab-
lished cultural settings. However, the source and patterns of resistance depend on whether
one assumes the ”values” approach or ”tool kit” approach to cultural influences. From the
perspective of Swidler’s (1986) ”tool kit” approach, change is necessarily costly because the
”new line of conduct” requires giving up already accumulated ”cultural resources” and the
establishment of a new resource base (and new skills) not readily available.5 As she writes,
4See, for instance, Abraham and Platteau’s (2010) discussion of how consensus-seeking norms in close-knit
tribal societies enhance collective action.
5Thus, for Swidler, resistance to change is a material or economic decision, rather than the result of an
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”People do not readily take advantage of new structural opportunities, which would require
them to abandon established ways of life. This is not because they cling to cultural values,
but because they are reluctant to abandon familiar strategies of action for which they have
the cultural equipment.” She also refers to prevailing cultural schemas as ”myths collective
schemas,” which are difficult to shift from because it is costly to find alternative myths
(Swidler 2013). She writes:
Such collective myths–really formulas or codes for describing group formation–
are very hard to change even in the face of repeated failure or other contradictory
experiences because it takes powerful, shared collective experience–a cathartic
convulsion or a ritual transformation in Sewell’s (1996) formulation–to enact an
alternative vision and constitute a new myth, to signal publicly that everyone
knows that everyone knows that there is now a new basis on which people can
act together to address collective problems. (in Hall et al. 2013: 338).
From a values standpoint, the source of resistance to change in established cultures is the
fact that shared values are themselves seen as distinct and salient.6 This in turn influences
how people perceive members of an out-group, or how they may react negatively to external
influences–such as information or behavior–perceived to challenge their shared values. As
Ashforth and Mael (1989) point out, a basic postulate of social identity theory is that
members of an in-group with strong social ties will respond defensively or even in a hostile
manner when shared values of the group are perceived to be threatened (Branscombe et
al. 1999). In other words, attempts to change (or denigrate) strongly shared values lead to
threat perceptions” or ”cultural threats,” which social identity and conflict theorists define
as perception by members of an ingroup that outgroup members are violating, or do not
support, their system of values, norms and beliefs (Mackie and Smith 2002; Stephan et al.
2000; Stephan and Stephan 2000).7
emotional attachments to cultural values. Many other studies (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 2004; Plateau and
Abraham 2004 2002) follow a similar line of reasoning.
6 This is a perspective emphasized in the socio-psychological literature, in particular social identity
theories (e.g.; Stephan and Renfro 2002; Schmitt and Branscombe 2002; Turner and Reynolds 2001).
7See Riek et al. (2006) for a review of this voluminous literature.
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In short, from a ”values approach,” resistance to change in established settings stems
from the fact that people do ”cling” to their shared cultures, which are valued intrinsically.
However, the argument here is not that established cultural settings resist change under
all circumstances. Dynamism and adaptability have long been recognized as an impor-
tant quality of many cultures. As Nussbaum (1999) writes, ”Cultures are dynamic, and
change is a very basic element in all of them.” Wildvasky (1987) echoes this statement,
pointing out that individuals frequently test cultural constraints, ”reinforcing them if they
prove satisfactory in practice, modifying or rejecting them, when possible, if unsatisfactory.”
But this is a slow and organic process of cultural adaptation to newer situations, and any
changes resulting from it are seldom the product of conscious efforts. Thus what is wor-
risome about culturally established settings is not that they are resilient to change under
all circumstances, but rather that they may not be able to absorb change quickly, in part
because they simply do not imagine living under alternative arrangements. The uneasiness
created by the very thought of change, without preparation to embrace such change, is what
Swidler (1986) refers to as ”cultural shock.”8 The key to successfully promoting political
change in local settings that are culturally established, therefore, may depend on the ability
of peacebuilders to work through existing structures and institutions (Swidler 2013; 2009).
3.1.2.2 Prospect of change in fragmented settings
The situation is reversed in local settings that are culturally fragmented, where change is
a ubiquitous feature. Typically such settings lack strong social norms, have looser social
ties and multiple institutions and often embody internal contradictions; they lack many
beneficial features of their culturally established counterparts. That is, information is much
more fragmented and multilateral reputation mechanisms less operational. Abraham and
Platteau (2010) describe such communities as ”repressive societies where mutual control
is constantly exercised, suspicions are continuously entertained about others’ intentions,
8As she writes: ”To adopt a line of conduct requires an image of the world in which one is trying to act, a
sense that one can read reasonably accurately how one is doing, and a capacity to choose among alternative
lines of action. The lack of this ease is what we experience as ”culture shock” when we move from one
cultural community to another.”
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inter-personal conflicts are pervasive, and a rigid rank-based hierarchical structure governs
people’s life.” The central problem in these settings is that while most community mem-
bers may be unhappy with the existing social order and ready to embrace alternative social
arrangements, they tend to face acute problems both in terms of knowing what constitutes
a good social arrangement and, furthermore, how to adopt one effectively. Platteau and
Abraham (2002) describe this as ”community imperfections,” where the existing cultural
resources lack adequate problem-solving capacities (low-cost information, frequent interper-
sonal interactions, etc.). This deficiency tends to make it difficult to converge on socially
desirable choices, leading to uncoordinated and unpredictable responses to new situations.
As a result, patterns of interactions are likely to settle into multiple and socially undesirable
equilibria, suggesting potential for instability.9 That instability makes the prevailing social
order particularly vulnerable to drastic swings, even as a result of relatively minor changes
to underlying circumstances (Bikhchandani et al. 1992).
The severe information asymmetries in culturally fragmented settings are likely to be
exacerbated by another problem: lack of legitimacy for whatever social order seems to
prevail, suggesting high probability of elite competition with multiple visions of social ar-
rangements (Platteau et al. 2012). Elite competition, in turn, suggests high likelihood for
misinformation. This combination of proneness to instability and ”bad” information makes
for a perfect storm of poor collective social choice. Competing elites have clear incentive to
reveal only selective information, making their vision of social arrangements as appealing
as possible while withholding damning information, withholding from the masses real clues
about the actual status quo. Neill (2005) explains precisely this type of social inefficiency
in heterogeneous populations assumed to have incongruent preferences and beliefs, arguing
that ”when agents must infer the preferences of others from observation, this can result in
negative cascades, causing the majority of agents to choose a dispreferred action (because
they believe, incorrectly, that they are following the majority preference)” (emphasis in orig-
inal). But what does this mean for the prospect of political change? Culturally fragmented
9A lack of knowledge about fellow citizens’ preferences is referred to by Lohmann (2000; 1994) as ”silent
discontent,” a situation that requires a shock to induce political, as in the case of the string of events in
East Germany that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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settings, too, have opportunities and challenges.
For one, the fact that there is very little ”shared culture” suggests more room for change.
The instability induced by cultural fragmentation may actually present a silver lining in
that it brings individuals closer to the borderline between alternatives (Bikhchandani et
al. 1992). But the severe information problems in these settings tend to make convergence
on socially desirable choices difficult, leading to uncoordinated and unpredictable responses
to new situations. While culturally fragmented settings are most susceptible to political
change, positive transformation can only be expected to materialize if outside interventions
step in to address the pervasive information problems and elite manipulation that stand in
the way. In addition, if change is promoted from the outside, the likelihood of resistance
is low; unsurprisingly, low valuation of existing cultural resources predisposes people to
alternatives that may offer higher utility. Simply put, in fragmented cultural settings,
existing values or resources may simply not be worth clinging to, whether for material or
intrinsic reasons.10
Clearly, the nature of an existing culture at the time of an intervention is key to the local
acceptance of externally driven political change. This understanding of cultural influences
has continued implications for our understanding of the conditions of successful outside
interventions, and in particular those designed to promote liberal norms and values. Next
I will apply insights from the foregoing discussion to shed light on the issue of whether and
how different peacebuilding strategies can successfully promote liberal political participation
in the aftermath of civil war, and on the mediating effects of local context on democratic
participation at the grassroots level.
10According to Ashforth and Mael (1989), when confronted with threatening information or behavior
intentionally directed at the in-group, ”high and low identifiers may be equally defensive, but responses
may take quite different and opposite forms, with low identifiers distancing themselves from the group or
repenting for its immoral behavior and high identifiers closing ranks and either symbolically or physically
striking back at the group they perceive as representing the threat.”
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3.1.3 Cultural strength’s implications for peacebuilding interventions
In light of the above discussion, I argue that postwar settings can be categorized in terms of
whether they are ”culturally established” or ”culturally fragmented.” To be sure, there are
many local settings that fit the description of fragmented cultural settings, and this is the
predominant picture in many peacebuilding accounts. The characteristics outlined by schol-
ars such Richards (2005) and Keen (2003) in the case of Sierra Leone are applicable in many
if not most sites of peacebuilding operations: abusive social structures, very little popular
legitimacy, severe information problems, elite manipulation and competition, sociopolitical
disruptions, and so on. Insights from the preceeding discussion, however, suggest that this
is only part of a complicated story.
However, other local settings can be defined as established. For instance, in Moran’s
description of postwar Liberia, some communities, such as Glebo in the country’s south,
had institutions that provided structurally subordinate people, especially women and youth,
with legitimate and recognized means of participation and expression–even before the civil
war (36). Meanwhile, Sawyer (2005) provides a detailed account of how the Poro (tradi-
tional) authority sought to protect rural dwellers during the violent conflict, sometimes by
co-opting the young armed leaders or by establishing parallel but unobtrusive authorities
to enable them to head off impending violence against their people and organize a timely
defense. In the case of Afghanistan, Wardak (2003) has argued that the Jirga–a traditional
conflict resolution institution–is ”closely bound up with the social and economic realities of
everyday life in Afghanistan and is deeply rooted in the culture and history of the people
of the country.” Such structures are likely to be characterized by cooperation-promoting
mechanisms like information-provision, reputation mechanisms and legitimate authority,
and to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy on the part of the local population, as described
by Hohe (2002a) and Ponzio (2011) in the context of East Timorese and Afghani societies,
respectively.
This categorization of postwar settings based of the strength of existing social structures
or cultures echoes Colletta’s and Cullen’s (2000) study differentiating postwar communi-
ties by two key features: (i) the presence of strong social bonds reflected in, for example,
levels of trust, propensity for cooperative action, levels of ethnic tension and other forms
CHAPTER 3. A MICROFOUNDATIONAL THEORY OF PEACEBUILDING 42
of polarization, as well as norms of reciprocity that go beyond ethnic boundaries; and (ii)
the presence of institutions and mechanisms to manage and resolve disputes peacefully. As
per this study, cohesive societies possess not only values and norms that enable positive
relationships and cooperation between groups, but also institutions and mechanisms nec-
essary to mediate and manage conflicts before they escalate into violence. Less cohesive
societies, on the other hand, possess neither, putting them at greater risk of fragmentation
and violence.11
In theory, in light of all the above, we should expect differences in the performance and
success of peacebuilding operations to depend on whether they are carried out in estab-
lished cultural settings or in fragmented cultural settings. Specifically, the challenges and
opportunities that different local settings present for peacebuilding operations can be can
be understood along two dimensions: (i) different local settings’ susceptibility to liberal
change; and (ii) the processes and mechanisms of such change. Furthermore, culturally
established settings and culturally fragmented settings tend to undergo change in different
ways, which may or may not be compatible with peacebuilding reforms, typically carried
out in a uniform, top-down fashion and rapid pace. This ”brisk” approach may not be
problematic in local settings that are culturally fragmented, wherein, at the very worse,
promoted changes may be viewed as one of many competing models of social arrangements.
But it becomes a problem in culturally established settings where stability is a key feature,
and where that type of brisk change risks triggering cultural shock. Thus, to be viable in
established settings, liberal reforms carried out under the auspices of peacebuilding oper-
ations will need to meet a twin requirement: change must be driven endogenously, and it
must be seen as adding value to prevailing cultural arrangements.
11These differences in features of existing social structures echo those identified in a number of recent com-
parative politics studies, including Putnam’s (1995) account of Italian communities and Varshney’s (2001)
in the case of Indian communities. Both Putnam and Varshney emphasize the fact that the presence or
absence of distinctive features such as strong social norms of reciprocity or institutional mechanisms to man-
age disputes influenced patterns of collective action and incidences of violent conflicts. Tsai (2007) provides
similar insights, distinguishing rural communities based on whether or not informal accountability mecha-
nisms exist, and operationalizes informal accountability in terms of moral standing–the esteem, respect, or
approval that is granted for above-average performance.
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Ultimately, the successful promotion of democratic outcomes depends on the extent to
which interveners are able to leverage particular, targeted strategies to elicit positive local
response, while avoiding strategies that provoke local sensitivities. But this is a complicated
challenge in contemporary peacebuilding interventions that give precedence to STs that are
by definition intrusive in domestic arrangements. Next I will address theoretical nuances of
how various intervention strategies can influence liberal democratic outcomes in different
local settings, and outline specific testable hypotheses.
3.2 Hypotheses on peacebuilding strategies and democratic
outcomes
The array of functions and activities carried out under the auspices of peacebuilding opera-
tions can be put in two broad categories: (i) status-quo transforming strategies (e.g., demo-
cratic education) explicitly designed to alter aspects of local structures; and (ii) status-quo
preserving strategies (e.g., military peacekeeping), which provide certain services without
seeking necessarily challenging the exiting normative order. To be sure, a key presump-
tion in the current peacebuilding approach is that democratic change emanates from the
transformative aspects of the strategy, while status quo-preserving aspects are presumed
to play a secondary, supportive role in keeping the democratic process from getting de-
railed (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 314; United Nations 2008: 22). These components entail
distinct logics and different assumptions about relevant challenges as well as about the so-
lutions required to address them, suggesting they may have different influences on various
local settings. Thus, in principle, we can clarify the premises and logics underlying these
different peacebuilding components and test them empirically.
The outcomes of interest are democratic outcomes, a concept I use broadly to refer to
a wide range of liberal transformations sought by peacebuilders. These outcomes encom-
pass a wide range of attitudinal, behavioral and institutional phenomena–some of which are
longer-term to show change and therefore difficult to evaluate–let alone to attribute (Paris
2004; Call and Cook 2003). In this dissertation, I focus on political participation and social
cohesion, recognizing that they are important–but not the only–dimensions of liberal trans-
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formations peacebuilders aim to achieve. Nonetheless, these two outcomes are presumed
to be key mechanisms underpinning democracy and peace (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Russett
and O’Neal 2001; Kumar 1998). Political participation–broadly defined as ”the processes
that give the population a voice through formal governmental mechanisms such as elections
and political parties and through the development of a vibrant civil society, including the
generation and exchange of ideas through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the me-
dia” (Orr 2002)–is seen as an antidote to war because it provides belligerents with a forum
to pursue political competition through peaceful means (Wantchekon 2004; Russett and
O’Neal 2001). Political participation also helps bring to the political scene a new set of
actors–voters, political parties, civil society groups–who can provide a democratic counter-
weight to the elites (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 313; Pouligny 2006). Voters, in particular,
are key players insofar as they are the ultimate custodians of political power (Reilly 2008;
Wantchekon 2004; Lyons 2002). In addition, political participation can help establish state
legitimacy (Papagianni 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).
But the kind of political participation emphasized in the current peacebuilding approach
looks beyond levels of citizens’ involvement to the quality of participation, reflecting im-
portant liberal values such as tolerance, freedom of expression and respect of other people’s
rights. It must also be the kind of political participation that extends all the way to pre-
viously marginalized groups, creating an equal opportunity for all members of society to
”play a role in determining the country’s direction and mobilizing to defend a new peaceful
order” (Orr 2002). This genuine political participation is vital to civil peace for it encour-
ages moderate political competition and provides mechanisms for competing demands to be
articulated and disputes resolved without resorting to violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006;
Reilly 2001). Political participation is said to be a prerequisite for democracy. Democratic
theorists have long argued that political participation is at the heart of democracy (Dahl
1989; 1979; Putnam et al. 1993). As Verba et al. (1995) note, ”democracy is unthinkable
without political participation” (1).
Social cohesion, the second outcome of interest in this dissertation, is equally considered
to be a key mechanism underpinning peace and democracy (Doyle 2002; Colletta and Cullen
2000). Its importance to peace comes from the presumption that healthy levels of positive
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relationships are necessary to prevent violence (Kumar 1998). Its connection to democracy
are based on the belief that the virtues such as diversity and tolerance that undergird social
cohesion are also important for democracy. The reasoning is that since genuine democratic
participation requires associating with individuals from groups dissimilar to one’s own,
it cannot be achieved in the presence of the same mistrust and fear that hinder social
cooperation (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Some analysts even go as far as to equate promotion
of social cohesion to civil society development, a Putnamian view of democracy promotion
from below according to which greater face-to-face interactions will generate ”social capital”
and socialize members into ”democratic norms through a processes of learning by doing”
(arstad and Sisk 2008: 185). Moreover, social cohesion can serve as an important barometer
of the quality of political participation emerging in different settings. Where in places
where social cohesion is high, political participation is likely to be of a civic kind that can
make a positive contribution to the rebuilding of state legitimacy and self-sustaining peace.
Where it is low, political participation is likely to take place along ethnic/religious lines
or be dominated by the elites, thereby dashing the prospect of self-sustaining peace and
democracy (Shewfelt 2009).
In sum, both political participation and social cohesion can be viewed as dimensions of
a broader phenomena, liberal transformations or democratic outcomes, sought by peace-
building interventions. Arguably, such liberal transformations are long-term processes that
may take years or even generations to take hold. Therefore, the effectiveness of peacebuild-
ing interventions in promoting democratic outcomes is necessarily relative and difficult to
measure. Scholars have suggested different metrics for measuring successful liberal inter-
ventions (e,g., Call and Cousens 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). I follow in the footstep of
scholars such as Coyne (2008) who conceptualize success in terms of positive and sometimes
incremental movements along key dimensions of liberal participation. In this view, a higher
degree of success or positive influence is measured in terms of greater positive effects on the
key outcomes of interest.
Below I discuss specific hypotheses about when and how STs and SPs influence demo-
cratic outcomes in established settings and fragmented settings, respectively.12
12These hypotheses are developed with political participation as the primary outcome of interest, even
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3.2.1 Status quo-transforming strategies and democratic outcomes
As noted earlier, STs encompass functions and activities explicitly designed to transform
existing structures by promoting democratic institutions and liberal values. In the realm
of political participation, for example, STs consider local power structures as hindering
genuine and inclusive democratic participation because they tend to favor elder men and
other power brokers, while shutting out young people, women and minorities (Pouligny 2005;
Orr 2002). From a peacebuilding perspective, this is a problem because social and political
choices resulting from this process are considered to be socially inefficient and undesirable
because they do not represent preferences of the broader citizenry. But I also argued that
theoretical logics underlying STs are overly optimistic, particularly in established settings.
3.2.1.1 Hypothesis on STs in established settings
Can STs have a positive influence on democratic outcomes in established cultural settings?
To the extent that democratic change sought by peacebuilders requires some shift away from
the status quo order (to give up cultural practices that may be considered inimical to human
rights), the prediction is that STs will have difficulties achieving this objective. Where local
people are satisfied with a prevailing cultural paradigm, there exists a level of stability from
which it is difficult to depart. The source or motivation for this stability can be instrumental
or intrinsic. Instrumentally, paradigms that are targets for transformation may provide
economic or material benefits that community members do not have incentive to give up,
unless the proposed alternative will provide even greater benefits. This is precisely what
Fanthorpe’s (2006) field research in Sierra Leone revealed; while international interveners
have targeted the customary chieftaincy system for wholesale reforms on the grounds that
it is ”irredeemably oppressive towards the rural poor,” many communities oppose such
reforms because they continue to value the benefits it provides. According to Fanthorpe,
”Many continue to find chiefs preferable to elected politicians and bureaucrats because,
according to their calculation, chiefs are predisposed to defend the customary property and
citizenship regimes that establish their own authority”
though they also apply for social cohesion. For the sake of generality, however, I use the broader concept of
”democratic outcomes.” Hypotheses pertaining to social cohesion will be further specified in chapter 5.
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Resistance to change may also stem from intrinsic values that the local population
attaches to existing cultural paradigms targeted by the intervention, even if alternative
arrangements will provide greater benefits from a material standpoint (Rubinstein 2008;
Duffey 2000). As many scholars have pointed out, STs tend to imply a false dichotomy be-
tween ”global norms and values” and ”bad local norms” (Acharya 2004); this questionable
sense of moral superiority may lead to uncompromising stances during implementation.13
Thus, for instance, CDD programs seek to promote democratic participation and liberal
values through new governance structures on the premise that existing structures of gover-
nance are illegitimate and despotic (Humphreys et al. 2013). Indeed, the current approach
takes it for granted that there is a clear-cut distinction between the two, an idea born out
by the words of the UN-TES project leader, whose unit provides orientation to military
contingents before deployment in war-torn countries: ”You do not need to know what a hu-
man rights violation is; you only need to know what steps to take [when you see one]” (cited
in Odoi 2005). Similarly, Module 8 of the Human Rights of Women in Peace Operations
training manual states that although gender roles vary across social and cultural contexts,
there is no ”cultural” excuse for abuse against women, and that no actors should ”invoke
any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligation with respect to
discrimination against women or their protection against any forms of abuses and violence.”
But it is precisely this kind of explicit targeting of existing cultural paradigms that
social identity theories warn may be problematic in culturally established settings. Some
types of STs, such as democratic education activities, may appear to be prejudiced against
a traditional leader or to denigrate some aspects of existing social structures; as such,
the local population may experience them as a violation of the dominant culture or feel
pushed to conform to foreign notions of social and political governance, perhaps causing
resentment, even if they may otherwise have been supportive of such reforms. As Talentino
(2007) writes, ”Although citizens in the target states may support the ideas behind reform,
they often resent the sense of forced acquiescence. Resentment is likely to be manifest in
obstructionism, which will impede the progress of reform and may lead to the renewal of
13Paris (2002) likens the current approach with the earlier practice of ”mission civilisatrice–the colonial-era
belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ’civilise’ their overseas possessions.”
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violence.” In the extreme, explicit promotion of liberal norms and values may be perceived
as an existential threat because by prescribing new set of norms and behaviors, it essentially
turns upside-down local people’s worldview and sense of morality, which generally breeds
local resistance and hostility towards international interveners (Rubinstein 2008; Rubinstein
et al. 2008).
However, the notion of cultural threats does not necessarily imply that there is a constant
threat any time an in-group happens to be exposed to values and beliefs from an out-group,
or that members of a group with strong bonds live in constant fear of their shared values
being threatened. Part of what it means to have stable values and beliefs is to be self-assured
and to be able to generate counterarguments when challenged (Druckman and Lupia 2000).
(In some cases, self-assurance may stem from cultural insulation, potentially unraveling the
moment it is challenged.) Nonetheless, as Branscombe et al. (1999) argue, the perceptions of
threats depend on signals emanating from an out-group, such as ”threatening information
or behavior” intentionally directed at the in-group. When STs seek to displace specific
aspects of the existing cultural paradigm and replace them with liberal norms and values,
they can be perceived as giving off such threatening signals.
Furthermore, a false dichotomy between paradigms of global and local values (Acharya
2004) can also lead to cultural threat perception through interveners’ prejudiced reactions
and negative stereotypes. Boniecki and Britt (2003) argue that the conflicts that peace-
keepers come to address are ”often the result of ethnic or religious differences, which violate
peacekeepers’ value of freedom, equality and tolerance,” and that such beliefs may cloud
interveners’ judgment and lead to hostility toward the local people (in Boniecki and Adler
2003: 55). Prejudiced actions are especially likely in the case of STs, which are at heart
motivated by presumed inadequacies or conflict-proneness of the existing normative order
and likely to be compounded by poor understanding of local cultural norms and practices.
The claim here is that prejudiced actions–even if directed at only a few individuals (e.g.,
elites)–may elicit perceptions of threats in culturally established settings where the local
people strongly identify with a cultural paradigm.14
14An-Na’im (1991) argues that when it comes to the evaluation of human rights standards, ”a degree of
ethnocentricity is unavoidable, and indeed indispensable. It is the basis of our acceptance of the validity
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Some peacebuilders tend to dismiss the notion that there is a single cultural paradigm
in any given setting with which the entire group identifies, thus brushing off complaints
that their behaviors violate or disrespect the ”local culture.” Some even consider any such
complaints as a mask for elites’ self-serving manipulation and as a strategy for maintaining
their domination over the local population. This may be especially true given that an
implicit presumption in STs is that existing social structures are undemocratic and therefore
unreliable when it comes to revealing or representing local social preferences.Conversely,
though, resistance to liberal values by local elites does not necessarily mean that ordinary
citizens actively welcome them. Nonetheless, whether or not the elites do in fact represent
the interest of their people is an important empirical question.
In sum, established settings provide members with stronger and more stable belief sys-
tems that are unlikely to be influenced by new information, suggesting that STs premised
on explicit promotion of liberal reforms will likely trigger resistance. Resistance can be
manifest in indifference, obstructionism or outright hostility–all of which will limit oppor-
tunities for adoption of liberal reforms. If these insights are correct, STs should be unable
to achieve transformational objectives. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H1: Status quo-transforming strategies will tend to have no influence or even have a
negative influence on democratic outcomes in established settings.
3.2.1.2 Hypothesis on STs in fragmented settings
STs are likely to be much more effective in promoting democratic outcomes in local settings
that are culturally fragmented, wherein information asymmetries, legitimacy gaps and coor-
dination problems are ubiquitous. Per insights from the previous theoretical discussion, the
social inefficiencies and instability that these problems create may bring people in these set-
tings closer to the borderline between alternatives, effectively predisposing them for change
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992). The question is not whether to abandon the status quo (that is
of the norms and institutions of our culture, an acceptance that is ultimately a matter of material and
psychological survival.” Thus, a healthy dose of ethnocentricity is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, such
an enlightened ethnocentrism would concede the right of other people or societies to be ”different.” What is
bad is rigid ethnocentricity, which breeds prejudice and hostility to people from different culture.
CHAPTER 3. A MICROFOUNDATIONAL THEORY OF PEACEBUILDING 50
already a given), but rather how to converge expectations on a different, socially-desirable
outcome. STs employ mechanisms appropriate for the kinds of problems and challenges that
culturally fragmented settings face. These strategies typically encompass educational and
informational campaigns covering a wide range of issues–from human rights to political par-
ticipation to good governance, among others–primarily intended to fill the information void
and enable people to realize the nature of the status quo and generate a shift in preferences
(Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Russett and O’Neal 2001). These activ-
ities help create new mechanisms and focal points by which community members are able
to establish common knowledge and cascade on actions that have the capacity to produce
socially desirable outcomes.
There are at least two reasons why STs may actually be more effective in liberal promo-
tion efforts targeting weak settings. First, the fact that any cultural resources associated
with the status quo order have little utility suggests that people have nothing to lose by
investing in new cultural resources required for the new life promised by liberal reforms (or
at least no reason to resist the reforms). The argument holds regardless of the particular
perspective one adopts (i.e., culture as tool kit or as ends-values). From a cost-benefit
standpoint, the claim is that change will still be preferable to the status quo, at least to
the extent that it is associated with some positive probability for a better life. From a
values perspective, the claim is that given a weak identification with the existing status
quo, the threshold for cultural threats in fragmented settings is much higher (with fewer
shared values to be threatened). In either case, the question here is what makes liberal
reforms so much more attractive than competing illiberal ideologies. Here, too, I submit
that the answer depends on whether change is driven instrumentally or intrinsically.
If the drivers of the desire for change are economic or material, then the alternative social
arrangement that has the best prospect for success (i.e., to win over the local population)
is one that is believed to offer a better life. Arguably, few such arrangements exist locally,
otherwise the population would not need outside intervention in the first place; competing
local alternatives are likely to have been discredited already, so local populations may
be more inclined to give STs the benefit of the doubt. Equally important is the fact that
liberal arrangements are credible (initially at least) as a result of an impressive international
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presence and resources. An additional advantage is that international peacebuilders often
lend credibility to the process of information aggregation. Postwar environments can be
highly politically charged, with different groups perceiving the actions of and information
from the other side with great suspicion, even if/when such actions and information are
consistent with their own interests. Thus, in addition to providing greater technical capacity
and resources, international interveners are typically not considered to be part of the conflict;
their objectivity means they can be trusted by contending social forces (Maynard 1997). As
a result, broad segments of the local population are more likely to perceive the process as
legitimate and therefore be more inclined to trust the outcomes of the internally-supported
reforms process.15
If change is driven by intrinsic normative desires for a new order, liberal arrangements
still have the best chance to be embraced locally because they offer a vision of societal order
fundamentally different from the one rebuked by the local population. In other words, liberal
reforms are likely to be appealing to the local population because they promote an order
based on peace-enhancing norms and values as an antidote to the existing orders associated
with conflict and instability, and from which local people may wish to distance themselves
(Jarsdad and Sisk 2008; Russett and O’Neal 2001). Moreover, while in some cases severe
information asymmetries and coordination problems inherent to weak cultures may render
locals unable to converge on an optimal alternative arrangement, STs are designed to address
precisely these inefficiencies, and to trigger informational cascades that enable people to
come into possession of common knowledge about the status quo. All the foregoing leads
me to formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: Status quo transforming strategies will tend to have a positive influence on demo-
cratic outcomes in fragmented local settings.
15Yet many scholars have warned that peacebuilders tend to put blind faith in the desirability of peace-
building reforms and to overlook the tradeoffs and (short-term) negative consequences over which these local
populations may make different choices (Call and Cook 2003). Talentino (2007) argues that this can lead to
a ”broken promise effect”–the notion that the longer it takes for results to materialize, the more the local
population may get the sense that ”international peacebuilders have promised more than they have deliv-
ered,” which may in turn lead to ”mistrust and obstruction, thereby undermining progress toward reform
and accelerating the development of frustration.”
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3.2.2 Status quo-preserving strategies (SPs) and democratic outcomes
In the current peacebuilding strategy, SPs play a supportive, rather than direct, role in
the transformative aspects of the overall strategy. Military peacekeeping does not in and
of itself have the mandate or the ”conventional” tools necessary to promote democracy (as
it can be seen from traditional peacekeeping operations). As Doyle and Sambanis (2006)
argue, the role of peacekeeping in multidimensional operations is to provide security and to
make it harder for spoilers to highjack the democratization process (314-315). Fortna (2008)
similarly claims that peacekeepers shape the political process indirectly by preventing abuses
and exclusions (98-102). An other reason for the relative ”subtlety” of the SP strategy in
democratic transformation is that many (if not most) peacekeepers are provided by countries
that are not themselves liberal democracies, such as Pakistan and Nigeria; their command
and controls are dictated from home capitals, which do not have a history or culture of
democracy.
Given this, how is it that SPs can effectively operate as a channel of liberal democracy
promotion? While peacekeeping contingents come from countries with diverse political
institutions and political cultures, once in the throes of a mission, they all subscribe, and
operate according, to the global, liberal culture. As Paris (2008) remarks, ”peacebuilding
missions are not merely exercises in conflict management, but instances of a much larger
phenomenon: the globalization of a particular model of domestic governance–liberal market
democracy–from the core to the periphery of the international system.” Additionally, while
civilian peacebuilders carry out STs by targeting the citizenry directly, military peacekeepers
do not; they interact primarily with the elites, both national and local (Fetherstone and
Nordstrom 1995). These interactions between peacekeepers and local elites can spill over to
ordinary citizens, though not under all circumstances or in a straightforward fashion. The
elites typically get firsthand exposure to liberal norms and values, which can then spread
to the broader community through secondhand exposure–a two-stage process.16
16This process is similar to the two-step process of social transmission of democratic knowledge, norms
and values described by Finkel and Smith (2011). They argue, as I do here, that in the first step, individuals
exposed to democratic messages in the National Civic Education Program became opinion leaders, who then
communicated new knowledge and attitudes to others within their social networks who had not yet been
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In that first stage, peacekeepers socialize the elites to liberal norms and values through
various professional and social interactions.17 In international relations, especially from a
constructivist perspective, socialization is a process that involves the transmission of norms
of socially appropriate behavior for actors in a given situation or setting (Checkel 2005).
The suggestion is not that peacekeepers will actively try to transmit liberal norms to their
local counterparts (although this does happen as well, as when peacekeepers visit jails and
provide advice on respect of human rights). Rather, it is that the liberal culture intrinsic to
all aspects of a mission will govern and be somewhat organically reflected in peacekeepers’
interactions with local elites, with secondhand effects on other citizens.18
By contrast, interactions between unaccountable local leaders and international inter-
veners are often guided by a different logic of incentives. Unaccountable leaders tend to have
poor relations with their constituents, which means that public interest is the last thing on
their minds when deciding whether or not to adopt liberal norms and values. A primary
consideration for them is, instead, whether or not such a move will improve their degree of
power and material condition. In many cases the answer will be no (e.g., the realization
that they would actually have to live up to those liberal values). They understand that
such adoption will only tie their hands without providing any benefits in turn; for example,
peacekeepers can verify whether or not public goods ultimately reach the citizens. So, in
many cases, unaccountable local leaders may simply reject liberal norms and values outright
or say what they think peacekeepers want to hear without any real desire or commitment
to live up to those promises. However, this is not necessarily a dire scenario, since what
really matters for successful norms adoption is what happens next, outside the interactions
between peacekeepers and local leaders.
exposed to the program. Panel data from Kenya spanning over 10 years also found positive support for this
mechanism.
17Peacekeeping environments offer many such opportunities. It is common practice for military peace-
keepers to invite local leaders to various cultural celebrations at military bases and, vice versa, for local
leaders to invite military peacekeepers to cultural and official events within communities.
18I have witnessed this in my work in a number of peacekeeping missions. Military leaders from countries
without established democracy seemed most eager to demonstrate awareness and subscription to liberal
values such as gender equality or respect for human rights.
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In the second stage, those liberal norms and values to which some local leaders have been
socialized will spread to their constituents through diffusion–”the process through which
an innovation, defined as an idea perceived as new, spreads via certain communication
channels over time among members of a social system” (Rogers 1995). As indicated above,
this stage usually only occurs for the subset of leaders who face strong accountability.
The relevant mechanisms and processes in this second stage of norms diffusion stress the
agency of local actors such as community leaders, local NGOs, social movement activists–
all of whom play a critical role in translating and/or reconstructing international norms to
make them fit within the existing cultural paradigm, and who are therefore more legitimate
and acceptable to domestic audiences (Levitt and Merry 2009). Indeed, sociologists have
identified and analyzed the importance of social relationships and networks to the process of
legitimizing outside ideas within a local context. In their study on issues of violence against
women in China, India, Peru and the United States, for example, Livitt and Merry (2009)
say: ”Centrally placed elite actors (either individuals or organizations) adopt culturally
legitimate innovations early on by customizing them.” These intermediaries, as Merry (2006)
argues elsewhere, are powerful brokers ”who understand both the worlds of transnational
human rights and local cultural practices and who can look both ways.” Consistent with
this line of reasoning, An-Na’im (1992) argues that because ”people are more likely to
observe normative propositions if they believe them to be sanctioned by their own cultural
traditions, observance of human rights standards can be improved through the cultural
legitimacy of these standards.”
In terms of specific techniques, the norms diffusion literature points to a number of
processes and mechanisms that might be at work in this regard. In some instances, these
leaders serve as norms entrepreneurs or local agents who take it up on themselves to create
what Checkel (1998) calls cultural match between the international norms being promoted
and pre-existing local norms in the local arena. Acharya (2004) refers to this same process
as localization, enabling key local actors to reconstruct the new norm to make it congruent
with a preexisting local normative order. Livitt and Merry (2009) and Merry (2006) use the
term ”vernacularization”–a process through which globally-generated norms are reframed
to resonate with local ideas and understandings, while maintaining their transformative
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potential–and point out the role of key local actors in the process, noting that in the case of
one local NGO, staff and clients conveyed the concept of women’s rights without ever using
that term; instead, they ”tended to emphasize the importance of women ’standing up for
themselves’ or ’not having to be hit’ rather than the importance of claiming human rights.”
While not all local leaders are able to play this role of ”interpreter” or ”translator,” those
who are ”centrally located” in the sense of sharing similar characteristics with potential
adopters, and who enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, are well placed to do so. From
this perspective, the extent to which local leaders are able to pass new norms and values
on to their constituents seems to depend significantly on community dynamics, and in
particular on types of social networks and levels of interaction between local leaders and
community members. Of course, these dynamics play out different in culturally established
and fragmented settings, leading to an expectation that SPs will have differential effects
on democratic outcomes in these respective contexts. Below I develop explicit hypotheses
about the strategy’s influence on democratic outcomes in each type of local setting.
3.2.2.1 Hypothesis on SPs in established settings
In the previous discussion, I argued that established settings operate as close-knit with
strong information and reputation mechanisms that constrain behaviors toward socially
desired outcomes; and that the members of these settings also sustain high levels of interac-
tion, while the leaders typically enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. I also argued that local
leaders who face accountability have incentive to adopt new norms and values to signal
good will during their interactions with peacekeepers. Based on these dynamics, I claim
that SPs will likely influence democratic outcomes in culturally established settings.19
Importantly, liberal norms and values to which local leaders are socialized cannot be
adopted, let alone internalized, by group members unless they become part of everyday life.
Thus an antecedent condition for the integration into an existing cultural system of new
liberal norms and values (or any others, for that matter) is the level of interaction between
19There are actually two types of accountability, both in the traditional sense of the concept, whereby
accountability comes from electoral mechanisms; and in a non-traditional sense, whereby accountability
refers to moral and solidarity commitments, as suggested by Tsai (2007).
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local leaders (with primary exposure to the new norms and values) and their constituents
(who may not have as much exposure). The frequency of close ties and interactions between
leaders and their constituents in culturally established settings should enable a greater
transmission. Moreover, since local leaders in these settings enjoy high degree of legitimacy,
their new behaviors are not likely to be questioned or resisted. At the same time, since
they wield influence on people’s behaviors, any change they endorse will likely be mimicked
by the rest of the community. In addition, the normative ideas transmitted subtly through
socialization of local leaders are less likely to trigger a perception of cultural threat or a
sense of imposition, as STs in contrast tend to elicit in culturally established settings.
Such a ”subtle” approach to norms transmission attends to the twin requirements of
space creation and local empowerment for successful promotion of change. More precisely,
by focusing on security–arguably the scarcest public good in any postwar setting–this ap-
proach creates an enabling environment for local revitalization, which is just the kind of
space culturally established settings need to realize stable preferences and goals. Further-
more, by working through local leaders–the ultimate keepers of community values (Swidler
2012)–this approach is tantamount to indigenous empowerment (Lederach 1995). By en-
abling the mainstreaming of outside norms and values in social processes, as though they
are coming from within, SPs avoid the impression that the outsider is the answer, all the
while promoting desired change.
In short, specific dynamics of culturally established local settings, in particular the
relatively high levels of interactions between socialized local leaders and their constituents,
make it possible for liberal norms and values subtly transmitted through SPs to be integrated
within the existing culture organically and with little risk of cultural threat perception.
Hence, SPs may have a better chance at influencing liberal political change in these types
of local settings, leading to the following hypothesis:
H3: Status quo-preserving strategies will tend to have a positive influence on democratic
outcomes in established settings.
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3.2.2.2 Hypothesis on SPs in fragmented settings
By contrast, SPs will be unlikely to have positive influence on democratic outcomes in cultur-
ally fragmented local settings because they lack the information and legitimacy mechanisms
that would enable local transmission of liberal norms and values, not to mention that local
leaders have little incentive to adopt these in the first place. For one, as argued already,
local leaders in these settings have little incentive to adopt liberal norms and values (as a
result of facing weak accountability and less pressure to provide public goods)–a prerequi-
site for any transmission to the masses. But even if we were to assume that incentives for
local leaders in these settings will align such that they, too, want to adopt liberal norms
and values, the infrequency of social interactions between them and other citizens and low
legitimacy levels will make it virtually impossible for such norms and values to successfully
transmit to the local population.
Whereas in culturally established local settings local leaders derive accountability mostly
from the solidarity and moral obligations that bind them to their constituents, in weak local
settings such accountability is limited to that which is provided though electoral mecha-
nisms. In short, unaccountable leaders are likelier to resist norms socialization on the basis
that it is a veiled attempt to challenge the status quo. Moreover, peacekeepers are typically
at a disadvantage in these weaker local settings because they may not fully understand
the socioeconomic and political dynamics at work. De Waal (2009) may have had in mind
these sorts of settings and dynamics when he described the ”primordial marketplace, which
operates according to socio-culturally determined rules” and in which the elite thrive on
buying and selling loyalty. He goes on to say that, ”international peace engagement efforts
become enmeshed in that marketplace, where they are usually at a disadvantage because
peacemakers and peacekeepers are neither well attuned to the rules of the marketplace nor
highly skillful in operating there.”20
But perhaps the biggest challenge is that local leaders may not have a platform or the
necessary clout to enable transmission and adoption of liberal norms and values to the
rest of their communities. Given that there is very little interaction between local leaders
20See Barnett et al. (2009) and Barnett and Zurcke (2009) for similar analyses and conclusions.
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and their constituents, these leaders do not typically have opportunities to pass along new
values to community members. Moreover, without broad-based legitimacy, local chiefs
cannot credibly set a new standard of behaviors, let alone elicit a mass following. At best,
only the small segment of the community that considers local leadership to be legitimate
may adopt new norms in imitation of the leader; and to the rest of the group, those norms
and values may likely end up getting categorized as merely another of many competing
normative orders.
In sum, in fragmented cultural settings, the lack of strong accountability mechanisms
tends to work against socialization of local leaders to liberal norms and values. Even if local
leaders do become socialized, transmission to the rest of the group is limited by a dearth of
endogenous mechanisms that would support secondhand exposure. If these arguments are
correct, we should expect the following hypothesis:
H4: Status quo-preserving strategies will tend to have no influence on democratic out-
comes in fragmented settings.
3.2.3 Summary of theory and hypotheses
The overarching argument developed in this chapter is that the strength of an existing cul-
ture is of far greater significance to the influence of peacebuilding strategies on democratic
outcomes than conventional wisdom acknowledges, playing a key role in determining when
and how promoted liberal norms and values gain local adoption. Status quo-transforming
strategies (such as democratic education) are typically explicit in their aim of changing
aspects of existing cultural paradigms at a rapid pace–an approach that often provokes lo-
cal resistance, even hostility, in culturally established settings, where change usually comes
organically and slowly from within established patterns of interactions (H1). Yet these infor-
mational mechanisms and their ”brusque” delivery are precisely what are needed, perhaps,
to overcome pervasive cooperation-hindering problems in culturally fragmented settings.
Therefore, status quo-transforming strategies have much better prospects in the latter set-
tings (H2).
By contrast, status quo-preserving strategies (such as military peacekeeping) take a
subtler stance toward existing cultural paradigms: peacebuilders create a space within lo-
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cal communities and interact with local leaders who have the legitimacy and credibility
to transmit normative change organically, easing the process of cultural adaptation (H3).
However, status quo-preserving strategies tend to be ineffective in culturally fragmented lo-
cal settings, because these settings lack the internal dynamics necessary to facilitate indirect
change, and also because fragmentation typically presents cooperation-hindering problems
on a mass scale, problems that these strategies are unable to address (H4).
These expectations are summarized in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Peacebuilding strategies and democratic outcomes in different setting types
Status-quo Transforming Status-quo Preserving
Strategies (STs) Strategies (SPs)
Established Less susceptible to change Positive Influence
Settings (Cultural threats; high costs, H1) (Through elite socialization, H3)
Fragmented Positive influence Negative Influence
Settings (Mitigate information asymmetries, H2) (Inadequate for mass information problems, H4)




CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 61
Chapter 4
Empirical Strategy
This chapter outlines an empirical strategy for investigating the hypotheses outlined above.
In it, I employ rigorous and systematic data from my 9-month field experiment in Liberia
to adjudicate among the main hypotheses about the influence of different components of
peacebuilding strategies on liberal democratic outcomes at the grassroots level, in partic-
ular political participation and social cohesion.1 These hypotheses will be tested against
the hypothesis implicit in the current peacebuilding approach, namely that transforma-
tive activities should, on average, have a positive influence on democratic outcomes at the
grassroots level.
I use randomized control trials (RCTs) to ascertain causal effects of different strategies,
taking into account variation in local settings. If conducted carefully, RCTs can provide
credible evidence of causal effects of specific strategies, including those investigated in this
paper. Because the strategies are assigned randomly, all other factors that may have other-
wise confounded potential effects cancel each other out (in expectation), and as I will show
below, balance checks confirm successful randomization. Household surveys and behavioral
measures are the primary sources of data on the key measures I employed. Qualitative
data collected during fieldwork will be used throughout, as necessary. My dissertation uses
experimental methods to test specific theoretical mechanisms and logics underpinning some
of these activities, rather than UNMIL operations per se. Therefore, the results are not
1The field experiment was part of joint work with Cyrus Samii (New York University.
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meant to speak for UNMIL success or failure but, rather, to shed light on the logics un-
derlying the strategies that UNMIL and other peacekeeping operations rely on to achieve
liberal objectives.
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief background to the
Liberian context in which the field experiment was carried out, highlighting in particular
the root causes of civil war and the role of peacebuilding interventions carried out under the
auspices of UNMIL in addressing these causes. The second section provides a description of
the field experiment and how it was implemented, while the third section section describes
the sample and my strategy for measuring cultural strength–my proxy for local context–
and a preview on the key outcomes of interest. Measurement strategies for key outcome
variables of interest will be discussed in separate chapters devoted on each outcome.
4.1 Peacebuilding interventions in Liberia
4.1.1 Background to the civil war
Liberia is a small coastal country in Western Africa that was embroiled in a 14-year civil
war (1989-2003) that claimed the lives of 250,000 people and displaced more than a million
others into neighboring countries.2 The country has a population of nearly 4 million (est.
2013), about half of them under the age of 15 years; a low income country ($ 400 GDP
per capita), with a significant share coming from foreign assistance; and consistently ranks
at the bottom of the Human Development Index.3 The poor economic and social outlook
is partly attributable to a devastating civil war that followed years of successive corrupt
governments that devastated the economy (Sawyer 2005).
The civil war started in 1989 when National Patriotic Liberation Front (NPLF) led
by Charles Taylor, a former government employee, launched a Christmas eve invasion on
2For a detailed background to the Liberia conflict, as well as to peacekeeping and peacebuilding inter-
ventions, see Waugh 2011; Omeje 2009; McCandless 2008; Sawyer 2006; Adebajo 2002; and Ellis 2006;
1999.
3The World Factbook, accessed at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/li.html
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Nimba county, from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire. The conflict quickly escalated, as the Krahn-
dominated government forces of President Samuel Doe retaliated against civilian popula-
tions from the Mandingo and Gio tribes of the region, killing scores of people and burning
villages (Abebajo 2002). The rebel forces capitalized on the mishaps of the government
army to grow their ranks, quickly overran much of the countryside, and within six months
they were on the doorstep of Monrovia, the Capital City (Ellis 2006). Meanwhile a cri-
sis of leadership begun brewing inside the rebel movement and as the group approached
Monrovia, a faction of combatants led by one of the commanders Prince Johnson formed
a splinter faction under the name of Independent National Patriotic Liberation Front (IN-
PLF) (Adebajo 58-59). Owing to their close proximity to the capital city, Johnson’s men
captured and executed President Samuel Doe (Huband 1998). The country plunged quickly
into turmoil, as new factions emerged and no faction was able to gain a decisive upper hand.
From the outset, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under-
took several peace initiatives and established a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), with
Nigeria in the lead, to support these efforts (Adebajo 2002; Sawyer 2005). This civil war
saw many twists and turns as several ceasefires were signed and violated by the warring
parties. With the support of the newly established United Nations Observers’ mission in
Liberia (UNOMIL), ECOMOG’s brokered several peace agreements between the warring
parties, which resulted in the 1997 presidential elections. These elections represented the
final stage of the seven-year peace process and brought Charles Taylor to power. They were
widely considered fraudulent and an overwhelming majority was coerced to vote Charles
Taylor in the belief that war would break out again if he did not win (Lyons 1999). The
window of peace, however, was short-lived, as two new armed factions, the Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy and Elections
in Liberia (MODEL), emerged in 1999, vowing to overthrow Charles Taylor’s government
purportedly due to the endemic corruption and the inadequacy of promised political and se-
curity reforms (McGovern 2008). A hope for peace came in 2003 when the warlord Charles
Taylor was forced to step down under pressure from the United States. Meanwhile, rep-
resentatives from the political class and civil society convened in Accra, Ghana, for peace
talks, resulting in a Transitional Government tasked with organizing elections. These devel-
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opments paved the way for the establishment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation,
the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL), comprised of 15,000 international peace-
keepers and hundreds of international and local civilian personnel, all working to accompany
the political transition and rebuild the country’s social, economic and political structures.
4.1.2 Peacebuilding efforts in Liberia
It is widely believed that earlier efforts to resolve the Liberian conflict were a failure because
they did not resolve the root causes of the civil war, which were arguably multiple and com-
plex (Sawyer 2005). Many scholars of Liberian politics have pointed to factors such as social
inequalities and economic disparities between the elites who were mostly former American
slaves and the indigenous population; systematic exclusion of the latter group from politics
and the economy; and abusive political systems, among others (Vinck et al. 2011). Sawyer
(2005) points to governance problems and other structural deficiencies, which made possible
corruption and other governance malfeasances in the first place. He argues that the origins
of the violent civil war can be found in the legacy of the over-centralized and predatory
state, which created general dissatisfactions enabling armed groups to flourish (35-40). As
a result of this, the central government never gained trust of and legitimacy in the eyes of
the people, especially indigenous people. These views were echoed by anecdotal accounts
provided by statement givers to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia
set up in the wake of the civil war to investigate the antecedents of the crises which gave
rise to the conflict. Overwhelmingly ”identified three major root causes: inequities implicit
in the structure of the settler-dominated Liberian state, tribalism, and greed/corruption.”4
In the same vein, a recent survey of adult Liberians (Vinck et al. 2011), an overwhelming
majority of Liberians (63%) identified greed and corruption as the causes of the conflict
(63%), while another (40%) pointed to tribal divisions. Poverty and inequalities were not
as frequently mentioned as root causes, having being reported only by (30%) and (27%),
respectively.
In short, governance problems as well as systematic exclusion of a vast majority of
4Accessed at: http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/chapter+4-
background+on+liberia+and+the+conflict.pdf
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Liberians from politics and economic opportunities were among the root causes that enabled
rebellion. They undermined people’s trust in the government–and therefore the state’s
very legitimacy, which created favorable conditions for rebellions to emerge and flourish.
While these causes point to issues of governance at the national level, they also played
out the local level in no small way, through co-optation of local and traditional leaders.
Specifically, the successive repressive governments in Liberia sought to increase control of
the local population in the hinterland by co-opting local and traditional chiefs whose role
had been to defend the interest of their people (Sawyer 2005; Sesay 1996). This situation
increased opportunity for abuses, which led to a loss of legitimacy and not surprisingly,
during the civil war, many of these leaders were specifically targeted by armed men in quest
for revenge (Sawyer 2005: 151). Hence achieving sustainable peace required attending to
governance issues both at the macro- and micro-levels.
Thus many analysts were critical of early efforts to end the conflict for putting to much
focus on elections, instead of addressing these root causes of conflict that required deep
governance reforms and broad-based political participation. As Sawyer (2005) writes:
None of the agreements saw the need for governance reforms as foundational;
thus, they embedded the assumption that electoral reforms was the most impor-
tant if not the sole governance reform needed. What seems to be ignored is the
fact that elections are fought to the bitter end in Liberia because the unitary
nature of power and its concentration in the hand of the president transforms
political competition into a zero-sum game...Governance reform has been one
of the missing links in Liberia’s attempts to organize transitions from violent
conflict to democratic peacebuilding (41).
The crux of Sawyer’s argument is that elections need to be placed within a broader
peacebuilding agenda that is carefully designed to address governance reforms and political
exclusion. It is against this backdrop that UNMIL was given a much more robust mandate
than its predecessor, including assisting the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, reform of
the country’s police and army, protection of civilians from imminent threats, humanitar-
ian assistance, human rights promotion, reform of justice institutions and management of
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elections, among others.5 The transition from war to peace began with the organization of
national elections in 2005, which was entirely organized and run by UNMIL’s own Electoral
Division and a coalition of international non-governmental organization partners. In this
regard, Liberia resembled an international trusteeship (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2013).
As with most peacebuilding operations, UNMIL pursued a two-pronged approach: one
the one hand, working to strengthen the government and state institutions, and on the
other hand engaging with other societal actors. With respect to the former, UNMIL carried
out a variety of activities, including establishing support teams to help the newly installed
government ministers and local authorities to set development priorities and other goals;
facilitating the return of Government officials to their respective areas of responsibility;
establishing task forces jointly with the government to work on specific problems such
as that of control over the exploitation of the country’s natural resources, and so forth.6
Likewise, The UNMIL established working groups with key government ministries in an
effort ”to infuse peacebuilding into the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS)” and
to ensure that root causes of conflict were recognized and addressed through development
strategies (Bayne and Vaux 2013; McAndless 2008). These sorts of structures were key
in ensuring that development plans and strategies prioritized addressing the root causes of
conflict.
Furthermore, mindful of the role that political exclusion and inequalities may have
played in triggering the conflict, international actors targeted civil society groups and the
citizenry at the grassroots level to promote active participation in the political process
(Swayer 2005). Indeed, UNMIL’s specialized sections, including the Electoral Assistance
Division (EAD), the Civil Affairs Section (CAS), the Human Rights Section (HRS) and a
host of INGOs, have since carried out a wide range of activities at the local level, includ-
ing consultative fora with local communities to identify priorities as well civic education
campaigns educating Liberians on such diverse issues as the importance of political par-
5 See mission’s web page for more detailed information about UNMIL’s mandates:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil background.shtml
6See ”Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia,” 9
June, 2006.
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ticipation in rejecting violence in politics to intra- and inter-community dialogues intended
to promote understanding, tolerance, reconciliation, respect for human rights and peaceful
dispute settlements, among others (UNIML-CAS 2010). These activities were carried out
on the premise that they will foster liberal norms and values and a new democratic culture
that provide the basis for self-sustaining peace. It is true that much of these activities at the
grassroots levels were carried out by INGOs, there was a close coordination on strategies
and programs between the two sets of actors and in many cases UNMIL provided direct
technical assistance to these INGOs.7
Since the 2005 elections, UNMIL remained engaged in capacity building activities,
though the draw down has begun and has been ramping up in the aftermath of the second
postwar elections, which took place in 201. Indeed as sign of institutional maturity, the
second postwar elections were almost entirely organized by the Liberian National Elections
Commission (NEC). The field experiment I describe below mimics the key components of
UNMIL’s activities, in particular the security provision and democratic education, in an
effort to test specific theoretical logics underpinning these activities.
4.2 Experimental design and implementation
From February to November 2011, I carried out (with Cyrus Samii) a large-scale field exper-
iment in Liberia entitled ”Peacebuilding and Democracy Promotion in Liberia” (PBDPL),
in close collaboration with UNMIL and two local civil society organizations–the Liberia
Democracy Watch (LDW) and the Bong Youth Association (BYA). Unique in its breath
and depth, this trial was designed to mimic as closely as possible two key components
of today’s peacebuilding operations, namely status-quo preserving strategies represented
by a security committee program that entailed monthly meetings between representatives
from selected villages and international security providers (UNMIL peacekeepers) to dis-
cuss security and other issues of concern to local communities; and status-quo transforming
7Some of this coordination was facilitated by the UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA), which tracked and mapped on a regular basis most international actors, the activities they were
carrying out as well as the locations where such activities were being undertaken through its 3W’s system
(Who does What and Where).
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strategies represented by a civic education program that entailed a 13-theme democracy
promotion curriculum covering a wide range of issues including nationhood and citizenship,
human rights and rule of law, democratic governance and political participation, and the
electoral process and gender-specific issues.8 Additional materials, especially those related
to programing in the social realm, came from a standard training manual employed in the
context of the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)–a global network
of representatives from INGOs and the UN as well as bilateral agencies working in the edu-
cational sector–a curriculum developed to promote mutual understanding and thus prevent
and resolve conflict peacefully; it has been used in thousands of schools and communities
in dozens postwar countries.9
Program activities on the ground were carried out by Field Facilitators from our imple-
menting partner organizations, who underwent intensive training by NEC staff and INEE
curriculum specialists. Once every month, over a period of nine months, they met with rural
Liberians in the targeted communities in a deliberative, town-forum style format, teaching
them about a wide range of topics, including general information about citizenship rights
and duties and the importance of political participation and good governance, including na-
tionhood and citizenship; human rights and rule of law; democratic governance; the electoral
process; and community mobilization for collective action, among others. The intervention
also included sub-treatments that emphasized matters of peaceful co-existence and politics
(e.g., ethnic tolerance or potential costs of electoral violence) and gender-related issues.
Consistent with the logic underlying STs, these activities sought to change aspects of the
status quo order (social structures or customs) primarily by providing citizens with political
information meant to: (i) enable citizens’ empowerment, coordination and mobilization for
political action; and (ii) change citizens’ normative priorities or preferences vis-a-vis the
prevailing order. In either case, the effects of such information are supposed to manifest in
8The program focused mostly on major issues emphasized in training manuals from international actors
involved in electoral assistance and democracy promotion in transitional countries, including the Interna-
tional Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES); the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); the
National Democratic Institute (NDI); and the Carter Center, among others.
9See http://www.ineesite.org/
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attitudinal and behavioral change. The goal, in other words, was to provide information
that would enable coordination and mobilization for otherwise costly political actions, while
altering preferences with regard to specific cultural practices. Appendix A1 lists the general
and specific themes covered in this intervention, detailed descriptions of which appear in
NEC’s Training Manual that can be provided upon request.
With regard to status quo-preserving strategies, my proxies were innovative ”village
security committees” that brought community members into regular contact with UNMIL
peacekeeping deployments. I designed this program to create a community-level ”early
warning system” with the goal of enhancing communication and building trust between
local communities and security providers, primarily UNMIL peacekeepers. At the start of
the intervention, program facilitators coordinated with local authorities to organize town
hall meetings with residents; at these meetings, six to eight community members were des-
ignated by the chief or plebiscite by community members to make up the town’s security
committee. These committee members were also to serve as points of contact for peace-
keepers in case of emergency or on an as-need basis during routine patrols. Thereafter, once
a month, each security committee met with a UNMIL military representatives (typically a
Camp Commander) at the nearest UN peacekeeping deployment base to discuss security
issues and concerns identified by the community, such as armed groups, communal or fa-
milial violence, robberies or cross-border armed activities. After each meeting, community
residents convened in another town hall meeting for a briefing by their security committee
members on the outcomes of their meeting with UNMIL military. These report back ses-
sions also allowed community members to decide as a group on new sets of issues to bring
to the attention of UNMIL military at future meetings
Consistent with the logics underlying SPs, this security intervention sought to mitigate
environmental sources of insecurity without meddling overtly in the social arrangements
of each community, with a goal of improving community members’ sense of security by
enhancing their confidence in UNMIL military (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2012). It also aimed
to boost peacekeepers’ knowledge of issues of concern to local communities and provide
them with an opportunity to keep communities abreast of ongoing peacekeeping activities.
In some instances, there did appear to be a fine line between STs and SPs activities and an
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unclear definition of what constituted a ”security” issue; for example, communities often
brought to meetings socioeconomic rather than security issues, such as the need to build
latrines or repair a bridge. UNMIL typically responded that such issues should be addressed
by local authorities and brought up to the Government of Liberia. Appendix A2 provides
a brief descriptions of the format and structure of these meetings.
The civic education and security committee interventions were randomly assigned over
a set of 144 communities, using a multi-way factorial design that allows us to measure ef-
fects for these two main treatments (and a number of embedded sub-treatments) along with
their interaction.10 Of these communities, 84 were assigned to a village security committee
program.11 We introduced variation in this treatment to better study the role of the pro-
cess for selecting committees, in which security committees in a randomly selected subset
of communities were nominated through a community ballot process, with the rest being
appointed by community chiefs. Forty-five communities were assigned to receive a civic ed-
ucation program, allowing us to measure the effect of civic education activities on average.
We were also interested in studying the effects of the specific content of the education pro-
gram. Therefore, in addition to giving all communities core training in general civic topics,
we introduced variation of content by randomly assigning half these communities additional
training in gender issues or issues related to non-violence and peaceful co-existence.12 The
remaining 42 towns did not receive any type of activities, serving as ”pure controls.”
Table 4.1 below shows the distribution of towns included in the end line study over the
cross security committee and civic education treatments, while Figure 4.1 visualizes the
locations of these different programs.13
10See Mvukiyehe and Samii (2011) for detailed information on program design.
11We therefore introduced exogenous variation in the density of committee communities from clan to clan
by randomly manipulating the proportion of villages in an area to receive security committees in order to
measure spillover effects of the security committee.
12A third type of treatment involved a combination of both the security committees and civic education
programming. 26 communities received such activities. In these cases, from month to month, the communi-
ties participated in one or another type of activity, sometimes alternating between the two due to time and
resource constraints.
13One town assigned to civic education and another assigned to the control group dropped from the end
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Figure 4.1: Geographic locations of the experimental study
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Table 4.1: Treatment assignment distribution
No civic education Civic education Total
No security committee 41 17 58
Security committee 58 26 84
Total 99 43 142
Prior to the launch of program activities and field experimentation, we carried out–
together with our implementing partner organizations–a ”community assessment” exercise
across all the targeted communities. This assessment collected key demographic informa-
tion on the towns as well as baseline conditions on key aspects of local contexts, including
social structures, community dynamics and security priorities, which the interventions were
designed to alter.14 The rollout of the program itself was carried out with assistance from
a field team of dozens of staff members from our local partner NGOs recruited from within
the communities (mostly leaders of community-based organizations). This staff was re-
sponsible for organizing the logistics of meetings between UNMIL military and community
members (for communities assigned to security intervention) and arranging community-
wide ”report back” sessions, as well as carrying out the monthly civic education campaigns
(for communities assigned to curriculum interventions).15 All communities received the as-
signed treatment as well the required number of interventions, with nine sessions for each
program. Program data shows fairly high participation rates on the part of community
members, with an average of 65 percent in communities assigned to a security intervention
attending at least one report back meeting, and 77 percent of those assigned to a civic ed-
ucation program attending at least one session. Throughout implementation, we gathered
a wide range of data. Sample pictures from these proceedings are provided in Appendix B.
line study due to access problems, so the final sample includes 142 rather than 144 towns. This attrition
rate, however, is too low to pose significant biases.
14See details about the kind of information that was collected on the ”Summary Sheet” in the appendix.
15This entailed liaising with a UNMIL Point of Contact (PoC), typically the commander of a company
of the peacekeeping deployment in the area to set a meeting date and to rent motorcycles to transport
community representatives to UNMIL meetings.
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4.3 Methods and data
4.3.1 Randomization check
Testing this study’s hypotheses depends in large part on the ability to draw valid inferences
from comparisons of the different experimental groups, which in turn depends on the success
of randomly assigning communities to different experimental groups. Did randomization
work? The idea behind random assignment of an intervention strategy is that these back-
ground features should be similar (in expectation) in the different treatment conditions.
Thus, balance needs to be ascertained to mitigate potential biases. I used multinomial logit
to check the extent of balance between the different treatment conditions by regressing the
different treatment conditions on an array of pre-intervention community characteristics,
using data from the 2008 census on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of com-
munities, proxies of wealth (e.g., occupation, wall material, household assets), community
infrastructures, literacy rates, and so on. I first ran a logit regression estimating the effects
of these community characteristics on the probability of receiving some kind of treatment
versus none (Model one). I then estimated a multinomial logit, allowing me to compare the
balance across the three main experimental conditions: probability of assignment to ”no
intervention” (Model 2 ) and to a security intervention (Model 3 in comparison to the base
category, which is the civic education). Table 3 summarizes these results.
The results in this table suggest that randomization worked successfully, as there is good
balance between the treatment groups and the control group–none of these community char-
acteristics is statistically significant at conventional levels in the comparison of propensity
to receive or not receive treatment. Only literacy levels seem to be imbalanced between
any treatment group and the control group. In addition there also seem to be significant
differences between the security committee treatment group and the control group with
respect to the extent proportion of young female and village population density. Otherwise
degree of balance is quite high. This provides a strong base for estimating causal effects in
a more straightforward way.
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Table 4.2: Balance between treatment and control communities
Any treatment No intervention Security committee
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-intervention community characteristics
Proportion of literates -.74 .21 -4.51**
(.63) (.47) (2.12 )
Proportion of death past 12 mos -1.43 3.55 1.16
(7.02) (6.09) ( 11.46)
Proportion of people in agriculture -.86 1.75 1.05
( 1.00) (1.25) (1.82)
Proportion of people employed -1.54 7.37 13.33
(10.30) (13.85) (11.33)
Proportion of households displaced .08 (-.10) .35
(1.55) (1.56) (1.30)
Proportion of people w/ high school .63 (-.93) 2.79
(1.66) (3.47) (2.51)
Proportion of young female 2.78 9.09 20.85**
(5.72) (9.70) (10.27)
Proportion of old male residents 2.00 5.14 11.03
(5.75) (10.62) (9.35)
Proportion of young male -2.34 10.03 11.50
(2.21) (8.05) (7.34)
Proportion of christian 3.45 .37 .68
(2.14) (3.15) (1.92)
Prop. of households w/ durable materials -.43 -3.63 .24
(1.88) (2.70) (3.26)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1.01 .78 2.09
(2.60) (3.78) (2.28)
High density .29 -.90 (-1.19)**
(.39) .59 (.51)
Fixed effects of geographic blocks -.14*** .13* -.031
( .05) ( .080) (.072)
Constant -1.97 -6.94 -16.25*
3.14 8.11 (8.81)
N= 1267 N1267 N1267
Chi= .03 .0000 .0000
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence levels respectively.
For models 2 and 3, the base outcome category is civic education interventions.
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4.3.2 Sample selection
Surveys with household decision-makers provided the main source of empirical data for this
dissertation.16 In each of the 142 study communities (see Figure 1), we first constructed
a roster of all the households and randomly selected 10 households for the survey, along
with the community chief. The 10 surveys were allocated as follows: (i) 4 surveys where a
male household decision-maker is the respondent; (ii) 4 surveys where a female household
decision-maker is the respondent; and (iii) 2 surveys where respondents were members of the
village security community in a community assigned with a security intervention.17 All 10
household respondents were interviewed using the same questionnaire, which gathered rich
data on the key outcome variables as well as on socioeconomic and household demographic
background (e.g., household wealth, conflict exposure) to serve as controls in the analysis.
In addition, we carried out one survey of the chief in each of the 142 study communities.
The town chief survey employed a different questionnaire and provided richer information
on community characteristics and dynamics that are usually difficult to measure reliably
from household surveys.
Household data collection activities took place from October through November 2011
with the help of an enumeration team of experienced researchers supplied by the Liberia
Institute of Statistics Geo-Information Service (LISGIS). We employed a variety of collec-
tion techniques, including self-reported questions, vignette-types questions and behavioral
games. We trained the enumerators extensively on the questionnaires, interview techniques
and principles of human subject protection. Quality control was conducted through unan-
nounced visits to the teams and regular reporting of global positioning satellite coordinates.
For the most part, sampling targets were met, as non-response was infrequent.
16We opted to interview decision-makers, rather than randomly selected individuals in households, to
minimize non-responses and sampling biases.
17In non-security committee communities, the town was asked to nominate 3 people who would serve as
members of a security committee, if the town had such an intervention.
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4.3.3 Measuring the strength of culture
Testing empirical implications of the theoretical arguments developed in this dissertation
requires a clear specification of the key variables that capture insights and ideas highlighted
in the theoretical discussion–in particular, variation in strength of existing local cultures,
which, I argue, mediate the influence of outside interventions on local populations’ attitudes
and behaviors. As cultural matters are intangible and therefore difficult to operationalize
(Sahlins 1999), this is hardly straightforward. Typically, empirical studies use the degree
of ethnic heterogeneity as a proxy for cultural strength (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Such
a measure, however, assumes ethnic heterogeneity is the most salient aspect of culture
and reduces this concept to a single dimension, when in reality it is likely to be multi-
dimensional.18 It also gives a misleading impression that cultural strength is static, which
is obviously not the case.
To avoid these pitfalls, my measurement strategy takes into account both the core
mechanisms that underlie cultural strength (e.g., its utility or the value it provides to group
members) and the multifaceted nature of culture (e.g., some may value its institutional as-
pect; others its ritualistic aspects). It operates on the understanding that cultural strength
is best seen as a latent concept inferred from more readily observable and therefore mea-
surable factors–and these are the variables hypothesized to increase or decrease culture’s
utility/value to its members. The proxies, then, when taken together provide a way for
us to discriminate empirically between culturally established local settings and culturally
fragmented local settings.19
Which variables influence cultural strength, and what drives variation in them (i.e. why
are they present in some settings, but not in others)? To posit an answer, I draw on
18Culture has many different components–deep culture or meaning, symbolic aspects, institutional dimen-
sions and so forth (Rubinstein 2008). Each of these aspects is complex in its own right and I do not attempt
to make claims about the relative saliency of these different aspects.
19Note that this operationalization is still limited in the sense that it presumes all factors considered to
have equal weight or importance in the measure of cultural strength, which is not necessarily the case. The
fact that people’s valuation of an existing culture depends on ethnicity, existing institutions or particular
cultural practices does not imply that all these aspects should be taken as equal under all circumstances.
Indeed, some aspects may be more salient to some groups, and less so for others.
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two sets of literature addressing different factors and sources of variation: the literature
of social change and political change (modernization, democratization, etc.) and that of
civil war. With respect to the former, classical writings of development theorists such as
Lerner (1958) point to a set of structural factors such as education or communication in
stimulating independent thinking to motivate individuals to question prevailing beliefs, to
imagine themselves outside of the current conditions and to ”move from their traditional
stance toward more modern perspectives challenging individual’s and thus society’s prevail-
ing beliefs” (Wilkins 2010). In other words, these factors provide feedback on one’s system
of beliefs or cultural paradigms, which can weaken them by making it possible to envi-
sion alternative and superior possibilities. Similar processes of change are implicit in some
democratization literature as well (e.g., Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Lipset 1981 1959).20
The relevant insight here is that education, information or wealth, among others, are en-
dowment factors that nurture change, and differences in these endowment factors should
be associated with differences in the strengths of existing cultural paradigms. Where such
factors are abundant, we should expect weak attachment to existing paradigms; where such
endowments are lacking, we should expect the opposite.
In some cases, differences in these change-enabling factors may reflect differences in
conditions that predate civil war. In other, however, such differences may be the result
of uneven civil war impacts. Hence my consideration of a second set of factors influenc-
ing cultural mechanisms as related to civil war violence. The literature tells us that civil
war directly devastates the very mechanisms that underpin cultural strength, including
norms of reciprocity and trust (Posner 2004; Widner 2004) or formal and informal dispute
management mechanisms (Colletta and Cullen 2000). Civil wars also tend to polarize com-
munities (Wood 2008) or lead to social and geographic dislocations–all of which can strain
the strength of an existing culture. (For example, culture will no longer have the same util-
ity if people are dispersed in different locations that have their own cultures.) But civil war
can also generate new institutions and mechanisms that enhance utility or value of a pre-
viously undervalued culture. As Gilligan et al. (2011) hypothesize in the case of Nepal, for
example, civil war violence can put pressure on less pro-social individuals to flee at a higher
20For a useful discussion of the relevant modernization literature, see Berman (2009).
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rate than more pro-social persons, leaving behind those who are disproportionately pro-
social.21 Specific factors related to civil war can reveal the extent to which the mechanisms
that underpin cultural strength may have survived war or been transformed/destroyed by
it. Therefore, these factors also serve as reasonable proxies of cultural strength.
My measure of cultural strength in the context of Liberia captures the multifaceted
concept of culture in a precise way, while also taking into account potential devaluation that
may stem from differential endowments in change-enabling/hindering structural factors and
from differential civil war impacts on pre-existing mechanisms. With respect to the former,
my measure of cultural strength includes factors such as the presence of traditional secret
societies or areas of the town that are closed off to outsiders, which suggest strong and
therefore change-resistant attachments to existing cultural paradigms, as well as variables
such as literacy rates that may suggest weak and therefore change-receptive attachments to
existing cultural paradigms.22 With respect to the latter, my measure of cultural strength
also includes a set of indicators meant to account for the fact that while culture as a
”structure” may appear to be in place and intact, its strength may have weakened as a
result of civil war violence and dislocations (for example, the proportion of households that
have been displaced or that lost a family member during the war). The following specific
variables were employed in my index measure of cultural strength (”+” sign indicates greater
contribution to cultural strength; ”-” sign indicates the opposite). Information on all these
variables come from the three main data sources: main household surveys and local chief
surveys carried out as part of the PBDPL, and the national census (henceforth Census).
• Ethnic bond (+): This indicator captures the extent to which community members
identify with community chief on an ethnic dimension and I measured it using the
21Gilligan et al. (2011) calls this a ”purging hypothesis,” in contrast with an ”institutional hypothesis,”
according to which communities disproportionately affected by civil war are forced to adopt more pro-
social behavior to increase chances of survival. Such an institutional mechanism is illustrated in changes in
patterns of settlement in many Liberian communities, where previously scattered households were forced to
form closer settlements to better defend themselves against rebel attacks (LISGIS 2008).
22An advantage here is the capture of specific sets of values, traditions and practices for groups that are
geographically bound as well as the degree to which such values are shared by this population, which is
missing in the ethnic heterogeneity measure.
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proportion of town members who share the chief’s ethnicity (Census).
• Presence of a traditional (secret) society (+): Traditional societies are known
to play a key role in maintaining cultural traditions and transmitting them to younger
members through various initiations and rituals–some of which have been suggested
to inimical to liberal values (Ellis 2006; Moran 2005). In the Liberian case the most
common traditional societies are the ”Poro” (typically restricted to male membership)
and the ”Sande” (typically restricted to female membership) and the survey collected
extensive data on the presence of such societies in all study communities (PBDPL).
• Area of town off limit to foreigners (+): In some communities, entire sections are
completely closed off to outsiders for community-wide cultural rituals and activities
and so the survey collected information on this aspect as well. Part of the motivation
for including this measure is that critics often argue that the culture that traditional
societies purport to embed merely serve to protect elite interests and do not really
represent cultural preferences of the community at large. Thus, this measure should
help capture some of the issues that the critics raise (PBDPL).
• Proportion of old male (+): It has been suggested that this demographic group
tends to favor the prevailing culture and to resist a new culture (than younger people
or even older female). Thus, an argument can be made that the higher the proportion
of old male in a community the more intense preference for the existing culture would
be (Census).
• Proportion of town dwellers engaged in agriculture (+): Similarly to old
male, people involved agricultural activities have been argued to have conservative
tendencies. This is a basic premise in modernization theories (Huntington 1968). One
of the reasons for this is that this demographic group simply has limited exposure to
other culture and information. Thus, preference over pre-existing culture is much a
statement about valuation of that culture as it is about lack of diversification (Census).
• Proportion of town dwellers with lower literacy rates (+): Similarly the pre-
vious two variables, modernization theories have argued that literacy rates contribute
to the lessening of attachments to traditional values. This intuition is consistent
with recent less educated people tend to have stronger preferences and stable beliefs,
though they point to the lack of feedback about current beliefs–limited opportunities
for stimulation for preference change–for mechanism (Druckman and Lupia 2000).
Similarly, for this and preceding three variables, stronger attachment to their PSAs
may be attributed, at least in part, to infrequent feedback about their culture. But
is still cultural strength (Census.)
• Proportion of young male (-): See below.
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• Proportion of young female (-): See below.
• Proportion of households with family member displaced during war (-):
See below.
• Proportion of households with a family member injured during war (-):
See below.
• Proportion of households that lost a family member during war (-): See
below.
The preceding five variables are self-explanatory and related to civil war. As argued
earlier, they are included to account for the fact that civil war may have weakened
values that culture used to offer and so the idea is that the more a community is
characterized by higher values along these factors, rather than the structural features
discussed earlier, the weaker the preferences of its members over an existing culture.
These demographic groups are also far more likely to have been exposed to other
cultural values, which they may import back into their community. As Keen (2003)
pointed out in the case of Sierra Leone, these demographics will tend to have the effect
of lessening these groups attachment to traditional norms and values and make them
more susceptible to adopting other values and cultures: ”Displacement has brought
exposure to new ideas and systems, and a new unwillingness to submit to abuses by
chiefs. The link between migration and awareness is a long-standing one. Historically,
outmigration from the less well-resourced north meant young people with a wider
experience of the world outside the chiefdom tended to be less willing to accept the
authority of chiefs, especially chiefs with no education.”
Table 4.2 below organizes these variables by source of disruption to culture and provides
summary statistics. I used factor analysis to construct an overall index measure of ”cultural
strengths.” All the variables were recoded appropriately so that higher values for individual
and overall measures consistently represent culturally fragmented settings (and therefore
greater susceptibility to adopting new values) and lower values indicate established cultures
(and therefore less susceptibility to change).
Overall, my measure of cultural strength or weakness show a great deal of variation. The
values of this overall measure range from -3.9 to +3.5, where lower values represent estab-
lished cultural settings and higher values represent fragmented cultural settings and with
mean values being essentially 0.23 Further empirical analysis will reveal the extent to which
23A more intuitive way may be to have higher value of the measure represent establish cultural settings
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Table 4.3: Indicators and overall index of cultural ctrength
N Mean SD Min Max Source
Structure-relate factors
Chief and Community level of ethnic bond 1287 -.640 [.422] -1 0 CNS
Presence of traditional secret society 1287 -.320 [.467] -1 0 CHS
Area of town off-limit to outsiders 1287 -.529 [.499] -1 0 CHS
Proportion of old male in town 1267 -.1241 [.0409] -.333 0 CNS
Proportion of town dwellers engaged in agriculture 1267 -.286 [.222] -1 0 CNS
Proportion of households built w/ durable materials 1267 .063 [.120] 0 .949 CNS
Proportion of town dwellers w/ some high schooling 1267 .106 [.137] 0 1
Proportion of young male in town 1267 .375 [.105] 0 .874 CNS
Proportion of young female in town 1267 .372 [ .102] .031 .889 CNS
Civil war-related factors
Proportion of households w/ member displaced 1278 .845 [.361] 0 1 CNS
Proportion of households w/ member injured 1251 .495 [.500] 0 1 HHS
Proportion of households w/ member died 1271 .773 [ .418] 0 1 HHS
Overall cultural strength (weakness):
Overall index of cultural strength or weakness 1183 .17 [1] -3.936 3.539 HHS/CNS/CHS
Agency-related factors
Town chief elected 1227 .538 [.498] 0 1 CHS
Key:HHS: Household survey —HHS: Chief survey —CNS: Census
High values = Fragmented cultures — Low values = Established cultures
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the strength of an existing culture, as measured here, interacted with with the different
peacebuilding strategies and how any such interactions influenced democratic outcomes.
4.3.4 Key outcome measures of interest
The key outcomes of interest in this dissertation are ”democratic outcomes,” a broad concept
that encompasses a wide range of liberal outcomes sought by peacebuilders. As noted in
the theory chapter, I focus on political and social participation dimensions of this concept,
specifically political participation and social cohesion at the grassroots level. Below I provide
a brief description for each of the two outcomes and important aspects that will be measured.
Specifics on measurement strategies will be discussed in greater detail in the respective
empirical chapters.
Chapter 5 will investigate the effects of peacebuilding strategies on political participa-
tion, both the (i) levels of political participation in a wide range of electoral and non-electoral
political activities as well as formal and national as well as informal and local mechanisms
that ordinary citizens rely upon to engage with political actors and institutions; and the ii)
quality of political participation, which focuses on a participant’s effective use of whatever
activities she chooses and on the presence of basic rights and liberties that are necessary
for genuine participation (Dahl 1971). Because of the peculiar features of politics in post-
conflict settings, my measures of political participation will also include indicators specific to
attitudes and behaviors related to the legitimacy and use of violence in politics. Household
surveys and behavioral measures are the primary sources of data for political participation.
Chapter 6 will investigate the effects of peacebuilding strategies on social cohesion, broadly
defined in reference to the behavior and attitudes that reflect the propensity of individuals
within or between communities to work together for a common goal (King et al. 2010).
I will use a public goods game that provide behavioral measures of social cohesion both
within and between communities.
I now turn to the empirical part of the dissertation.
and lower values fragmented settings. I opted for the reverse, however, as I use susceptibility to change (not
resistance) as a reference point.
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Chapter 5
Effects of Peacebuilding Strategies
on Political Participation
The aim of this chapter is to conduct a formal empirical testing of research hypotheses devel-
oped in chapter 3. That is, to investigate the effects of two peacebuilding strategies, namely
status-quo preserving strategies (SPs) and status-quo transforming strategies (STs), repre-
sented by a village security committee program and a civic education program, respectively,
on democratic outcomes at the grassroots level across different local contexts. Specifically,
I hypothesized that status quo-transforming strategies (such as democratic education) are
typically explicit in their aim of changing aspects of existing cultural paradigms at a rapid
pace–an approach that often provokes local resistance, even hostility, in culturally estab-
lished settings, where change usually comes organically and slowly from within established
patterns of interactions (H1). Yet these informational mechanisms and their ”brusque” de-
livery are precisely what are needed, perhaps, to overcome pervasive cooperation-hindering
problems in culturally fragmented settings. Therefore, status quo-transforming strategies
have much better prospects in the latter settings (H2).
I focus on political participation–a key mechanism for democracy and peace (Doyle and
Sambanis 2006; Orr 2002; Boutros-Ghalis 1992)–and relatively measurable at the micro-
level. Empirical evidence suggests that the effects of these two strategies depend on local
context, measured in terms of cultural strength. In areas where local culture is firmly es-
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tablished, the village security committee program has strong positive effects on the overall
measures of political participation; in areas where local cultures are fragmented, it has no
meaningful effects. By contrast, in those same culturally fragmented areas, the civic educa-
tion program has strong positive effects on the overall measures of political participation,
and adverse effects where local cultures are firmly established. With this heterogeneity,
average effects look no different from zero, as found in some macro-level empirical studies.
Theoretical and policy implications of these results are discussed.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section outlines my strategy for measuring
political participation (chapter three discusses measurement strategies for other variables),
while section two outlines my empirical framework and presents empirical findings. Section
three discusses these results in detail, and section four concludes.
5.1 Measurement Strategy
Verba and Nie (1987) define political participation as ”those activities by private citizens
that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel
and/or the action they take” (2). This definition is broad enough to encompass involvement
in both elections-related and non-elections-related political activities. Indeed, comparative
research has identified various ways in which ordinary citizens can influence their country’s
politics and policies. The survey contains an array of questions relating to these different
modes of political participation,1 organized around the dimensions established in the liter-
ature: (i) the voting mode, encompassing voting in the 2005 election; (ii) the campaigning
mode, including contributions of time and/or money to a political campaign and political
rally attendance; (iii) the contacting mode, including contact with one’s representative in
the national assembly or senator, or contact with a government official or agency; (vi) the
communing mode, encompassing community meeting attendance, speech and contacting
community leaders; and (v) the protesting mode, encompassing peaceful forms of protest.
Given the peacebuilder’s typical focus on the liberal values underlying political partici-
1Question formulation for each indicator may be found in the survey instruments, which can be provided
upon request.
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pation, and not just levels of participation, we added a new dimension to this investigation:
liberal politics and orientations, meant to capture the extent to which Liberians subscribe
to liberal values such as non-violence and respect for human rights. Specific indicators in-
clude non-participation in violent protests (such as mob violence); rejection of violence as a
legitimate political strategy; propensity to resist political intimidation; political empower-
ment (i.e., interest and efficacy); rejection of parochial (ethnic) politics; and participation
in peace festivals–an expressive form used increasingly by Liberians to send a strong signal
to political leaders about their preference for peaceful politics.
The questionnaire covered many of these self-reported measures of participation, asking
respondents about their participation (or lack thereof) in such activities over the preced-
ing 10 months (February to November 2011).2 In addition, PBDPL went a step further
and supplemented these self-reported measures with innovative behavioral (and observable)
measures, including contacting political leaders by posting message cards to survey team
pickup locations; sending petitions against violence to political leaders; voting tests using
copies of the actual ballot used during the elections; a game that ascertained civic voting
by presenting multiple ”fictional candidates” who presented competing political platforms;
and selling daily newschapter clips that provided the latest information about elections re-
sults, among others. These behavioral and observable measures were designed to enhance
incentive compatibility on the part of respondents and to reduce potential priming biases
of self-reported survey questions. This is particularly important with respect to outcome
measures associated with liberal political participation, in which people may already be
familiar with desirable answers, even if these do not necessarily reflect their underlying pre-
dispositions (Collier and Vicente 2011; Pande 2011). I provide a brief description on these
measures below.
• Voting: Reports of voting in the first round of the elections were verified by either
checking the respondent’s index finger to see if they have election-stain (which tends
to last several days and so it was still visible for most respondents at the time of the
interview) or by asking the respondent to show the finger on which election staff put
2Many of these indicators do not count as measures of political participation per se, but they are often
described as indicating political orientations or general dispositions expressing beliefs and attitudes towards
politics and institutions (Brady et al. 1995; Bratton 1999).
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the stain after voting. We use this indicator to measure voting behavior (turnout).
• Contacting political leaders with a card message: Respondents were asked
about their most important issues/concerns and whether they would like to bring
these to the attention of a local or national leader. They then were given a postcard
where they could write prioritized issues and asked to drop it in a mail box placed in
the middle of the town within three days if they wanted the message to be carried to
the intended leaders. Our survey team came back three days after to collect the cards
that returned. Returning the card is taken to be a measure of political participation.
See sample card in Appendix C.2
• Signing message card: In addition, respondents who were willing to contact their
leaders via the message card that was provided to them, they were asked if they would
like to send the card anonymously or with their name signed on it. The former was
taken as a message of political empowerment. See sample card in Appendix C.2
• Voting test: Respondents were presented with a sample of the voting ballot specimen
that was used in the first round of the presidential election and asked to mark it as
they did in the poling center. If the respondent had gotten help from a family member
of a trusted individual in the community, we asked them to do the same on this test–
that is to seek help from the individual who helped them on election day. See sample
ballot in Appendix C.1
• Civic/liberal voting: Respondents were presented with pictures portraying different
types of politicians based on messages they provided voters. We asked respondents
to think about their own situation in the campaign that hand just ended and tell us
which politician and message type had resonated with them the most (e.g., ethnic,
religious, regional, materialistic, civic, etc.) and ask to tell us which candidate they
would vote for if elections were held today based on the message that resonated with
them the most. This measure sought to distinguish between voters who cast their
ballot on a more ”civic,” national platform versus those who cast their ballots on
more parochial platforms. See materials that were used in Appendix C.5
• Legitimacy of violence as a political strategy: Sending a petition against vi-
olence to the presidential candidates in run-off. Respondents were told a vignette
about elections violence that had just taken place in Ivory Cost and asked whether
they thought violent means were justified for politicians who wanted to maintain
themselves to power. Then they were asked specifically about politicians in Liberia,
in particular those from the party they supported. Those who reported that violence
should never be justified in politics were asked if they were willing to send a clear mes-
sage to the two presidential candidates who were in the run-off elections. Acceptance
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to sign and send the petition to political leaders was taken a a strong, incentive com-
patibility measure capturing the respondent’s perceptions about the use of violence
in politics. See Sample petition in Appendix C.3
• Buying a news paper to measure the costs one is willing to pay to ob-
tain political information: Since most of the villages targeted in this study are
rural and hardly get exposed to direct information about political currents, especially
information from the print media, we sought to ascertain their political interest by
proposing them to buy newschapter daily we had brought from Monrovia. Specifically,
respondents were asked about their interest in learning about the latest elections news
and then presented with a clip of local daily newschapters (which circulate mainly in
Monrovia) that they could buy, if they were interested. We take this to be a fairly
reliable measure of political interest. See sample news clip in Appendix C.4
• Measuring political knowledge with a popular political slogans: Respon-
dents were told a popular slogan in Liberian politics and asked whether they were
knowledgeable of its meaning and able to identify the party/candidate who uses it.
The slogan employed is: ”Baboon wait small; monkey is still working.” This slogan
was widely used by the incumbent president, Johnson-Sirleaf of the United party, dur-
ing the elections campaign as a veiled message to her main opponent of the Congress
for Democratic Change that she deserved another term to finish she work she had
started in her first term. Positive identification was taken to be a sign of political
interest.
Table 5.1 below lists these and all other outcome indicators of political participation as
well as their broader outcome families. It also provides summary statistics for each outcome
indicator.
What do the data say about the prevalence and patterns of liberal political participation
in this sample of Liberians? Summary statistics are provided in Table 5.1 and closely align
with those reported in Mvukiyehe (2013a), albeit based on a different sample. Overall,
descriptive statistics suggest the prevailing pattern of political participation to be one with
higher rates of participation in activities oriented community level politics and far smaller
rates of participation in activities oriented towards national politics, other than voting.
Patterns with respect to liberal orientations are also similar to those reported earlier, with
71% sending a petition against violence to their leaders, 65% indicating preference for a
political office seeker with a national/civic–rather than a parochial–political platform, and
more than 50% buying news papers for elections-related information, among others. In
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Table 5.1: Outcome indicators of liberal political participation
N Mean SD Min Max Source
Standard modes of political participation
Electoral participation
Running for elected office 1288 .045 [.207] 0 1 HHS
Contributed to campaigns 1288 .173 [ .378] 0 1 HHS
Attended political rallies 1257 .267 [.442] 0 1 HHS
Contacting
Contact political leaders 1297 .124 [.330] 0 1 HHS
Sending card to leaders 1297 5.548 [2.51] 0 10 BEH
Protesting
Attend peaceful protests 1266 .0537 [.225] 0 1 HHS
Call in radio to complain about leaders 1287 .0924 [.289] 0 1 HHS
Communing
Attend community meetings 1297 .871 [.335] 0 1 HHS
Speak at community meetings 1297 .710 [.453] 0 1 HHS
Contact traditional leaders 1297 .733 [.442] 0 1 HHS
Liberal orientations and politics
Send anti-violence petition 1297 .631 [.482] 0 1 BEH
Voting test 1235 .937 [.2418] 0 1 BEH
Civic voting 1262 .672 [.469] 0 1 BEH
Buy news news paper 1246 .492 [.500] 0 1 BEH
Respect for women’s rights 1297 4.976 [1.588] 3 8 HHS
Signed message card 1297 [4.212] [2.649] 0 10 BEH
Political efficacy 1297 .419 [.493] 0 1 BEH
Key:HHS: Household survey —BEH: Behavioral activity
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the next section, I carry out statistical analyses that will provide evidence for whether this
variation can be attributed to the two peacebuilding strategies under study or to their in-
teractions with local cultures. The remainder of this chapter will provide empirical evidence
to adjudicate.
5.2 Empirical estimation framework
I now turn to a discussion of my empirical framework. I use multiple regressions to model
two sets of relationships: (i) that between two treatment interventions (i.e., security com-
mittee program and curriculum intervention) and measures of liberal political participation
as previously described; and (ii) that between two treatment interventions and measures of
liberal political participation accounting for a potential mediating role of local cultures. I
discuss modeling specifications and present empirical results for each set of relationships in
turn.
5.2.1 Estimating average effects of the treatments
The first set of the relationship seeks to estimate the difference in average treatment effects
(ATEs) for the security committee treatment and the curriculum intervention, respectively,
for the population towns and provides evidence for the ”conventional hypothesis,” which
suggests that the two strategies should have independent positive effects (on average) on
political participation and have even greater effects when they are carried out as a package.
I estimate a regression equation of the following form:
Yit = β0 + β1St + β2Ct + β3SXCt + γc[t] + δb[c[t]] + ￿it (5.1)
Where:
Yit : is the level of participation for person in in town t (also town average);
St : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at security committee
treatment;
Ct : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at civic education treat-
ment;
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SXCt : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received both treatments;
γc[t]: is an indicates wether the clan of security committee town was a high or low
density;
δb[c[t]] : is a fixed effect for the block (and field facilitator) to which the town was assigned;
and
￿it : is the disturbance term for the regression.
The parameters of interest in this equation are: β1 and β2, which should provide us
with estimates of the difference in ATEs for the security committee treatment and the cur-
riculum intervention, respectively,3 as well as β3, which should provide us with estimates
of joint effects of these treatments. Other regression terms are included simply to increase
precision of the estimates. I estimate the effects of individual indicators of political par-
ticipation, as well as overall measures extracted by averaging normalized means across the
relevant indicators. The overall measure of political participation is based on averages of
all indicators of political participation typically employed in this chapter, including those
related to liberal norms and values, in order to capture the liberal quality that is explicitly
sought by contemporary peacebuilding interventions. I do not include any other controls,
as randomization achieved very good balance. Specific estimation techniques depend on the
structure of the outcome variable.4
5.2.1.1 Marginal effects on individual outcome indicators
I employ probit estimation techniques to estimate marginal effects of each treatment on
individual outcomes of liberal political participation. The main results on each outcome
indicator are displayed in Table 5.2 Models 3-20. Separate regressions were estimated for
each outcome variable, as specified in equation (1) and thus the coefficients in the table are
marginal effects for each of the treatment conditions: security committee (Column 1); Civic
3Assignment of probabilities to the security committee treatment was not uniform, as a result of different
clan sizes and density variability. To ensure consistency of this estimator, weight adjustments were made.
4Most of my outcome variables are dichotomous, making probit the more appropriate technique. It
estimates the probability that the latent variable Y*, representing the propensity of person i to engage in
political participation, is observed as 1. The other three variables are continuous and I therefore employ
standard OLS regressions. All statistical analyses to be reported here were performed using Stata version11.
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Table 5.2: Marginal effects on outcome indicators of liberal political participation
Specification Security Civec Mixed
Committee Education Program
Standard modes of political participation
Electoral participation
Running for elected office -0.00 -0.03** 0.06**
(4) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Contributed to campaigns -0.07** -0.11** 0.18**
(5) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08)
Attended political rallies 0.06* 0.09 -0.06
(6) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Contacting
Contact political leaders -0.03* 0.01 0.02
( 7) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Sending card to leaders -02 -.30* 0.31*
( 8) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18)
Protesting
Attend peaceful protests 0.04*** 0.03 -.01
(9) (0.01) (0.03) (0.025)
Call in radio to complain about leaders 0.00 -0.00 00
(10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Communing
Attend community meetings 0.04 -0.01 0.01
( 11) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
Speak at community meetings 0.00 -.10 0.13***
( 12) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Contact traditional leaders -0.02 -10 0.12*
(13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Liberal orientations and politics
Send anti-violence petition 0.06 0.10 -0.10
(14) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Voting test 0.00 -.0.03 0.03
(15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Civic voting 0.08 0.07 -0.03
(16) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Buy news news paper 0.09 0.14* -0.012
(17) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Respect for women’s rights 0.05 -0.03 0.01
( 18) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12)
Signed message card -.00 -0.22 0.23
(19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.30)
Political efficacy -0.05 -11 0.16*
( 20) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10)
Mean effects on liberal political participation
Average z scores 0.14 -0.09 0.29
(21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
Note: Regression for each outcome was estimated separately. N= 1147 -1297
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
curriculum (Column 2) and joint effects (Column 3).
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The results in Table 5.2 do not provide compelling evidence of meaningful effects of
the main treatment interventions, neither of which is seen to have consistent or systematic
positive effects across the different measures of political participation. In fact, from a
statistical significance viewpoint, the table is virtually empty. Perhaps the only glimpse of
hope comes from the joint (i.e., interaction) effects of these two treatments, which suggest
modest effects on a few outcome indicators including running for elective office or speaking
at community meetings, though no systematic effects. These results also show that civic
education has a negative association with many of the outcome indicators investigated,
though only a few achieve high enough statistical precision to make this point. On balance,
then, these results lead me to conclude that the two strategies–status quo-preserving and
status quo-transforming–simply do not have systematic, independent effects or meaningful
joint effects on many measures associated with liberal norms and values or, therefore, on
levels of liberal participation.
Arguably, with regard to a multifaceted issue such as political participation involving
so many relevant outcome measures, it is unrealistic, possibly even unfair, to expect any
one intervention to have consistent positive effects across these measures. With multiple
comparisons there is always a possibility that some results may occur purely due to chance;
and inevitably, some measures will be influenced positively while others will not (Casey et
al. 2011). Without a clear sense of the overall net effects from these multiple indicators,
it is difficult to draw conclusions from disparate sets of findings. Moreover, the different
coefficient estimates are not necessarily statistically significant, nor do they all necessarily
point in the same direction. One way to address these concerns is to compute ”mean effects”
across the different outcome variables to ascertain any treatment effect overall (Casey et al.
2012; Robert 2010), as I will show next.
5.2.1.2 Estimating mean effects
”Mean effects estimates” are intended to provide an overall net effect on a set of outcomes of
interest. They are typically extracted by averaging normalized means across a large number
of indicators to capture different aspects of a multifaceted subject phenomenon (Casey et
al. 2012). Estimation procedures are fairly straightforward and entail three steps. In my
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analysis, I first normalized all outcome indicators investigated in this study over the entire
sample (17 indicators of political participation). Second, I created a new overall variable
by aggregating the normalized variables, which was then normalized. The third and final
step was to fit a regression as in equation (1), with the only difference being that the z-
scores are the only dependent variable on which intervention effects are estimated. The
coefficient of the treatment variables in this regression represents the percentage change in
standard deviations, with respect to the distribution of the index. This is the ”mean effect”
of a particular treatment across the different outcome indicators. Thus, I performed an
OLS estimation of the overall (normalized) outcome variable on the two primary treatment
variables (security committee and curriculum intervention) and their interactions, as in
equation (1.)
Regression estimates for the three treatment conditions are also presented in Table 6
(Model 21). They confirm the patterns seen with individual indicators–basically, a null
result on either of the two treatments or their interaction. Specifically, the combination of
both security committee treatment and curriculum intervention continues to be the most
promising, showing a mean effect size of 0.20 standard deviations, within range of the effect
size found in a separate observational study that looked at the effects of UNMIL operations
on participation (See Mvukiyehe 2013a), but not statistically significant at conventional
levels. The results on the effects of the two primary treatment variables display a similar
pattern to that of individual outcomes indicators, with the security committee showing
a positive average treatment effect of .18 standard deviations and the civic education a
negative effect of about .07 standard deviations. Neither of these results is statistically
significant.
Taken together, these results cast doubt on the hypothesis implicit in the peacebuilding
approach that transformative aspects of the strategy through democratic education activ-
ities should increase the likelihood of local adoption of liberal norms and values as well
as increase levels of political participation. It is particularly noteworthy that curriculum
intervention, which has been the flagship activity for liberal transformation, seems to per-
form least well on measures of political participation examined in this study. The evidence
presented here does not support this hypothesis. Nor does it support the conservative
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hypothesis that puts emphasis on security provision (e.g., Wantchekon 2004). The two
treatment programs with a security dimension do in fact show moderate positive effects on
overall measures of political participation, but the lack of statistical significance of both
estimates cautions against jumping to conclusions too quickly.
From a substantive point of view, the modest mean effects achieved when both treatment
types are combined were encouraging, but even then they were not statistically significant,
meaning they are not different from zero effect. Proponents of the conventional hypothesis
may argue that it is meant for macro-level processes, and so micro-level evidence does not
necessarily undermine its logic. That is true, but only to a point, as we know that these
claims do rest on micro-foundations that can only be ascertained at the micro-level. Thus,
a further investigation of the mechanisms that govern democracy promotion is warranted.
I now turn to an empirical investigation of an alternative account that I developed in the
theory section.
5.2.2 Estimating effects heterogeneity
The results presented in the previous two subsections suggested little support of the implicit
hypothesis in conventional accounts of peacebuilding influence on political participation–
results I argued should be expected if variation in local contexts is not taken into account. In
the theoretical section, I drew on insights from social science studies to formulate specific
hypotheses about how the strength of local cultures plays an important role in terms of
moderating different peacebuilding strategies’ influence on liberal political participation at
the local level and argued that these should provide a better accounting of the empirical
relationship between peacebuilding strategies and political participation in local settings of
different cultural strength, at least as measured in this chapter. I now turn to empirical
data for answers.5 To ascertain effects, I fit a generic regression equation of the following
5My research hypotheses were formulated in a pre-analysis plan prior to conducting data analysis. The
type of analysis I carry out is typically referred to as ”heterogeneous treatment effects” or ”interaction
effects,” which Gerber and Green (2012) define as ”the change in treatment effect that occurs from one
subgroup to the next.” The quantity of interest here is typically referred to as Conditional Average Treatment
Effect (CATE), and it ascertains whether, and the extent to which, pre-specified covariates (in this case,
cultural strength) lead to higher or lower ATE estimates.
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type:
Yit = β0 + β1St + β2Ct + β3Pt + β4SXPt + β5CXPt + γc[t] + δb[c[t]] + ￿it (5.2)
Where:
Yit : is the level of participation for person in in town t (also town average);
St : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at security committee
treatment;
Ct : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at civic education treat-
ment;
Pt : is a variable indicating that indicate the strength of local culture t;
SXPt : is an interaction term between the security committee treatment and the
strength of measure;
CXPt : is an interaction term between the civic education treatment and the strength
of culture measure;
γc[t]: indicates wether the clan of security committee town was a high or low density;
δb[c[t]] : is a fixed effect for the block (and field facilitator) to which the town was assigned;
and
￿it : is the disturbance term for the regression.
This equation is similar to equation (1), except for the addition variable Pt, which
indicates the level of cultural strength for town t and its interactions with the security
committee and curriculum treatment (i.e. SXPt : and CXPt :).6 The parameters of
interest in this equation are: β4 and β5, which basically provide estimates of ATEs across
culturally established settings and across culturally fragmented settings.
The coefficient on the interaction terms (in model one) or the coefficient on the primary
factors (in models 2 and 3 where the sample is already split) will provide an answer.7 That
6It should be noted that for the purpose of this part of the analysis, the civic education treatment combines
the civic education only condition and the civic education plus security committee for both conceptual,
statistical power and practical reasons. Though I plan to conduct sensitivity analysis with these measures
employed separately to see if there will be significant variation in the results.
7In the full model, only the coefficients on interaction terms are of substantive and statistical importance.
CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES ON POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION 96
is, these coefficients (in the full model at least) should be interpreted as the predicted
differences in increase (or decrease) of levels of liberal participation between heterogeneous
communities that have undergone similar treatment interventions. Regressions estimates
are summarized in Table 5.3 below8 Model 22 presents results on a full sample, with two
interaction terms based on each of the two treatment variables and a dummy variable
indicating cultural strength (1 is the category for weak valuation). Models 23 and 24
present interaction effects in a different way, by looking at the effects of the treatment
variables in split samples for local settings with and without an established culture. (I
used the mean as a threshold to discriminate between the two types). Figure 5.1 provides
compelling visualization of these heterogeneous results.
The results in Table 5.3 and visualizations shown in Figure 5.1 are striking and re-
veal that the effects of the two peacebuilding strategies under study–the village security
committee program and the civic education curriculum–depend critically on local context
measured in terms of cultural strength. The results provide support for theoretical expec-
tations outlined in this theory. Over the entire population of our communities, as model 22
indicates, the civic education had very large positive effects on political participation of the
communities with fragmented established cultures in the order of .69 standard deviations,
whereas the security community had a negative effect of -.48 standard deviations on the
same set of communities. These are as substantively meaningful as they are statistically so,
having achieved significance at the 99 percent confidence level.
Statistical analyses in split samples provide clearer support of each of the hypotheses
outlined. In local settings that have established cultures (model 23), the curriculum inter-
vention led to a .25 standard deviation decrease in levels of liberal political participation
(a prediction made in H1), whereas the security committee intervention increased liberal
participation by nearly twice this effect size (.41 standard deviations), the prediction made
In other words, the importance and significance of the primary factors are different when interaction terms
are taken into account (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003), and for the purpose of the analysis at hand, they are not
of primary concerns.
8I also estimated interaction effects between the two treatment variables and the full index measure of
cultural strength, with values centered at mean 0 and the significance of the results is unchanged.
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Table 5.3: Heterogeneous effects of peacebuilding strategies
Overall political participation
Full model Established Settings Fragmented Settings
(22) (23) (24)
Security committee .40*** .41*** -.18
(.10) (.12) (.16)




Sec com X Cultural Strength -.48***
(.19)
Cived X Cultural Strength .69***
(.17)
Constant -.08 -.14 -.06
(.11) (.14) (.12)
N= 1172 N=618 N= 554
F= .000 F= .000 F= .000
Adj. R2 = .18 Adj. R2 = .19 Adj. R2 = .19
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
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in H3. By contrast, in culturally fragmented settings (model 24), the curriculum interven-
tion is shown to have contributed to a .50 standard deviation increase in levels of liberal
participation, an effect statistically significant at the .01 level, which is consistent with the
prediction made in H2, whereas the security committee intervention did poorly–as predicted
by H4–and appears to have reduced levels of liberal political participation by 18 standard
deviations, though this result is not statistically significant at the conventional level. These
are important results as they suggest that different aspects of the same peacebuilding strat-
egy can actually work at counter-purposes. Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that
CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES ON POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION 99
differences in cultural strength do not automatically translate into a startup ”bump” with
respect to political participation, suggesting that these effects do in fact come from the
work of international interventions.9 Yet with this heterogeneity in local settings, average
effects of the peacebuilding strategies can look no different from zero, as found in a number
of the macro-level empirical studies discussed previously.
But how robust are these results? From a statistical standpoint, the results are quite
robust, as a series of robustness checks confirm.10 Yet before drawing definitive conclusions
about the established relationships, one needs to demonstrate that the results presented
here are not a statistical artifact of the particular set of data employed. This is especially
important since for my primary measure I relied heavily on auxiliary data provided by the
national census (collected in 2008). While such data is typically more reliable than self-
reported data, it may raise questions about whether it accurately captures people’s own
valuation of their culture. Therefore, it is important to cross-check this construction with
self-reported information from the respondents.
One way to do this is by examining whether the patterns of results hold with respect to
a host of measures that are theoretically related to cultural strength, but that are not part
of the primary measure. Here, I look at the saliency of six alternative indicators: greater
trust in a co-tribesmen or co-religious, active participation in community works and in koko
and susu, which are forms of rotating credit (in money, goods or labor), greater trust in the
traditional leader, and frequency of interaction with the traditional leader. These measures
get at qualitative aspects of cultural strength discussed earlier (i.e., stronger social identity
and norms such as trusts and frequency of interaction with the chief) and therefore do serve
as a good proxy of cultural strength. If the arguments advanced here are correct, we should
expect the two treatments to have differential effects across individuals who have high and
low values on these indicators. I recoded these indicators as dummy (0 below the mean and
1 above the mean) and estimated regressions of the type equation (2) on each subsample.
9The relevant variable (i.e., strength of culture) in the model does not have a meaningful or statistically
significant association with liberal participation.
10I ran 100,000 basic simulations for each of these models, and the means estimates produced by these
were virtually similar to those in the original models.
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Regression estimates are summarized in Table 5.4 below, in the order listed above and with
each pair of models showing results for individuals who value an existing culture strongly
and those who do not.
The results are surprisingly consistent with those reported in the preceding paragraph.
In particular, it is noteworthy to see the consistency of strong positive effects of the security
committee treatment on liberal political participation with respect to proxies of estab-
lished cultures, and virtually no effects with regard to proxies for less established cultures.
By contrast, the civic education treatment does not achieve any effect of significance on
participation with respect to cultural strength, which is again consistent with theoretical
expectations. On these particular proxies of weak settings, the effects of the curriculum
intervention are not consistently positive, but some are (see, for example the results on
community works). These results increase confidence in the hypothesized relationship. I
discuss these results in greater detail below.
5.3 Discussion
The findings presented in this chapter fail to support important micro-level hypotheses that
are implicit in the current peacebuilding approach. Neither status quo-preserving strategies
nor status quo-transforming strategies were found to have meaningful positive influence on
political participation–broadly defined as encompassing political acts and liberal attitudes–
in the context of postwar Liberia. These null results are particularly noteworthy because the
depth and breadth of the study over 9 months of sustained programing set the bar lower
for finding any effects that may have existed. Taken together, these results cast doubt
on the hypothesis implicit in the peacebuilding approach that transformative aspects of
the strategy through democratic education activities should increase the likelihood of local
adoption of liberal norms and values as well as increase levels of political participation. It is
particularly noteworthy that curriculum intervention, which has been the flagship activity
for liberal transformation, seems to perform least well on measures of political participation
examined in this study. So why did STs fail to perform? One explanation of these lack of
results may be attributed to the fact that I investigated a wide range of measures of political
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Table 5.4: Political participation and cultural strength: robustness checks
Security Civec
Specification Committee Education N
Alternative proxies for cultural strength
More trust in co-religious (Established cultures) .33*** -.01
(25) (.11) (.13) N=670
Less trust in co-religious .20* .16
(26) (.10) (.08) N=461
Participation in community works (Established cultures) .34*** .-04
(27 ) (.14) (.07) N=837
No participation in community works .16 .32***
(28) (.22) (.09) N=292
Participation in koko (Established cultures) .32*** .06
(29) (.12) (.11) N=649
No participation in koko .18 .04
(30) (.16) (.09) N=558
Active participation in susu (Established cultures) .33*** -.10*
(31) (.15) (.06) N=653
No participation in susu .18 .04
(32) (.16) (.09) N=558
More trust traditional leader (Established cultures) .28*** .10
(33) (.10) (.11) N=410
Less trust in traditional leader .11 .13
(34) (.11) (.08) N=469
Frequent interaction w/ trad leader (Established cultures) .29*** .08
(35) (.14) (.11) N=854
Less frequent interaction w/ trad leader .18 .11
(36) (.11) (.10) N=291
Note: Regressions were estimated separately on each proxy of cultural strength.
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
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participation–including both formal and informal measures–whereas focus typically tends
to be on formal measures. Indeed, in a separate paper that focuses on formal measures of
electoral participation, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2013) found that the civic education programs
had significant positive effects. Yet the extent to which such formal mechanisms may be
meaningful to the local population is questionable. This is particularly true given that
political institutions are likely to be too week to be responsive to citizens’ demands.
However, these results are not surprising in light of the theoretical arguments developed
in the chapter, which predicts the effects of peacebuilding interventions to depend on the
context, particularly the strength of existing cultural paradigms. In fact, these expectations
were empirically borne out: In culturally established local settings, democratic education
activities meant to enable greater political participation and adoption of liberal norms and
values were shown to be counterproductive, as levels of overall participation did actually
decrease as a result; whereas indirect and more subtle involvement in community matters,
via security meetings, for example, seems to have produced greater political participation.
Ironically, this is not an effect that the peacebuilders themselves would typically expect.
The reverse is true in culturally fragmented settings, with civic education activities having
the greatest and strongest effects on political participation, and security interventions falling
flat, at best. What do these results mean?
First, they are counterintuitive and suggest paradoxes of democracy promotion in con-
temporary peacebuilding interventions. While peacebuilders have generally banked on sta-
tus quo-transforming strategies, such as the curriculum intervention discussed here, as the
most effective means to transmit liberal norms and values directly to the citizens in war-torn
societies, the evidence in this chapter suggests that such strategies may actually be ineffec-
tive or even counterproductive in some settings. On the other hand, status quo-preserving
strategies such as military peacekeeping, which are not typically viewed as promoting lib-
eral norms and values, seem to be doing just that in at least some local settings. What
explains these differential results? My theory argued that variation in cultural strength in
the different settings types is responsible for these patterns, particularly because it sug-
gests different processes of change and responses to external interventions seeking change.
The theory also suggested mechanisms that may govern these processes that are worthy of
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further discussion in light of the empirical findings.
In culturally established settings, where existing cultural paradigms provide greater
utility or value (both in an intrinsic sense and in an instrumental sense), I argued that
such valuation is precisely the reason why people have the tendency to resist external
efforts to bring about change in an explicit way, and the negative effects of the study’s
civic education program on political participation here are evidence of such resistance. The
theory also suggested two sources of such resistance: (i) perceived high costs of change
(i.e., local people are not convinced that alternative social arrangements will be superior to
the status quo); and (ii) perceptions that one’s culture is being threatened. Both sources
are plausible, as alternatives to and complements of one another. The current data does
not enable us to disentangle these mechanisms directly, as this requires specific data about
many aspects, such as how much information people from different settings have about
each other, what informs status quo social arrangements, how new values and norms are
evaluated, what is the nature of interactions between peacebuilders and the elites, and so
on–all aspects which the present study was not designed to collect.11 Nonetheless, field
reports from our teams and anecdotal accounts from interviews with key informants on the
ground suggest that both mechanisms may have been at work.
For instance, costs and benefits calculations can be seen in the initial reactions of local
chiefs at the time of program introduction, as in the case of two towns, one in Grand Cedeh
County and another in Lofa County, both of which scored high on cultural strength and also
had relatively lower rates of political participation.12 In one town, upon learning that the
intervention would be about democracy and human rights, the local chief responded that
the majority of his residents were involved in mining activities and did not have the time
11For instance, to test the cultural threat argument properly, one would need to design a study that
specifically isolates this aspect of outside messaging. For instance, one could design an experiment in which
cultural strength is held constant, but then within each group promotes new norms and values internally with
two different strategies, with one emphasizing ”negative” aspects an existing culture and the other stressing
”positive” aspects. Along a similar reasoning, to test the ”high cost” argument properly, one would need
to have precise information about people’s expected payoff for adopting change versus their current payoff,
under the status quo.
12See Summary Sheets, February 2011. Name of town dot disclosed for Human Subjects considerations.
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for meeting with NGOs unless such meetings were related to mining: ”Chief happy about
the project but said the place is a gold camp so everyone there is after their mining and
don’t have time for NGO meeting, only meetings that are related to mining.” The reasoning
was virtually similar in another town. Read the field report: ”Chief expressed reservations
about the project as a result of the intensive farming activities.” What we see going on in
these towns is uncertainty about the added value of the new program activities. The local
chiefs were not convinced that such activities would be worth the time that their people
would rather spend mining or farming. In fact in the case of the first town, the chief was
willing to make time for NGO meetings if the meetings would be related to mining, perhaps
because he assumed that such meeting would improve skills and productivity.
Experiences in other towns, however, suggest that resistance to programs was moti-
vated by unambiguous cultural concerns. For instance, in one town in Bomi County, the
implementation team was told that the town could not accept the program because town
residents were not interested and were engaged in constant ritual activities closed to people
from outside the community. After multiple attempts to get the leaders to change their
minds and accept the program, they simply told members of the implementation team that
they were free to come and do whatever work they wished, but added that ”they [the lead-
ers] could not guarantee their safety.”13 Similarly, in an interview I carried out with an
elderly women who had just participated in a civic education meeting in one town in Bomi
County, she could not hide her misgivings about the program, in particular human rights
teaching, which she thought were encouraging people to go against the will of ancestors who
watch over the town and its people. She also found it strange that she was now receiving
wisdom from her daughter, when in her tradition it is the mother who gives wisdom to the
daughter.14 These anecdotes suggest that for some people, the problem with civic education
campaigns was not so much the costs (in terms of time sacrifice or other considerations) it
imposed on them, but rather the fact that it brought ideas that were foreign to their world
views. This does not necessarily mean that existing beliefs were so deeply held that they
13Field Assessment Report, February 2011.
14Author’s interview. April 2011. The interviewee said ”daughter” in reference to the Field Facilitator
conducting civic education campaigns who was a women in her early 20’s.
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could not be altered. But it could also be that the program lacked enough credibility to
sway people’s beliefs, as the anecdote about the elderly women I interviewed suggests.
Thus, these anecdotes do support my theoretical intuitions in culturally established set-
tings, where existing cultural paradigms represent an equilibrium that is not only stable
and resilient, but also desirable. So perhaps the puzzle is not so much why civic education
campaigns fail to alter such an equilibrium, but rather why we tend to believe that typi-
cally short-term civic education interventions (even 9-month-long ones) would alter such an
equilibrium in the first place.
Yet the civic education program had impressive results in culturally fragmented settings,
suggesting that status quo transforming strategies are not fundamentally flawed. What,
then, is different about these settings that makes them more receptive to civic education
programming? My theory suggested that what is different is that the existing cultural
equilibrium is neither stable nor desirable. Under such circumstances, as evidenced in
empirical results, status quo transforming strategies can in fact do more good. Under these
circumstances, I argued, there are pervasive information problems, which hinder cooperation
(hence the instability and undesirability of the existing order). Since people are always on
the lookout for alternatives, change is easier to achieve, provided that the alternative is
credible enough. Could this be what may have been going on Liberian communities that
ranked low on cultural strength? Anecdotal accounts suggest so. Again, the community
assessments carried out before the launch of the project are instructive here, as they reveal
information asymmetries–primary between the local chief and residents, but also among
the residents themselves–in many of these culturally fragmented communities. Many chiefs
expressed fear that the program would enable citizens to ”check on them”; others wanted
to ”know the motives behind the projects” and to be able to review all of the information
collected from town residents beforehand; other insisted on being in charge of the main
aspects of the project, among others. In one encounter in a town in Grand Cedeh County,
the Field Facilitator reported that ”Mr. [Name of the chief left out] expressed concern about
the SMS reporting system, that it be reviewed before it is sent. He doesn’t want people
to send misleading information. He wants to let his boss know.”15 These are the kinds
15Field Assessment report, February 2011. The quote makes reference to SMS because this was a compo-
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of information asymmetries that underlie cooperation problems in culturally fragmented
settings, and as the anecdotes show clearly, local chiefs go to greater length to maintain this
asymmetry, even if this means depriving their towns of the opportunity to benefit from a
program that may help them address collective action problems.
Therefore it is not surprising that the resulting inefficiencies make the status quo order
undesirable. What makes status quo-transforming strategies appealing to the masses is
precisely the fact that they enable citizens to overcome this informational barrier and resolve
some of the collective action problems. One participant in the civic education program in
Grand Bassa County put it best, when he was asked what he thought the benefits of
participating in the program were:
The program has been very fine and the program taught us some of those
things that we never known before, the facilitator taught those things. One of
the things the program taught us is the regular meeting we have been having
in this town since the starting of this program give us chance to discuss our
problems like we never used to do. We also learned from our training, we also
learned how to development our community and how to handle disputes between
husband and wife and how to settle disputes among people in the community. I
have been attending most of the meetings Edmond [the Field Facilitator] started
coming in this town.16
It is interesting that despite being in the community, this man had not felt like he had
the opportunity to discuss common problems with his fellow residents before this program.
But again it is not entirely surprising, given the tight grip and control of the local chiefs
in fragmented settings with regard to community life. People may give the impression of
knowing each other or knowing common problems, but as this quote reveals, that is not
always the case. Hence the difficulty of achieving convergence in expectations on socially
desirable outcomes. So what the civic education program does is to provide an open platform
or forum that enables people to learn about each other’s preferences and payoff, without
nent of the project before it was dropped for logistical constraints.
16Supervisor’s interview civic education program participant. Grand Bassa County, September 2011.
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these being filtered by the local chief; and so the process makes it possible to arrive at
solutions that reflect preferences of the majority. Hence the above-quoted man’s statement,
”this program gives us chance to discuss our problems like we never used to do.” These were
the exact same feelings about the program expressed by another resident in a different part
of the country: ”I believe that the program has been very helpful to the community and as
an individual and resident of this town...I also I like the idea of the interactions the local
community members is having with UNMIL without fear and intimidations. I also like the
idea that this program has made us to be having meeting all the times in our community
which never use to happen in this town. In this meeting, we can be able to discuss the
developmental issues of the our towns and many good things for the town; like sanitations
and the health care delivery of the town.”
But the program does more that just revealing information or preferences. By bringing
people together, it also empowers them to undertake actions they would not have been able
to undertake in isolation, which in turn leads the chiefs to change the way they interact
with their constituents. It is this kind of empowerment that one resident in Lofa County
was referring to in an interview:
As I told you in the beginning, I can now talk and discuss anything with the
chief without fear. Before, Mandingo couldn’t go to the chief easily and carry
lorma complain. But, through our regular meetings with the chief, I am now
able to talk and discuss any issues with the chief and will listen to me. There
are also a great change in how the chief treats people in this town unlike before
this program where people of different tribe were not given the opportunity to
talk to the chief like this except his people.17
In short, these findings support theoretical intuitions discussed previously. The success
of the civic education program in influencing political participation in culturally fragmented
settings and its failure to do so in culturally established settings, are two sides of the same
coin and have to do with different social dynamics and processes of change in the two setting
types. In the latter, existing patterns of interactions are stable (thanks to strong valuation
17Supervisor’s interview civic education program participant. Lofa County, August 2011.
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of existing cultural paradigms) and desirable, which raises the bar for any program seeking
change rapidly, as many civic educations programs do typically. By contrast, dissatisfaction
with social life in culturally fragmented settings means change is always within reach, but
this does not mean it is automatically realizable. Civic education programs typically have
the appropriate mechanisms to supply what is lacking in these settings (e.g., information)
and hardly face credible competitors.
But does this mean (liberal) political change in never achievable in culturally estab-
lished settings? As the evidence presented in this chapter has shown, change is achievable
on the same order of magnitude as in fragmented cultural settings. What is surprising
is that positive effects on political participation in established settings came from status
quo-preserving strategies (in this case, the security village committee) rather than from
status quo-challenging activities (civic education). From the point of view of the current
peacebuilding approach, this is a puzzling result, but as argued in my theory it should not
be. Why? Because change in these settings can only be promoted successfully if it is seen as
emanating organically from within established (and legitimate) existing structures; and, as
I demonstrate, status quo-preserving strategies have the appropriate approach and mecha-
nisms required for this. Specifically, the mechanism I have proposed emphasize democracy
promotion in culturally established settings through a two-tier interactive process, first
between interveners and the elites (which is where norms socialization occurs), and then
between the elites and the masses–the every day social processes, which enable local leaders
to mainstream the newly acquired liberal norms within existing cultural paradigms. But
my theory has suggested that liberal norms can only be transmitted successfully through
this channel under the condition that the local chief enjoys strong legitimacy, and that he or
she maintains frequent interactions with constituents, both of which conditions, I posited,
should be satisfied in established cultural settings. How plausible is this explanation?
My field experiment in Liberia had a specific feature that sheds light on this question.
The security commitment treatment included two sub-treatments, one in which community
representatives to UNMIL meetings were democratically elected by their peers in a town
hall meeting, and another in which these representatives were appointed by the local chief.
The idea here is that for an elite channel to be a plausible explanation of the security
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committee effects, one would need to show that the effects can be attributed to some aspects
of the chief’s authority, in this case, the appointment mechanism. Thus, if the explanation
I propose is right, we should expect to see two things: 1) that in established cultural
settings, the effects of the village security committee on political participation come from
the ”chief appointment” mode, rather than from the ”community vote” mode; and 2) that
in fragmented cultural settings the two modes perform more or less equally. The logic of (1)
may not be that obvious, especially since one would expect that the interest of the chief and
of local population should align. But interest alignment is not the issue. The issue is whether
the chief has a degree of contact with UNMIL military that warrants the suggestion that
local elites have been socialized to liberal norms through their encounters with peacekeepers
(first stage)–and this assumption, at least in the case of our field experiment, is more
warranted if the chief has direct control over representatives who go to UNMIL meetings.18
To isolate the effects of the chief appointment mode, I fit a regression in which ”chief
appointment” is used as a measure of the security committee treatment, separately for less
established cultures. The results are summarized in Table 5.5 Model 37 presents estimates
for chief appointment effects on political participation for established cultural settings, while
model 38 provides similar estimates for fragmented cultural settings.
As seen from the table, ”chief appointment” has a non-negligible, statistically signifi-
cant effect on political participation in culturally established settings, but not in culturally
fragmented settings, whereas the performance of the community mode is virtually the same
in both setting types. This result provides support to the intuition that the elite channel
may be at work in culturally established settings. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with
town chiefs seems to support the notion that local chiefs who appointed representatives
expected greater feedback from the security committee members. As one chief in a Lofa
County town explained in an interview:
18In other words, there is not necessarily any tension between the appointment mode and accountability.
This mode is simply serving as a mechanism through which the chief gains better access to security providers.
The intuition here is that information flows from the chief to peacekeepers, and feedback moves from peace-
keepers to a local chief more effectively if that chief exerts greater control on his representatives, and that
these representatives are more likely to be thorough in debriefing a chief by whom they were appointed.
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Table 5.5: Testing the elite socialization mechanism: cultural strength
Mean effects liberal political participation
Established Settings Fragmented Settings
(37) (38)





F= .02 F= .04
Adj. R2 = .11 Adj. R2 = .13
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
My opinion about this program is that first of all the program was brought
as a program that we will take our problems that we are faced with to UNMIL
and that we should [choose] people that will be representing us to UNMIL men
or women from this town...These people go to UNMIL once in a month and
bring to us the feedback they receive from UNMIL to explain them to the town
people...So far the program is looking good to us and any time they go to
UNMIL, they come back to us and explain to us. We also tell them the problems
we are facing in the town and they will again take them to UNMIL. Some of
those things that this program has been able to do for us is the recondition
of our roads and the constant patrol of UNMIL in our community. Those are
things I love about this program.19
As this quote suggests, the motivation of the chiefs to have greater interactions with
UNMIL military may have been material or economic. But UNMIL military may also
have used the opportunity to socialize local chiefs to desirable behaviors–something which
19Supervisor’s interview civic education program participant. Lofa County, August 2011.
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accountable chiefs had incentives to do in order to maintain UNMIL military’s good will
and maintain the flow of material resources they desperately need for their community.
Once local leaders adopted liberal norms and values, passing them on to the rest of the
community would come naturally, as the result of close and frequent social interactions
between the chiefs and their constituents in these settings.
Some may feel the evidence presented here unconvincing on the grounds that empirical
testing does not capture the notion of accountability as a mechanism incentivizing local
leaders to socialize to liberal norms and values in the first place. However, such a criticism
is not warranted. We know from recent studies (e.g., Tsai 2007) that accountability mecha-
nisms exist in many shapes, forms and settings; as Tsai agues, the moral types said to exist
in solidarity groups are likely to operate in established cultural settings. Nonetheless, I
address this issue by running separate regressions communities in which the local chiefs had
and had not been elected.20 The results are summarized in Table 5.6 below, with model 39
presenting results for settings that do not have established cultures and model 40 presenting
estimates on participation in established cultures.
The results in the table are consistent with those presented in the preceding paragraphs,
with the security committee having an effect size of .36 standard deviations across commu-
nities where the local chief was elected. The estimates are statistically significant at the
.01 level, which lends more support to the notion that status quo-preserving strategies may
indeed operate as effective channels of liberal norms transmission in local settings whose
existing structures are stable and enjoy broad popular legitimacy. (The curriculum inter-
vention has virtually zero effect irrespective of whether the chief is elected or not, which not
only confirms the suggestion that elites, as a channels of democracy promotion, are appro-
priate only for status quo-preserving strategies). Thus, both set of results (i.e., the effects
of security committee on political participation through the chief appointing the committee
or the chief being elected) do in fact suggest a more positive, constructive role of more
20Arguably, there are elected chiefs in both established cultural settings and fragmented cultural settings.
To the extent that elected local chiefs in culturally fragmented settings are able to enjoy the kind of legitimacy
that local chiefs enjoy in established settings, then there are no reason why they cannot operate as a channel
through which status quo-preserving strategies influence local adoption of liberal norms and values. This is
not an issue I fully investigate in this chapter, however.
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Table 5.6: Testing the elite socialization mechanism: electoral accountability
Mean effects for political participation
Chief elected Chief Not elected
(39) (40)
Security committee .36*** .28
(.13) (.17)





F= .06 F= .09
Adj. R2 = .11 Adj. R2 = .18
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
accountable local decision-makers in the process of liberal democracy promotion. Both sets
of results suggest that legitimacy of local leaders (whether it comes from cultural strength
or electoral mechanisms) is an important necessary condition for status quo-preserving ac-
tivities to operate as an effective mechanism for liberal norms transmission in local settings
that are culturally established. That legitimate local chiefs play this role should not come
as a surprise to diffusion theorists (e.g., Rogers 1995) and anthropological scholars who
study the dynamics of local adoption of foreign norms (e.g., Levit and Merry 2006). These
theorists have long considered centrally placed local leaders to play a key role in facilitating
local adoption of new norms and values they have adopted themselves, precisely as the
results here reveal.
To some in the peacebuilding community, however, this finding that local chiefs, in
some settings, enable adoption of local norms and values may come as a shock because such
leaders are often denied agency or most commonly presumed to be part of the problem
rather than as part of the solution (e.g., Barnett et al. 2009; Donnais 2006; Pouligny
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2006; de Wall 2006). But clearly some leaders can play a positive, constructive role in
the democratization process. Local chiefs who appoint representatives are likely to gain
more precise information and knowledge about peacekeepers’ preferences and still manage
to be socialized as though they were interacting with them directly. This presumption,
however, is debatable, and future research is required to collect more adequate data to
test this and other proposed mechanisms directly. Whether local leaders facilitate liberal
norms adoption simply by transmitting subtly through everyday interaction (which is the
mechanism suggested here) or use other mechanisms to mitigate cultural threat perceptions
that STs tend to raise in established cultures is an important question for further research.
It is also noteworthy that the security committee intervention did not have meaningful
effects on political participation in settings that are culturally fragmented. This result,
too, was predicted by my theory. As argued, the failure of SPs to operate as an effective
channel of promoting liberal norms and values in culturally fragmented local settings has to
do with a twin problem. First, these strategies typically lack the information aggregation
mechanisms to solve severe community-wide information problems. This is certainly true
in the case of UNMIL operations in Liberia. While in today’s peacebuilding operations
peacekeepers live in close proximity to and have greater interactions with local populations
than ever before, with survey evidence suggesting that such proximity boots perceptions of
security on the part of the local population (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2012), the fact that they
do not have direct involvement in social arrangements suggest their limitation in helping
people overcome barriers like information asymmetries that characterize social life in these
settings. These intuitions find support in many accounts provided by program participants
about their experience. In interview after interview, participants in the village security
committee program touted improvements in security conditions that have resulted since its
launch or complained about UNMIL addressing social and economic priorities they have
raised. By contrast, very few participants reported the kind of information provision and
problem-solving capacities that many did in the civic education program.21 Considering
21An excerpt from an interview with a program participant in Bong County illustrates many responses to
the question about what, if any, benefits the security program has brought to the community: ”I believe that
the program has been very helpful to the community and as an individual and resident of this town...It has
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this in relation to the fact that few peacekeepers actually speak the language of the local
population, it is evident why it is simply unrealistic to expect peacekeepers to have any
direct effects on political problems rooted in severe information asymmetries at the mass
scale.
This limitation means that any chance peacekeepers have to influence local processes
is indirectly, through local elites. However, local elites in fragmented settings typically
lack incentives of their counterparts in established settings to adopt liberal norms and
values. Since they face less internal pressure to provide public goods, they often find it more
profitable to keep relationships with peacekeepers at a strict minimum to avoid ”strings” in
terms of accountability and human rights demands that come attached to such relationships.
When these leaders do interact with peacekeepers, they typically have more leverage and
bargaining power than peacekeepers (Barnett at al. 2009). For example, in one town in
Grand Bassa, a local chief threatened to take all his constituents to his farm on election
day if UNMIL peacekeepers did not pave the road to his compound, a message that he sent
explicitly through the Field Facilitator for our program.22 Of course this chief made such a
threat because he knew how much importance UNMIL attached to having a smooth electoral
process and calculated that threatening this objective would make UNMIL acquiesce to his
demands. It is difficult to imagine how such chiefs can be brought to adopt liberal norms
and values–let alone to pass them on to their constituents–as the results presented here
confirm.
Recent empirical studies (e.g., Fortna 2008b) have suggested that peacekeeping op-
erations seem to have both positive and negative effects on democratization that cancel
made us to understand the roles of UNMIL in the country such as in the handling of security issues and other
important things among others. Before the project, we use to pass by the UNMIL people not knowing any
things about them and we were far away from them in the case of association and interactions with them.
Thank God for this program which has made us to know that UNMIL is a friend to the local community
and that they are here to protect and keep our peace. It is the first time that we are able sit down on the
same table with UNMIL and eat together and share funs together. This program has become helpful in
that it made UNMIL to build some of confident in us and the community to give them concerning security
threats.” (Supervisor’s interview with civic education program participant. Bong County, September 2011.)
22Briefing with Field Facilitator and UNMIL, Ghana Batalion. Grand Bassa, LAC. August 2011.
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each other out. Findings in this study confirm this intuition, at the micro-level at least,
and points to specific conditions under which peacebuilding strategies can lead to posi-
tive or negative effects on democratic outcomes. Thus these findings have practical and
theoretical implications. At the practical level, the results presented here challenge con-
ventional wisdom about how peacebuilding strategies promote democratic outcomes and
prevailing presumptions about local settings’ receptiveness to democracy (or lack thereof).
Specifically, the current peacebuilding approach gives primacy to status quo transforming
strategies, while relegating status quo preserving strategies to a supporting role. But the
findings show that each aspect of the approach may have its own democracy-promoting
features, operating differently under various local circumstances and clarify some of these
conditions. In fact, the findings make clear that the issue may not be about which strategy
is optimal for democracy promotion, but rather when and within which type of context a
particular strategy is likely to produce optimal results. This question of ”when”, in turn,
cannot be addressed properly without bringing into the picture important aspects of local
settings which have not been adequately researched from an empirical standpoint.
My findings also confound expectations of both proponents of the current peacebuilding
approach who tend to have a more optimistic view about the prospects of influencing polit-
ical processes and critics who tend to emphasize resiliency of local contexts. They suggest
that not all local settings are as malleable, at least at many in the peacebuilding research
and practice tend to think. But this does not necessarily mean that settings are always
resilient or resistant to change, as critics often, and wrongly, assume. As I have shown,
change is achievable in culturally established local settings on the same order of magni-
tude as in fragmented cultural settings.23 The tricky part is to recognize that processes
of change in these two setting types are different, and so are change-triggering inputs or
interventions. Moreover, as Wildvasky (1987) remarks, individuals frequently test cultural
23This affirms a basic observation that is often oversold by proponents of the current peacebuilding ap-
proach or dismissed by critics: liberal democracy (or at least the micro-foundations of it) can emerge in
different types of local settings and thus proponents may be right in holding the view that democracy has
a universal appeal (Fukuyama 2011). What proponents often get wrong is to assume that there is only one
way or one ”best” approach to realize the promise of liberal democracy, which critics call ”one-size fits all,”
”top-down” approach.
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constraints, ”reinforcing them if they prove satisfactory in practice, modifying or rejecting
them, when possible, if unsatisfactory.” Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect the kind of rapid
and sudden changes that may occur in settings with weak culture, but it is realistic to
expect that it may occur in due course. The key to successful liberal transformation may
be, in fact, figuring out how to integrate liberal norms and values into social dynamics more
organically.
While insights and findings in this chapter help contribute to our understanding of when
and how peacebuilding interventions can have positive influence on democratic participation
in war-shattered societies, many lacunae remain. Future research may fruitfully address
more fully the quality of participation and democracy that emerges from these different
paths; such an assessment ultimately requires an investigation of long-term prospects for
liberal transformations, not just in the political realm, but also in related realms such as
social cohesion and governance. Arguably, where democracy emerges functionally and is
adopted quickly based on costs and benefits calculations, as likely in culturally fragmented
settings, an argument can be made that the quality of democracy that emerges therein
may be limited, its viability depending on a continuous stream of external benefits that
might have made it appealing in the first place. The demise of democracy would come the
moment at which benefits that made it appealing disappear, so that the risk of democratic
breakdown is greater in culturally fragmented settings. Where democracy has emerged
organically, however, it likely that democratic norms and values would be reflected in other
aspects of social life, laying the foundation for long-term endogenous sustainability.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of existing
social structures and customs in mediating the influence of peacebuilding strategies on polit-
ical participation after civil war. It has laid out specific hypotheses about the performance
(and prospects for success) of different peacebuilding strategies in different local contexts,
and pitted these against an implicit hypothesis in the current peacebuilding approach that
premises the prospect of liberal change on transformative aspects of the strategy. Using a
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9-month field experiment in Liberia and a set of outcome indicators of political behaviors
and liberal attitudes on the part of ordinary citizens, I find that the effects of the two
peacebuilding strategies–the village security committee program and the civic education
curriculum–on political participation depend critically on local context measured in terms
of cultural strength. In areas where local cultures are established, the village security com-
mittee program has strong positive effects on the overall measures of political participation,
but it has no meaningful effects in areas where local cultures are fragmented. By contrast,
the civic education program has strong positive effects on the overall measures of political
participation in areas where local cultures are fragmented, but in areas where local cultures
are established it has adverse effects.
In the next chapter, I test implications of my theory on social cohesion.
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Chapter 6
Effects of Peacebuilding Strategies
on Social Cohesion
In chapter five, I provided evidence in support of my theory that the effects of peacebuilding
strategies on political participation depend on local context. The present chapter investi-
gates the extent to which similar dynamics may be at work in the social realm. This is a
worthwhile investigation because a key premise implicit in the current peacebuilding ap-
proach, namely that ”all good things go together” (Paris 2010), is on shaky theoretical and
empirical grounds. Using a public goods game that provides behavioral measures of social
cohesion within and between communities, I find no evidence that the two strategies–status-
quo preserving and status-quo transforming–have meaningful influence on social cohesion.
In addition, cultural strength does not appear to be salient for social cohesion, suggesting
that interventions in political and social realms may have different governing mechanisms.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section one discusses the rationale and logics
underlying peacebuilding interventions on social cohesion. Section two outlines a set of
alternative testable hypotheses, drawing on my discussion in chapter two. Section three
provides a description of the public goods game used to measure social cohesion, while
section four outlines my empirical framework and presents empirical findings. Section five
discusses these results in detail and the last section concludes.
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6.1 Peacebuilding Interventions and Social Cohesion After
Civil War
6.1.1 Conventional Wisdom
The main research questions this chapter addresses are the following: Can peacebuilding
strategies have positive influence on the level of social cohesion after civil war? Can peace-
building strategies have positive effects in any given local context or do the effects depend
on peculiar conditions existing in local contexts? It is a foregone conclusion among scholars
and practitioners that war-torn societies have low levels of social cohesion–defined as a set
of behaviors and attitudes within a community that reflect the propensity of community
members to work together for a common purpose (King et al. 2010; Fearon et al. 2009).
Its depletion is often attributed to civil war devastations. Civil war, it is argued, damages
norms of reciprocity and trust (Posner 2004; Widner 2004); polarizes communities along
sociopolitical cleavages (Maynard 1997); and destroys formal and informal dispute manage-
ment mechanisms (Colletta and Cullen 2000), to name a few. But numerous scholars (e.g.,
Kaplan 2009; 2008; Colletta and Cullen 2000) have argued that depletion of social cohesion
is often a contributor to conflict in the first place. For instance, Stewart (2006) argued that
violence is often caused by social fragmentation resulting from inequalities between groups.
In short, deficit of social cohesion is much a consequence of civil war as its root cause (or
at least the two share the same root causes).
Regardless of the source, persistence of low levels of social cohesion is an important
barrier to effective peacebuilding (Doyle and sambanis 2006; Doyle 2002). The lack of trust
can get in the way of healthy social relationships, prevent people from working together
for a common good and increase the risk of conflict rekindling (Kumar 1998). Likewise,
Colletta and Cullen (2000) argue that without social cohesion, communities will be unable
to resolve disputes peacefully and therefore be at risk of violence. The concern, then, is
that if left unaddressed, deficits in social cohesion can undermine reconstruction efforts and
increase the likelihood of further social tensions and violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:
74; Counsens and Kumar 2001). Maynard (1997) writes:
In such a discordant setting [that has low levels of social cohesion], commu-
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nity living standards deteriorate from the lack of cooperation in construction,
mutual economic support, and demise of productivity. This results in increased
dependence on outside assistance and diminished community self-esteem. Eco-
nomic adversity typically contributes to scapegoating, which in a war-torn soci-
ety, may lead to a continuation of the revenge cycle...predisposing the commu-
nity, and possible the region, toward a return to war (in Kumar 1997: 208).
In response, promotion of social cohesion has been integral to the international com-
munity’s efforts to build stable and self-sustaining peace in war-torn societies, owing in
part to the prevailing presumption that postwar states have little capacity or legitimacy
to replenish social cohesion on their own (United Nations 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2008;
Doyle 2002). In United Nations (UN) circles, this prioritization is evidenced by the fact
that social cohesion is officially considered as one of three key pillars of postwar recovery,
alongside political legitimacy and economic recovery, and it is explicitly included in most
mission’s mandates (United Nations 2008). In the same vein, the World Bank has recom-
mended mainstreaming social cohesion as an explicit objective in programs and policies,
particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states (Brown 2013).1
Flagship activities to promote social cohesion have typically included new governance
structures through CDD programs; civic education campaigns aimed at challenging preju-
dices and intolerance; workshops about dispute management and resolution skills; engaging
traditional leaders through training; and provision of public goods to joint development
projects designed to promote trust and collective action both within and between social
groups, among others (Blattman et al. 2011; King et at. 2010; Fearon et al. 2009; Mansuri
and Rao 2004; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Kumar 1999). Importantly, social cohesion is
typically promoted through a holistic approach, alongside other aims such as democratiza-
tion and governance reforms and with the same set of multifaceted programs and activities
1Other actors engaged in peacebuilding and development interventions–including UN funds and agencies
such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); multilateral and bilateral development agencies
such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and interna-
tional non-government organizations such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), among others–have
a wide range of programs and activities explicitly aimed at promoting social cohesion.
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(Cousens and Kumar 2001). Thus as with political participation, peacebuilding interven-
tions rely on both status-quo preserving strategies (SPs) and status-quo transforming strate-
gies (STs) to promote social cohesion. SPs are necessary to provide a stable environment
for positive relationships between groups to take place (Maynard 1997). STs typically aim
to transform social structures by tackling the root causes of conflict and mistrust.
Reliance on the same set of strategies to promote social cohesion and other goals has
to do, at least partly, with the presumption that social cohesion deficits are only symp-
tomatic of much deeper problems rooted in abusive domestic structures, which need to
be addressed holistically (Boutros-Ghalis 1995; 1992). Another rationale is that the many
goals pursued by peacebuilders are mutually reinforcing, as the virtues such as diversity
and tolerance that are central to social cohesion also important for democracy–another key
goal of peacebuilding operations. Some analysts even go as far as to equate promotion of
social cohesion to civil society development, which is also a key aspect of democratization.
As noted earlier, the presumption is that, as Belloni (2008) remarks, ”by participating in
civil society organizations, individuals learn how to confront divergent opinions and tend
to develop greater tolerance for different interests and views,” which is essentially a Put-
namian view of democracy promotion from below according to which greater face-to-face
interactions will generate ”social capital” and socialize members into ”democratic norms
through a processes of learning by doing” (in Jarstad and Sisk 2008: 185). What, then, has
been the track record of international efforts to promote social cohesion?
6.1.2 Existing evidence and gaps
Policymakers tend to be optimistic about the prospects of achieving positive influence, even
as they acknowledge the challenges that this involves. But optimism alone does not tell us
why activities undertaken will succeed in reestablishing healthy patterns of social interac-
tions or how. Indeed, this optimism is often at odds with unflattering anecdotal accounts
from cases that tend to portray seemingly uneven improvements across the geography of
countries.2 A growing number of recent experimental studies carried out in the context of
2Take Bosnia and Herzegovina–perhaps the most expansive international reconstruction project since the
post-World War II rebuilding of Germany and Japan. After 16 years of intense international reconstruction
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CDD programs, most of which failed to find evidence for positive effects of outside inter-
ventions on levels of social cohesion (Casey et al. 2012; Blattman et al. 2011).3
The lack of positive findings on external interventions has led some scholars and analysts
(e.g., Herbert 2013; Kaplan 2008; Hohe 2002a) to question the appropriateness of such
efforts in the first place, emphasizing instead to endogenous sources and mechanisms of social
cohesion generation. Furthermore, the ”endogenous” logic emphasized in these studies has
been echoed in a longstanding social science literature that casts doubt on the very ability
of outside interventions to alter patterns of social interactions (Fearon et al. 2009), as
these are presumed to result from long-term historical and indigenous processes that have
settled in equilibrium (Plateau and Abraham 2010; Putnam 2000; Putnam et al. 1993;
Bourdieu 1993). In sum, scholars and analysts stressing the endogenous logic have come
to see a more resilient local context and therefore reach a pessimistic conclusion about the
prospect of externally-led social change, in contrast to mainstream peacebuilding scholars
and practitioners who tend to view of a more malleable local context that is amenable to
outside interventions.4
Yet the two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. To say that patterns of social
cohesion are endogenously established does not necessary mean they are immutable. The
fact that there was a civil war and violence means that at least in some places the mech-
anisms that create and sustain patterns of social cohesion may have been altered in some
efforts, democratic and social reconciliation achievements have been modest at best. On the social side,
while some towns such as Mostar and Grapska have been remarkable success stories in terms of overcoming
the wartime segregation and of different constituent ethnic groups, others such as Zvornik and Jajce are still
enclaves of particular ethnic groups (Dahlmana and Tuathail 2005).
3See Mansuri and Rao (2004) King et.al (2010) for systematic reviews of this literature. Only Fearon et
al. (2009) study in Liberia finds positive effects of a CDD intervention on social cohesion, while Casey’s et
al.’s (2012) study on a 4-year program in Sierra Leone finds modest positive effects in the short-term, but
does not find evidence of long-term effects.
4As Chopra and Hohe (2004) observed in the context of East Timor, ”Despite long-term presence of some
kind of state apparatus in the form of either colonial rule or an independent though authoritarian regime,
local communities have often functioned according to their own fundamentally stateless structures...such
social structures have proved profoundly resilient and easily resist quick interventions to build new ’demo-
cratic’institutions to replace the ones that have previously collapsed.”
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ways or destroyed all together (Platteau and Abraham 2010). Consistent with this sugges-
tion, a number of recent micro-level empirical studies that investigated patterns of social
cohesion in the aftermath of civil war (e.g., Gilligan et al. 2011; Voors et al. 2011) did un-
cover a great deal of variation in these patterns, which they attributed to differential levels
of exposure to civil war and violence. What this suggests, then, is that local settings vary
in terms of the resilience or stability of existing patterns of social interactions: while some
settings may be characterized by stable and resilient patterns of social interactions, others
may be characterized by unstable and quite malleable patterns of social interactions. This
variation, in turn, suggests different challenges and opportunities to cooperative behaviors
as well as the need to take into account the source of this variation (e.g., important contex-
tual factors) to better understand the conditions under which peacebuilding interventions
can and cannot influence patterns of social cohesion in the aftermath of civil war.
By stressing the importance of endogenous mechanisms and processes for social cohesion
generation, these studies nudge the mainstream literature to shift away from the treatment
of local settings as undifferentiated wholes and toward an approach that takes the diversity
of contexts seriously. However, these critical studies do often fall into the same trap they
take issue with in the mainstream: they, too, make unwarranted presumptions about about
the resilience of existing patterns of social relations, which imply coherence and commonality
of purpose in local communities (Donais 2009). Yet if such commonality existed, perhaps
peacebuilding would be unnecessary in the first place. The fact that civil war took place
suggests that patterns of social relations were altered in some ways, even if unevenly so. But
then not all communities in war-torn settings experience such social disruptions, at least not
to the same extent. Hence recent micro-level studies investigating the links between civil
war and social cohesion outcomes in war’s aftermath seem to affirm: they provide evidence
for a great deal of heterogeneity in patterns of postwar social cohesion, which they link to
differential levels of exposure to civil war and violence.5
5See, for example, Gilligan et al.’s 2011 study of social cohesion in postwar Nepal; Voors et al.’s (2010)
study on trust in postwar Burundi; Bellows and Miguel’s (2008) study on social institutions in postwar
Sierra Leone; and Whitt and Wilson’s (2007) study on patterns of ethnic cooperation in postwar Bosnia and
Herzegovina, among others.
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What this suggests, then, is that the argument and assumption that patterns of social
cohesion are endogenously established and resilient to outside influence (which are strong
to begin with) do not hold under any circumstances–certainly not in war-torn settings. In
other words, while some settings may be characterized by stable and resilient patterns of
social interactions, others may be characterized by unstable and quite malleable patterns
of social interactions.6 If different communities vary in pre-existing levels of social cohe-
sion (and for that matter in endogenous mechanisms that drive social cohesion), then it is
reasonable to assume that they have differences in the extent to which they experience coop-
eration problems and this has implications for the prospects of peacebuilding interventions
to influence social cohesion.
A related, but rarely examined issue with the current peacebuilding approach to social
cohesion, is the implicit assumption that ”all good things go together”–the notion that pos-
itive outcomes in one issue area (e.g., political participation) will go in tandem with positive
outcomes in other outcome areas (e.g., social cohesion). This is not a new idea in theories
of change; in fact, in fact this very notion was quite popular in the heydays of moderniza-
tion theory. However, the problem with this idea is that it assumes the different outcome
areas to have similar change processes. But then again, as Fukuyama (2011) reminded us,
Huntington’s (1968) arguments that the political sphere does entail different processes than
other spheres dealt a blow to this assumption. While the situation Huntington was writing
about is arguably different from that of peacebuilding operations, the questions he raised
and insights he provided are worth exploring.
In sum, patterns of social interactions in postwar settings are not uniformly unstable
and therefore malleable to outside influence, as typically presumed in peacebuilding prac-
tice and research or invariably characterized by stable patterns of social interactions and
therefore resilient, as critics claim. Rather, postwar settings are diverse in terms of existing
levels of social cohesion and in the factors that drive social cohesion and this diversity has
implications for the prospects of peacebuilding operations to influence existing patterns of
6In some cases, this variation may be due to prewar differences in social cohesion-generating mecha-
nisms, while in others variation may be attributed to uneven civil war impacts and the kind of war-time
transformations that Wood (2008) describes.
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social interactions in the aftermath of civl war. Sawyer (2005) stresses the need for peace-
builders to understand the nature and diversity of local contexts, which structure people’s
choices in different ways. As he writes, ”the full stock of social capital should be displayed–
those things that strengthen bonds within communities, build bridges between communities
and create the basis for harmonious and productive relationships among people, as well as
those that work against this process. there is a need to to understand the patterns and
internal logics of this pool of capital and to assess their suitability as building blocks for a
new democratic order.”
In the previous chapters I argued and provided evidence showing thatthe strength of
local culture–plays a key role mediating the effects of peacebuilding strategies on political
participation at the grassroots level. I expand this line of inquiry to the social realm,
investigate whether local culture has hypothesized saliency when the focus of peacebuilding
strategies is the social realm, rather than the political realm.
6.2 Hypotheses
This section develops hypotheses about the effects of two key strategies embedded in peace-
building operations–SPs and STs–on social cohesion, taking into account variation in local
contexts. The research hypotheses I develop below draw on arguments development in chap-
ter two, suggesting thatthe strength of local culture–a key aspect of community life–plays an
important role in mediating the effects of peacebuilding strategies on democratic outcomes
at the grassroots level. This notion is intrinsic to the distinction, critical to my claims,
between ”established” settings characterized by particular features associated with stabil-
ity and predictability, and ”fragmented” settings lacking such features. These differences
are important because they suggest different degrees of predispositions or susceptibility to
change. Local settings that are culturally established tend to be satisfied with the status
quo, making any rapid shift to a new social arrangement very unlikely. Change is possible,
however, provided that it is part of an organic process of social adaptation.
The situation is reversed in local settings that are culturally fragmented, where change
is a ubiquitous feature as a result of deficit in problem-solving capacities discussed previ-
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ously. The central problem in these settings is that while most community members may
be unhappy with the existing social order and ready to embrace alternative social arrange-
ments, horizontal information problems (among citizens) and vertical information problems
(between citizens and the elite) make it difficult for group members to arrive at a common
knowledge about alternative arrangements, furthermore, how to adopt them effectively. As
unsettling as these conditions may be, they actually make these settings more susceptible
to change. What is difficult is how to solve severe information and coordination problems
and to converge on socially desirable choices. As I noted in chapter three, this conceptual
framework is relevant to peacebuilding interventions that seek to promote change, including
in patterns of social interactions. There are, in fact, some local postwar settings that can be
defined as established cultures, and others that can be characterized as fragmented. These
differences matter for how communities approach new problems and organize collective ac-
tion. But they also present both opportunities and/or challenges for social change sought
by peacebuilding interventions, as I discuss below.
6.2.1 Promoting social cohesion in established settings
The social cooperation problem in culturally established local settings can be summarized
as follows: higher levels of ”within group” cooperation co-exist alongside lower levels of ”be-
tween group” cooperation. Internally, these settings operate more like information networks
with credible multilateral reputation mechanisms that enhance coordination and overcome
collective action (Abraham and Platteau 2010; Bowles and Gintis 2004). Literally every-
body within such a setting knows everybody else in terms of individual preferences and
payoff; there is little ambiguity in terms of where everybody stands vis-a-vis the status quo
or any other alternative, greatly simplifying collective action. Take, for example, homoge-
nous ethnic communities. As Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue, such communities tend to
be characterized by dense social networks, frequent interactions, a low cost to access infor-
mation about each group member, and trust. ”It is often the case,” the authors suggest,
”that everyone knows everything about everyone else, more or less.” Abraham and Plat-
teau (2010) argue that these cultures are by definition close-knit groups, wherein ”members
interact in a free atmosphere of trustful cooperation based on well-accepted social norms,”
CHAPTER 6. EFFECTS OF PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES ON SOCIAL
COHESION 127
while Bowles and Gintis (2004) argue that they operate as informational networks and
provide multilateral reputational mechanisms. These are problem-solving capacities that
enable patterns of social interactions to settle into socially desirable equilibrium in which
outcomes such as cooperation and successful collective action prevail.
However, the situation is different when members from established cultures attempt
to cooperate with members from an out group, particularly one characterized by cultural
fragmentation. This is because the kind of cooperation-enhancing features (e.g., information
and reputation mechanisms, etc.) that characterize cooperation between members of an
established cultures are not present in this situation. Two sets of rules govern patterns of
cooperation for culturally established settings. Patterns of interactions within the group
are typically characterized by liberal values such as tolerance or respect for others as well
as democratic norms, even more democratic as decision-making tends to be by consensus
(Abraham and Platteau 2010). By contrast inter-group cooperation, members from an out
group tend to be viewed with suspicion are rarely trusted (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero
2007; Rousseau 2006). As a result, interactions between members in established setting and
members from an out-group are likely to involve hard-to-avoid inefficiencies or be avoided
altogether. Hence Thus, Bowles and Gintis (2004) characterize established cultural settings
as ”parochial” because they tend to harbor segregation tendencies toward other communities
and often prefer to forego material gains from increasing interaction with stranger groups
rather than to sacrifice social practices exclusive to their own group, even if to the outsider
such practices are often identified with parochialism.
This twin dynamic poses a serious dilemma for peacebuilding operations: should within-
group social cohesion be acknowledged and built-up on in the process of promoting inter-
group social cohesion, or should it be viewed as a negative to be counteracted? In practice,
the tendency of the current peacebuilding approach has been to err on the side of the
latter, on the assumption the real issues underlying cooperation problems are rooted in
existing social structures and customs. In other words, seemingly liberal norms and values
that cultural established settings may have are often dismissed as ”masks for domination.”
Consider, for example, the following quote from a recent document by the peacebuilding
initiative:
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Traditional/informal systems are often non-democratic, based on unequal
power relations, subject to abuse of power and corruption. Checks and balance
generally exist but, in many cases, the appearance of consensus may well be a
mask for domination. Members of some section of the community–for example
women or young people–are likely to be put at a disadvantage in relation to more
powerful members, such as elder men, particularly as the arbitrators themselves
may be chiefs, elders, and religious leaders (Emphasis my own)7
As noted, the current peacebuilding approach’s preferred strategy to promote cooper-
ation emphasizes the need to address the supposed underlying causes rooted in the social
and cultural traditions and calls for intrusive solutions (Paris 2008; Pouligny 2005). I call
such strategies ”status quo-transforming” (STs) because they primarily seek to transform
aspects of the status quo in an explicit way in order to bring local norms and values into
alignment with liberal norms and values. The status quo order is targeted not only because
it is believed to be a key source of problems that peacebuilders seek to address (e.g., coop-
eration), but also because it ”can be inimical to modern democratic norms that strive to
promote equality of opportunity, especially for women and minority groups” (Ponzio 2011:
47). On a social level, STs generally presume that the mistrust and information problems
that people from dissimilar groups face are only symptomatic of similar problems within
their own community. The idea then is that by addressing the underlying problems at the
source (i.e. within the community), not only this will lead to greater levels of cooperation
within the group, but cooperation between groups will also flow more or less automatically.8
What, then, are the prospects of status quo-transforming strategies to influence pat-
terns of cooperation in culturally established settings? Based on my previous theoretical
discussion, I argue that the prospects are bleak, regardless of whether one assumes that
7http://peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1878 (Accessed on February 10, 2012).
8For example, lack of cooperation between groups is often blamed to mistrust and misunderstandings
between ordinary members of the groups, but then mistrust and misunderstandings are often attributed
to elites’ manipulations and misinformation. Thus a key strategy in the current peacebuilding approach is
to bypass the elites and target the masses directly with politically relevant information that aims both to
enhance their independence from the elites, but also to foster greater understanding and reconciliation with
members of the other group (Kumar 1999).
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local people approach change-seeking interventions from an instrumental or emotional per-
spective. From an instrumentalist point of view, we saw, existing cultural resources provide
the level of utility that is not easily matched. With respect to intra-group cooperation, for
example, it is difficult to imagine that STs can provide group members any new informa-
tion about each other or about status quo conditions that they either don’t already have or
that is believable. The same is true even in the case of inter-group cooperation. Thus, an
argument can be made that locals almost always have an informational advantage about
their foes, imperfect as it may be, than foreigners do (de Waal 2006). So it is not clear why
locals would believe anything that foreigners tell them through, STs, about out groups.
Moreover, even if we assume that ordinary group members’ beliefs and attitudes to-
ward out-group members are a result of mistrust and misinformation fed by the elites, if
people do in fact share those beliefs genuinely or mythically, then there is no amount of
information that outsiders can provide to change such beliefs. To borrow from Swidler’s
(2009) arguments, these beliefs may well be ”collective myths,” but they are still difficult
to shift from unless people find alternative and better myths. In addition, in the case of
inter-group cooperation, there is always the possibility that information may not even be
the most salient problem underlying lack of cooperation. It could be that people know all
there is to to know about each other, but simply to lack the ability to uphold any bargains
credibly, in which case the informational mechanism underlying STs will still be inadequate.
From an intrinsic point of view, the conclusion will be the same: the prospects of STs
to have positive influence on cooperative behaviors in established settings are dim because
people do in fact ”cling” to their shared cultures and have stronger beliefs systems that are
not easily swayed, especially by outsiders. Indeed, insights from social identity and conflict
theories suggested, attempts to challenged existing cultural paradigms in an explicit way,
as is typically the case with STs, can actually elicit perceptions of ”cultural threats.” This
precise concept of threat is not typically employed in research on peacekeeping and local
cultures (e.g., Ponzio 2011; Hohe 2002a; Rubinstein et al. 2008; Duffey 2000) but it captures
the essence of the ideas expressed: the feeling on the part of the local population that their
shared norms and values have been violated by outsiders and empirical manifestations can
range anywhere from interveners’ prejudiced actions or behaviors toward the locals (Boniecki
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and Britt 2003) to more intrusive aspects such as seeking change in aspects of existing
cultural institutions and paradigms, as Hohe (2002a) described in the case of UNMET’s
peacebuilding efforts in East Timor. What this suggests is that the kind of information
campaigns that peacebuilding operations carry out to promote greater cooperation can
have unintended effects of eliciting threats to shared values in established settings and fail
to produce desired attitudinal and behavioral.
These arguments taken together suggest the following hypothesis:
H1a: Status quo-transforming strategies will tend to have no influence (or even have
negative influence) on the propensity of established settings to engage in intra-group or
inter-group cooperation.9
However, as noted, intra-group with established cultures may be particularly vulnerable
to informational failures when attempting to cooperate with out groups, which may result
in collective fear and commitment problems, or even violence (Lake and Rothchild 1996).
Given their parochial tendencies (i.e., less frequent interaction with other groups), member
groups from these settings typically tend to lack credible information to reliably interpret
actions of outer groups. The in-group may not be able, for example, to determine whether a
particular action is simply ”noise,” idiosyncratic behavior from a rogue outer-group member,
or a ”real signal,” something done systematically and purposefully by the other group to
send a message. This may lead groups to assume the worse about one another and interpret
every signal from any member of an outer group as representative of the entire group. As
Fearon and Laitin (1996) point out, ”If you know nothing more than the person facing
you is a Serb, then you cannot condition your behavior on how the person acted in the
past, but only on the fact that the other person is a Serb.” This, of course, can result in
security dilemmas between groups, not only driving groups further apart and intensifying
distrust, but also potentially resulting in tremendous violence (Lake and Rothchild 1996;
Posen 1993). Indeed, these authors argue that ethnic entrepreneurs may even exploit these
9The prediction of this hypothesis is that STs will not achieve intended positive outcomes, which means
that they will either have ”no” effects or ”negative effects.” For the time being, I allow these two possibilities
in my hypotheses simply because further specifications (i.e. whether the effects of STs will actually be null
or negative requires bringing into the theory additional elements (e.g., creating an opening for opportunists
and spoilers), which I have purposefully left out to keep the theory parsimonious.
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fears to further polarize communities.
A key question here, then, is whether there is another way to solve such information
and commitment problems while avoiding the pitfalls of STs? I argue that there is, even
though it is not obvious. In chapter three, I argued that SPs (e.g., military peacekeeping)
tend to operate at the elite level by bringing elites from different factions in regular con-
tact and interaction (Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995). This forum or space can actually
provide an alternative institutional mechanism to resolve informational failures between
communities by enabling respective elites to interact and learn about each other’s issues,
thereby enhancing the prospect of intergroup cooperation. More precisely, SP-facilitated
interactions among leaders from different communities can lead to intergroup cooperation
in two ways. First, to the extent that intergroup cooperation may have been hindered by
(mis-)perceptions that groups harbor against one another, then SPs-facilitated interactions
can allow these leaders to update their prior beliefs and perceptions about each other’s
group and convey them to their constituents. For example, the different local leaders can
develop closer bonds, which could in turn influence interaction dynamics between their
group members by setting an example.10 In addition, as I argued in chapter two, SPs can
also socialize local leaders to liberal norms and values, which can then be passed along to
ordinary community members thanks to the dynamics intrinsic to communities with estab-
lished cultures (e.g., tighter social interactions between the local chiefs and constituents as
well as the high degree of legitimacy that these leaders enjoy). The argument applies in
the case of social cohesion as well, since the same liberal values tend to be emphasized in
political and social realms.
Another way in which SPs-facilitated interactions between elites from different commu-
nities can promote greater cooperation is by revealing the different local leaders’ preferences,
which could in turn help resolve commitment problems that may have existed. The idea
here is that through these regular interactions, the different local leaders may also come to
see themselves as working toward the same goal and rely on each other to enforce commit-
10One analogy here could be members from two different families who avoid each other as a result of
enmities or conflict between family heads, but once the issues between the heads have been resolved family
members from both sides start interacting again.
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ments on their respective members. A potential mechanism at work here could be similar
to Fearon’s and Laitin’s (1996) ”in-group policing.” In this mechanism, as the authors ar-
gue, members of different groups tend to ignore perceived transgressions from other groups
under the expectation that culprits will be sanctioned by their own group. Implicit here
is the fact that groups need to possess information about what is going on inside other
groups. Such interactions can become a crucial mechanism when they effectively reveal
different leaders’ commitment to peace and cooperation, information that may have gone
unrecognized without mediation from peacekeepers.
It is clear then that SPs may stand a better chance than STs to promote intergroup
social cohesion, albeit in subtle ways, in situations where at least one side is culturally
established. They can provide a forum through which leaders of different communities
resolve the issue of intergroup cooperation and transmit liberal norms and values subtly
through these interactions. SPs should also have positive influence on intra-group social
cohesion, though not as big as for inter-group. The reasoning here is that even though
established settings do have higher levels of social cohesion at baseline, relative to their
counterparts in fragmented settings, it may not be optimal. This is particularly true in
postwar settings where social relations can remain under the shadow of war and conflict for
a long time.11 Thus, the right interventions can always add value to already higher levels
of social cohesion.
The foregoing discussion suggests the following hypothesis:
H1b: Status quo-preserving strategies will tend to have positive influence on the propen-
sity of established settings to engage in cooperation both within and between groups, but the
effects will likely be higher for inter-group cooperation.
11Many studies (e.g., Mugghah 2011; Autesserre 2010; Tschirgi 2004; Maynard 1997) have suggested that
a recurrent feature of postwar settings is that organized armed violence tends to mutate into criminality
and other forms of pervasive local insecurity such as disputes or sectarian violence and arguably established
settings are not entirely spared from these issues, which in turn, suggests that they may not be realizing
their fullest potential.
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6.2.2 Promoting social cohesion in fragmented settings
The situation is reversed in culturally fragmented local settings, which typically lack the kind
of dense social networks or ties that their established counterparts possess, which tend to
lead to protracted instability. An example of this might be what Autesserre (2010) described
as ”grassroots rivalries over land, resources, and political power motivated widespread vi-
olence” that underlie protracted conflicts and violence in eastern the Democratic Republic
of Congo. There is no other rational explanation for protracted and inefficient (for the
community, at least) conflicts such as these, expect for severe information and commitment
problems12, which in turn, stem from low valuation of existing cultural paradigms. Sawyer
(2005) describes similar dynamics in the context of postwar Liberia. He remarked that while
theporo authority and elders have ”always played a critical role in the transmission of value
and knowledge in many rural societies,” the onslaught that some of them suffered during
years of conflict has elicited ”a response of withdrawal...from participation in community
affairs” and that this in turn has contributed to the erosion of values and knowledge loss,
which have exacerbated socioeconomic hardships in communities (151). The phenomenon
that Autesserre (2010) and Sawyer (2005) are describing in the communities they study is
akin to what Plateau and Abraham (2002) described as ”community imperfections” or the
lack of what Bowles and Gintis (2004) called ”problem-solving capacity.”
As discussed, these deficiencies not only hamper cooperation within the group, but also
make it difficult to engage in cooperative behaviors with out groups. There are at least
two reasons for this. First, the low levels of within-group social cohesion suggest greater
potential for opportunistic behaviors that may jeopardize collective interest. This is true
when cooperation involves group members only, and it is even more so when outside groups
are involved. Second, the presence of opportunists is highly problematic, as they do not
worry about the consequences of their actions; so the entire group may be collectively blamed
by association with such an opportunist. Hence commitment problems may add another
layer of complications. As Fearon and Laitin (1996) put it in their earlier cited example,
”that ’Serb’ may have no individual reputation to worry about protecting in interactions
12See Fearon (1995) for a discussion of ”rational explanations of war,” in general.
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with non-Serbs.” This may make credible commitment difficult, as sustained cooperation
requires the expectation of reciprocal, positive interactions in the future (I do good for you
today, and you will do good for me tomorrow). In short, frequent social transgressions from
a group’s opportunistic members undercut its credibility to commit. Yet, as the previous
discussion implied, such social instability are actually good for the prospect of change.
People are much more open to alternative social arrangements that might be superior to
the status quo (Moore et al. 2003). The only question is which alternative and how to
overcome the same collective action problems that prompt people to want to move away
from the status quo in the first place and to converge on socially desirable alternative
arrangements.
The question here then is: to what extent can peacebuilding strategies (both STs and
SPs) help address these cooperation-inhibiting deficiencies in fragmented local settings?
I argue that are appropriate for the unique problems and challenges that these settings
face in two ways. First, STs do provide information that the elites may otherwise not
have volunteered to to share. This is the basic premise on which rest many of today’s
civic education programs or information campaigns, included those provided within the
context of peacebuilding operations (Russett and O’Neal 2001). Such information, in turn,
can enable people to establish common knowledge about the status quo and to converge
their expectations around a new, socially desirable alternative arrangement. STs can also
overcome the problem of ”bad information” in a way that local alternatives may not, at
least in the sense that the information provided through these strategies is likely to be
independent of particularistic agendas of one side or the other. This is not an trivial issue.
The polarizing nature of many civil wars often make it difficult to trust information from the
other side.13 Thus it is crucial the the information be provided by a third party arguably
benefits from the presumption of impartiality.
But STs do not merely provide information. Perhaps more importantly, they also pro-
13One informant in Cote d’Ivoire explained it in the following way as made the case as to why the United
Nations Operation in Cote d’voire (UNOCI) should be in charge of running the entire electoral process,
including delivering civic education campaigns: ”There is always the fear that that whatever information
the other side provides is not completely accurate or if it is accurate then there may be ulterior motives for
providing it.” Author’s interview. Abidjan, October 2011).
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vide a forum or space, which enables people to interact from frequently. Such interactions
can reveal each other’s preferences. Preference revelation, in turn, can facilitate deliberation
and coordination toward socially desired solutions. Unlike established settings where close
and frequent social interactions are an everyday routine, in fragmented settings local elites
typically do not provide such forum or when they do, discussions are very controlled for
members to be able to learn anything meaningful about one another.14 Elites’ tight grip on
social life stand in the way of people’s learning about each other’s preference and payoffs,
even though they live in close proximity with one another. Thus, by providing a space in
which people can actually discuss and deliberate without being censored by the elites, local
people in fragmented settings can have the opportunity to learn about each other in a new
light.
Finally, STs have the capability of leading, whether directly or indirectly, to improved
intergroup cooperation. They can do so indirectly by strengthening the internal dynamics
of culturally fragmented local settings, enabling them to better control the opportunistic
behaviors of its members and therefore be able to enter into credible commitments with
other groups. And they can do so directly by providing members from both groups with
relevant information that enables them to aggregate knowledge and converge expectations.
For example, many international NGOs carry out information campaigns and other project
activities that specifically seek to generate convergence in expectations at this macro-level
(e.g., community A learns more about community B, and both communities come to an
understanding that they need to work together for a common purpose). Moreover, since
social cohesion in fragmented settings is generated primarily with outside help, there is no
reason to expect that strengthening intra-group social cohesion will necessarily lower the
group’s propensity to engage in inter-group cooperation, as it seemed to be the case with
established cultural settings. The idea here is that since both aspects of social cohesion
are promoted simultaneously and primarily with outside help, they will tend to be seen as
complementary to each other.
The foregoing arguments implicitly assume that local people in fragmented settings are
driven by instrumental considerations. But the predictions are the same even when people
14See chapter four for anecdotal accounts that support this notion.
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are being driven by emotional or moral considerations. The claim here is that weaker
identification with with the existing cultural paradigm means that STs are less likely to
elicit perceptions of cultural threats, which typically come into play in contexts of culturally
established settings. Ashforth’s and Mael’s (1989) argument that when confronted with
threatening information or behavior intentionally directed at the in-group, ”low identifiers”
typically respond by ”distancing themselves from the group or repenting for its immoral
behavior” is applicable in culturally fragmented local settings. In other words, there are no
”shared values” to be threatened by new norms and values being promoted by STs.
If these arguments are correct, we should expect the following hypothesis:
H2a: Status quo-transforming strategies will tend to have positive influence on the like-
lihood of fragmented settings to engage in cooperation both within and between groups.
However, there is no reason to expect that SPs will have a similarly positive influence on
communities that are culturally fragmented. SPs lack the kind of information mechanisms
that are appropriate for severe information asymmetries pervasive in fragmented settings.
In addition, SPs primarily operate indirectly through interactions with local elites, and
fragmented settings typically do not have the sort of community dynamics (e.g., higher
legitimacy; frequent interactions between the elites and masses) that would enable the
mechanisms to work at the level of the constituents. More specifically, what SPs-facilitated
interactions do is impart to local leaders (who may not have had previous incentive for
peaceful interaction) a great deal of information about other communities. This learning
alone, however, does not translate into greater social cohesion within and between groups.
That would require local leaders to pass the newly acquired information along to their
respective group members, a transmission also necessary for improvement in intergroup
cooperation. In addition, local leaders must be able to make credible commitments (on
behalf of their respective groups) for present and future transactions between groups. Local
leaders from strong communities have the ability to do both of these things, but local leaders
from weak communities do not.
Thus, even when leaders from weak settings interact with peers in other groups, this
does not address the two major sources of cooperation problems between the groups. That
is, they may not have the capacity to effectively address misperceptions or mistrust their
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own group may harbor towards other groups. They may also lack the ability to control the
opportunistic behaviors of some of their members. As a result, SPs will have no meaningful
influence on fragmented settings to engage in greater intra-group or intergroup cooperation,
as stated in the following hypothesis:
H2b: Status quo-preserving strategies will tend to have no influence on the propensity of
fragmented settings to engage in intra-group or inter-group cooperation.
6.2.3 Summary of hypotheses
To summarize, the overarching argument developed in this paper is that the strength of an
existing culture plays a far more important role in shaping the influence of peacebuilding
strategies on social change than is typically acknowledged in the mainstream literature.
Drawing on insights from social science studies, I have formulated specific hypotheses about
how local contexts that are and are not culturally established will tend to respond to
peacebuilding interventions designed to promote liberal norms and values. In settings where
the valuation of existing cultural paradigms is strong (i.e. established settings), status quo-
transforming interventions such as curriculum treatment will likely be ineffective or even
counterproductive (H1a), as people may find it too costly to abandon existing cultural
resources (and acquire new ones) or norms and values they promote may appear to the
local population as a threat to existing culture. But status quo-preserving interventions,
such as the security committee program examined here, may be able to promote change
indirectly through the use of interaction with local elites (H1b).
By contrast, in local settings that are culturally fragmented (i.e. where existing cultural
paradigms are weakly valued), status quo-transforming interventions may be exactly what
is needed to overcome the cooperation-hindering information and commitment problems
that tend to be pervasive therein. STs also stand a better chance to have positive effects
in such settings, as existing cultural paradigms may be too suboptimal for local people
to maintain them and there is a lesser likelihood of perceived cultural threats (H2a). On
their part, status quo-preserving strategies will tend to be ineffective in these same con-
texts because SPs lack appropriate information mechanisms and as a result of deficits in
local leaders’ legitimacy and the infrequency of social interactions, which would otherwise
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facilitate indirect social change (H2b).
These expectations are summarized in Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: Peacebuilding strategies and social cohesion in different local settings
Status quo Transforming Status quo Preserving
Strategies (STs) Strategies (SPs)
Established Negative influence Positive Influence
Settings (High costs; threats perceptions, H1a) (Through elite socialization, H1b)
Fragmented Positive influence Negative Influence
Settings (Mitigate information asymmetries, H2a) (Inadequate for mass information problems, H2b)
One caveat is that these hypotheses were develop from the standpoint of the ”all good
things go together” assumption implicit in the current peacebuilding approach. In other
words, if this assumption is warranted and given that these hypotheses were borne out with
respect to political participation, then we should expect the same result with respect to other
outcomes, social cohesion in this case. However, as noted earlier referencing Huntington
(1968), this assumption may not be warranted after all. It is quire likely that political and
social processes may be driven by different factors and if it is true the strength of existing
cultural paradigms may not be as salient for social cohesion as they are for social political
participation. For the time being I will treat these as empirical questions, which the data
will help address and leave for future research the theoretical question of why political
participation and social cohesion may or may not be driven by the same set of factors.
Below I discuss my strategy for measuring social cohesion, before conducting a formal
test of hypotheses developed above. But first a brief note on the social context is in order.
6.3 Social Context in Postwar Liberia
I have already, in chapter 4, provided background information on the civil war in this
country as well as on international efforts to resolve it. Perhaps more relevant to the
challenge of restoring social cohesion is that the civil war wrought unimaginable social
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toll to individuals and communities such as the thousands of families who lost their loved
ones, communities completely destroyed, millions of people who were forced out of their
homes and property or forced to separate with their loved ones, to name a few (Richards
et al. 2005). Indeed, with the end of the civil war and people settling back in their
communities, new challenges such as land conflict and tensions between returnees and those
who stayed behind started to threaten the fragile peace. In 2009, UNMIL carried out week-
long consultative fora on ”reconciliation, peacebuilding and conflict resolution” in all of
Liberia’s 15 counties aiming to assist communities and groups ”to better understand one
anothers positions, and contributed to strengthening the capacity of local bodies to facilitate
inclusive problem-solving processes and consensus-building around community priorities”
(UNMIL-CAS 2009). Figure 6.1 below depicts the types of social tensions and conflicts that
were identified during this process and their locations.
As it can be seen from the map, virtually every single country experienced a mixture
of conflicts–from religious and identity conflicts to communal land disputes (both intra and
inter) to ethnic conflicts (both intra and inter), among others. It is against this backdrop
that the international community, with UNMIL in the lead, intervened to rebuild the social
fabric and prevent the country from slipping in another civil war. My objective in the
remainder of this chapter is to outline a measurement strategy of how I measured social
cohesion in Liberia and use UNMIL as a setting to investigate empirically theoretical hy-
potheses I developed about when and how different peacebuilding strategies might positively
influence social cohesion at the grassroots level.
6.4 Measuring Social Cohesion
Operationalizing social cohesion is tricky, as there is little clarity and consistency in how the
concept is defined and employed. For the purpose of this paper, I follow recent empirical
studies that conceptualize social cohesion as a set of behaviors and attitudes within a com-
munity that reflect the propensity of community members to work together for a common
purpose (King et al. 2010; Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Fearon et al. 2009; Colletta and Cullen
2000; Putnam 1995). Thus defined, social cohesion encompasses different dimensions, the
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Figure 6.1: Social conflicts in postwar Liberia
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most important of which are collective action and trust (Glaeser et al.2000). Most empirical
studies, including the aforementioned, tend to focus on collective action (or cooperation)
because it presupposes trust (Fearon and Laitin 1996). This study follows in their footsteps.
As noted, peacebuilding interventions to promote social cohesion typically target two types
of social cohesion: one that refers to patterns of interaction among members of the same
group or community, and another that refers to patterns of interactions between different
groups or communities (King et al. 2010). Putnam (2000) refers to these as ”bonding” and
”bridging” social capital, while Fearon and Laitin (1996) make a similar distinction between
”intra-group” cooperation and ”inter-group” cooperation. Accordingly, this study focuses
on both types of social cohesion.
An additional challenge of studying social cohesion concerns measurement. Beyond rou-
tine problems associated with survey measurement (it is difficult to come up with survey
questions that meet the validity and reliability test), measuring social cohesion also comes
up against an underlying strategic obstacle: low-cost incentives to lie. Since respondents
face no costs for reporting inaccurate answers to enumerators, many will be tempted to
provide answers that reflect socially desirable behaviors, even if they are an inaccurate re-
flection of actual social predispositions or past behaviors (Collier and Vicente 2011; Pande
2011). Recent studies (e.g. Baldwin and Mvukiyehe 2013; Gilligan et al. 2012; Grossman
2011; Fearon et al. 2009; Witt and Wilson 2007) have relied on public goods games that are
more incentive-compatible with underlying predispositions. I follow in these studies’ foot-
steps. Specifically, I investigate the effects of peacebuilding strategies on both intra-group
and inter-group social cohesion, using behavioral measures from a public goods game that
provides behavioral measures assessing the willingness of community members to cooperate
both internally and with outside groups.
6.4.1 Context of the game
This game departs from standard public goods games in two important ways. First, while
many studies recognize the importance of the two types of social cohesion discussed above,
the public goods games they employ tend to focus only on intra-group social cohesion and
rarely on the inter-group type. Furthermore, in standard games participants are typically
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provided with the same amount as a ”gift” and asked to make a contribution of any amount
to a community fund; the portion contributed to a common good is usually raised by a pre-
specified rate. Because the community typically gains more when more people contribute
a greater amount, pro-social behaviors are generally measured by the contribution amount.
It is not clear, however, whether this is a reliable measure of pro-social behaviors since
income was unexpected.15 Therefore it may be argued that some people can afford to be
more generous (though not necessarily more social) with funds they did not expect than
with finds they already had. The loss feels greater in the former.16
Thus, the game employed in this paper was designed to take advantage of the reliability
and behavior-compatible features of typical public goods games, while also addressing their
shortcomings. Specifically, a public goods game was carried out in all of the towns targeted
by the study with the same respondents who participated in the household survey. I first
provide some information about the general context surrounding the game, before describing
the steps and outcomes of the game itself. Participants in the public good game were the
same individuals targeted for household survey interviews and so in most cases the game
took place after the interviews, on the same day or a day latter. Typically, at the end of
the interview, enumerators extended an invitation to the respondents to come to a meeting
with other town residents. They were provided with information about time and location
and given general information about the purpose of the meeting, which was explained in
terms of helping researchers working with a local NGO understand ”how people of this
community identify important priorities for their town as well as how they work together as
a communities and with other communities to address those priorities.” The vast majority of
respondents agreed and came to a pre-determined location at the agreed time. Because the
research team had gotten clarence from the local chief, few people doubted the legitimacy
15It is true that some studies (e.g. Whitt 2012), especially those that focus on trust rather than collective
action per se, do involve some measure of ”bridging” social capital, as when players are given the option
to make contributions to an anonymous out-group. But members thought this was hardly an everyday
collective action, which typically involves face-to-face interaction.
16Intuition for this comes from prospect theories and other psychological studies, which suggest that
individuals are more averse to losing what they currently have to losing potential future gains (Druckman
and Lupia 2000). Unexpected income is not so different from ”future” gains.
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of the invitation or the group activity.
Once at the location, participants were given more detailed information about the meet-
ing and the activity it entailed, namely setting up priorities for the community (and a
neighboring community) and making contributions towards identified priorities. Debriefing
sessions with Field Facilitators suggested that the activity was considered to be genuine,
based on the quantity and quality of interventions. Participants argued passionately to push
for their ”preferred” priority, but in a cordial atmosphere.17 In other words, most partici-
pants interpreted the game as a ”real” project that might help the community and arguably
people’s decision-making in the public goods game mimicked decision-making in their ev-
eryday life. Thus the activity provides a fairly reliable measure of patterns of cooperation
in these communities.
6.4.2 Steps in the public goods game
The game entailed the following. First, participants were invited to a central location and
briefed about the goal and objective of the activity. Second, after explaining the purpose
of the activity, participants were asked by the Field Facilitator to identify a pressing social
need in their community, and invited to make two types of contributions with their own
money: (i) a contribution toward the identified need in their own community, which mea-
sures ”bonding” or ”intra-group” social cohesion; and (ii) a contribution toward a similar
need in a neighboring community different from one’s own, which measures ”bridging” or
”inter-group” social cohesion.18 The contributions were made anonymously in two separate
envelopes provided to participants at the beginning of the activity. Participants were also
told that other communities were also involved in a similar initiative and that at the end
of the program the community that will make the highest contributions to both types, the
17A related similar exercise had taken place during the assessment phase of the project where community
members, but the goal of the previous activity was primarily to collect information about community pri-
orities and extent of collective action (e.g., whether community would prefer to address their own priorities
or reach out to the government or NGOs for help.
18This is a departure from the standard public goods games just described.
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program will match that amount as a prize.19
Third, after contribution and accounting processes after been completed, participants
were told that the contributions made where not anywhere closer to targeted amount for
the identified need and that it was necessary to redo the contributions again. At this point,
the total sum from the first round was divided among the participants equally (because
what each participant contributed was not known) before proceeding to the second round.
20 Finally, at the end of the second round of contributions, both sets of funds–contributions
to an intra-group cause and contributions to an out-group cause–were taken to the town
chief who was also involved in an additional set of experiments on good governance that
are not part of this present study.
Thus, this public goods game better captures community collective action dynamics. It
also capture the two most important dimensions of social cohesion namely collective action
and trust (Glaeser et al.2000): The negative correlation between levels of contributions
(amount) and number of empty envelops or zero contribution–which I use as a proxy of
defection and untrustworthiness aspects of trust–is very high and robust (r=.60). Commu-
nities that had higher average contributions were likely to have fewer defectors who did not
contribute anything at all; conversely, communities with lower average contributions were
more likely to have many defectors. Therefore, we can have confidence that the game is
capturing essential features of patterns of interactions in the communities studied. Descrip-
tively, the sample mean contribution in the first round is 264 Liberian dollars (LD) toward
an in-group social cause and 130LD toward an out-group cause.21 In the second round,
19This is another departure from standard public goods games in which a pre-specified interest rate is
applied to all social contributions in each community, regardless of the amount. In this game, I did not use
such an interest rate, but there is a subjective interest rate implied in the conditionality of the prize, which
I suspect is how people decide to make investments in a social cause–by comparing conditions in their town
to conditions in other towns.
20I note that use contributions in the first round as my primary measure of social cohesion. The second
round was introduce for the sake of another feature of the public good game, a discussion module, introduced
in a random subset of communities with the aim to isolate the effects of short, decentralized deliberations on
collective action. This aspect is not a key part of this paper, but I will reference it in the discussion section.
21The exchange rate was 70 LD for 1 USD. While the average contributions may look small in size, they
are actually meaningful if interpreted within a proper context. These are very rural towns in which most
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contributions were slightly higher: 370LD and 200LD toward an in-group and out-group
cause respectively. But the dispersion around mean value is fairly wide in these measures,
suggesting a great deal of variability across communities. For instance, standard deviation
values for the last two measures are 322LD and 221LD, respectively, for the within-group co-
operation measure and the between-group measure. Moreover, there are strong suggestions
that variation in the contribution levels is related to variation in the strength of culture, a
key contextual factor that I hypothesized is highly relevant for peacebuilding interventions.
Table 6.2 below presents average contributions in both rounds and for both intra-group and
inter-group social cohesion disaggregated by the type of local settings. (I use the mean of
the cultural strength variable as a threshold to distinguish between culturally established
settings and culturally fragmented settings.)
Table 6.2: Contributions in a public goods game, by local setting type
Contributions Contributions
Round One Round Two
Established Intra-group cause: 300 LD (N=637) Intra-group cause: 385LD (N=619)
Settings Intergroup cause: 136 LD (N=627) Intergroup cause: 192 LD (N=609)
Fragmented Intra-group cause: 218 LD (N=505) Intra-group cause: 344 LD (N=495)
Settings Inter-group cause: 120 LD (N=495) Intergroup cause: 256 LD (N=505)
The figures in this table form an interesting picture. While contributions in the first
round toward an out-group were virtually similar the set of established settings and frag-
mented settings (136LD and 120 LD respectively), the same was not true with regard to
contributions to an in-group cause. The former outperformed the latter by a 16-percent
margin (300LD and 218LD, respectively), which seems to support the intuition that local
settings with established cultures do have a stronger startup advantage with respect to intra-
group social cohesion than their counterparts with fragmented cultures, but not necessarily
with respect to inter-group social cohesion. Taken together, these statistics support the
notions that intra-group cooperation is easier to achieve than inter-group cooperation and
people probably live off less than 1 USD per day. Thus, for a town that contributed 210LD, each participant
would have contributed the equivalent of 3 days or more worth of earnings.
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that established settings have higher baseline levels of social cohesion than their fragmented
counterparts. Below I investigate systematically whether and how different peacebuilding
strategies may have contributed to both patterns of social interactions in the two types of
local settings.
6.5 Empirical Framework and Results
I use the same framework as used in chapter four. I use multiple regressions to model two
sets of relationships: (i) the relationship between two treatment measures (i.e., security
and curriculum interventions) and measures of social cohesion provided by the public goods
game; and (ii) the relationship between two treatment measures and measures of social
cohesion, accounting for the probable mediating role of cultural strength. I discuss modeling
specifications and present empirical results for each set of relationships in turn.
6.5.1 Estimating average effects of the treatments
The first set of relationships concerns the average or ”main” effects of the primary treat-
ment variables on social cohesion in the population towns and provides evidence of the
”conventional hypothesis,” according to which the two strategies being investigated (se-
curity intervention and curriculum intervention) should have independent average positive
effects on social cohesion and should have even greater positive effects when they are carried
out as a package. I estimate a regression equation of the following form:
Yt = β0 + β1St + β2Ct + β3SXCt + γc[t] + δb[c[t]] + ￿t (6.1)
Where:
Yt : is the level of intra-group or inter-group social cohesion for town t;
St : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at security committee
treatment;
Ct : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at civic education treat-
ment;
SXCt : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received both treatments;
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γc[t]: indicates wether the clan of security committee town was a high or low density;
δb[c[t]] : is a fixed effect for the block (and field facilitator) to which the town was assigned;
and
￿t : is the disturbance term for the regression.
The parameters of interest in this equation are: β1 and β2, which provide estimates of the
difference in average treatment effects (ATEs) for the security committee treatment and the
civic education intervention, respectively,22 as well as β3, which provides estimates of joint
effects of these treatments. Other regressions terms are included simply to increase precision
of the estimates. Since both outcome measures are continuous, I employ standard OLS
regressions. All statistical analyses reported here were performed using Stata version11.
Results of intervention effects on the two measures of social cohesion are summarized in
Table 6.3 below. Model 4 presents results on intra-group social cohesion and model 5 on
inter-group social cohesion. Both are measured in terms of total contributions for each
community.
The results in the table suggest that the security committee program had meaningful
positive effects on intra-group social cohesion, 89LD increase (or about 28%) from the
baseline levels of 314LD, but but the confidence intervals are too wide for this result to
have statistical significance at conventional levels. The effects of this treatment on inter-
group social cohesion were much smaller (19LD), also statistically insignificant. I find
similar results with respect to the civic education program: no meaningful no meaningful
effects on either measure of social cohesion. As can be seen in Table 6.3, the results also
fail to provide evidence for joint effects of these two strategies: communities that received
both intervention types did not fare any better or worse along the two measures of social
cohesion than those that received one or neither intervention type. These patterns of results
challenge to conventional wisdom implicit in the current peacebuilding approach. Even if
we interpret these results generously to recognize the rather important, but imprecise, effect
of the security committee program on intra-group social cohesion, we still have to address
the lack of similar effects on inter-group social cohesion and, perhaps more importantly,
22Assignment probabilities to the security committee treatment was not uniform, as a result of different
clan sizes and density variable. To ensure consistency of this estimator, weight adjustments were made.
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Table 6.3: Maim effects on social cohesion measures
Intra-group Inter-group
Model (4) (5)
Security committee 89 20
(71) (28)
Civic education -26 2
(42) (31)





F= .05 F= .67
Adj. R2 = .43 Adj. R2 = .42
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
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the poor performance of the civic education program because, as noted in the theory, such
programs are typically given precedence in the current peacebuilding approach to social (and
political) change. What, then, is missing in the theory implicit in the current peacebuilding
approach that might account for this lack of results?
Next I investigate my own hypotheses developed in this chapter.
6.5.2 Estimating effects of heterogeneity across local settings types
In the theory section, I outlined hypotheses about the influence of status quo-transforming
strategies (civic education program, in this case) and status quo-preserving strategies (se-
curity committee in this case) on intra-group and inter-group social cohesion, taking into
account the strength of an existing culture (see Table 1 for summary.) To test these hy-
potheses, I fit a generic regression equation of the following type:
Yt = β0 + β1St + β2Ct + β3Pt + β4SXPt + β5CXPt + γc[t] + δb[c[t]] + ￿t (6.2)
Where:
Yt : is the level of level of social cohesion in town t;
St : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at security committee
treatment;
Ct : is a dummy variable indicating whether the town received at civic education treat-
ment;
Pt : is a variable indicating that indicate the strength of culture in town t;
SXPt : is an interaction term between the security committee treatment and the
strength of culture;
CXPt : is an interaction term between the civic education treatment and the strength
of culture;
γc[t]: indicates wether the clan of security committee town was a high or low density;
δb[c[t]] : is a fixed effect for the block (and field facilitator) to which the town was assigned;
and
￿t : is the disturbance term for the regression.
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The parameters of interest in this equation are: β4 and β5, which provide estimates of
the difference in ATEs across culturally established local settings and culturally fragmented
local settings. The coefficient on the interaction terms (in full sample) or the difference in
coefficient on the primary factors (in split samples) will provide answers.23 That is, these
coefficients (in the full model at least) should be interpreted as the predicted differences in
increase (or decrease) of levels of social cohesion between communities of different cultural
strength that have undergone similar treatment interventions. Regressions estimates are
summarized in Table 6.4 below. Models 6 and 7 presents results on interaction effects on
both measures of social cohesion in the full sample, with two interaction terms based on
each of the two treatment variables and a dummy variable indicating the strength of culture
(1 is the category for fragmented cultural settings). Models 8-11 present interaction effects
in a different way, by looking at the difference in coefficients on the treatment variables
in split samples for culturally established settings (8 and 9) versus culturally fragmented
settings (10 and 11). For ease of interpretation, the results in model 8-11, which depict the
effects of my two primary treatments on both measures of social cohesion in established
settings versus fragmented settings are summarized in Table 6.4.
The results presented in Table 6.4 do not provide strong support for hypothesized re-
lationship and in some instances they even point in the opposite direction than one hy-
pothesized. In established settings, as predicted in H1a, the effects of the civic education
program on both intra-group and inter-group social cohesion are fairly negligible. The secu-
rity committee treatment does have moderate positive effects on intra-group social cohesion
(68LD) as H1b predicts, but these estimates are not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Nor do the effects of this treatment extend to intergroup social cohesion (the coef-
ficient is a mere 13LD). In fragmented settings, my theoretical predictions were that the
civic education program will have positive effects on both intra-group and inter-group social
cohesion (H2a), but that the security committee will have influence on neither type (H2b).
23In the full model, only the coefficients on interaction terms are of substantive and statistical importance.
In other words, the importance and significance of the primary factors are different when interaction terms
are taken into account (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003), and for the purpose of the analysis at hand, they are not
of primary concerns.
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Table 6.4: Heterogeneous effects of program interventions
Established Settings Fragmented Settings
Intragroup Inter-group Intra-group Inter-group Intra-group Inter-group
Model (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Security committee 63 01 63 -03 168*** 63*
(61) (30) (63) (30) (53) (35)
Civec education -14 28 -7 25 -20 -23
(64) (35) (68) (37) (37) (32)
Cultural Strength (17) (23 )
(60) (31)
Seccom X Culture 99 74
(77) (40)
Cived X Culture 10 -44
(80) (49)
Constant 296*** 138*** 330*** 144*** 253*** 167***
(53) (25) (60) (40) (45) (40)
N= 1166 N=1146 N=613 N=603 N=553 N= 543
F= .02 F= 0.04 F= .38 F= .91 F=.02 F= .09
AR2 = .47 AR2 = .46 AR2 = .26 AR2 = .25 AR2 = .64 AR2 = .66
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
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Table 6.5: Heterogeneous effects of program interventions (summary)
Security Civic
Committee Education
Established Intra-group cause: 68 LD (N=613) Intra-group cause: 14 LD (N=613)
Settings Intergroup cause: 13 LD (N=603) Intergroup cause: -7 LD (N=603)
Fragmented Intra-group cause: 168 LD (N=553) Intra-group cause: -19 LD (N=553)
Settings Inter-group cause: 63 LD (N=543) Intergroup cause: -23 LD (N=543)
Instead, the results in the Table 7 suggest the reverse is true: the security committee had
very large positive effects on intra-group and inter-group social cohesion to the tune of 168
LD and 63LD, respectively–which represent an increase in the measure of intra-group social
cohesion by an astonishing 66% (baseline contributions in control communities are 253 LD)
and in the measure of inter-group social cohesion by 38%. The first estimate is statistically
significant at the 99 percent confidence interval, while the latter is significant at the .1 level.
On the other hand, the civic education program has no meaningful effects on either type of
social cohesion (a decrease of 19LD and 23 LD, respectively for intra-group and inter-group
social cohesion and only the latter is statistically significant at conventional levels.
Taken together, these results suggest differences in patterns of social dynamics in these
two settings types. But the fact that these results appear to deviate from theoretical pre-
dictions suggests there may be much more going on than just the hypothesized relationship,
warranting further investigation. The next section discusses these results in greater detail,
drawing comparisons with results on political participation where relevant.
6.6 Discussion
Empirical evidence presented in this chapter does not support the conventional hypothesis
implicit in contemporary peacebuilding interventions. Specifically, while the theory implicit
in the current peacebuilding approach give precedence to status quo-transforming strategies
as the primary mechanisms through which outside interventions influence patterns of social
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interactions in war-torn societies, a 9-monthlong civic education program used as a proxy
for such strategies had no meaningful effects measures of intra-group and inter-group social
cohesion employed in this paper. By contrast status-quo preserving strategies such as
military peacekeeping are not typically presumed, in the current peacebuilding approach,
to play a direct role in changing patterns of social interactions. But the security committee
program used in my field experiment to proxy for these strategies suggests otherwise, at
least when we take the strength of existing culture into account. The results on main
effects of the two peacebuilding strategies (or lack thereof) point in the same direction
with my finding in the realm of political participation (see chapter 5) and together, at first
glance, they would seem to raise doubt about key mechanisms presumed in the current
peacebuilding strategy. But this is only part of the story.
As the results in this particular chapter and in the previous chapter suggest, the influ-
ence of peacebuilding strategies on social and political outcomes appear to depend critically
on local contexts, in particular the strength of existing cultures at the time of an interven-
tion. But unlike in my previous study, local culture does not appear to be salient for social
cohesion, according to my theoretical predictions, and as it did for political participation.
To be sure, the differential performance of the security committee program and civic edu-
cation program suggests that context does matter for the effects of the interventions, but
not entirely in the manner predicted by my theory. To reconcile theoretical expectations
and empirical realizations (or at least to shed light on the seeming discrepancies), I will
highlight four issues for further discussion: (i) local culture’s apparent lack of saliency
for interventions targeting social cohesion; (ii) the seeming underperformance of the secu-
rity committee program with respect to inter-group cooperation and seeming persistence of
parochial tendencies; (iii) the poor performance of the civic education program, particularly
in fragmented settings, which according to my theory, should have been more responsive;
and (iv) the surprisingly strong performance of the village security committee in fragmented
settings where I least expected them to work. I address these issues in order.24
With respect to the first issue, there are a number of possible explanations. Perhaps
24I note that this discussion and some of the explanations that will be offered are necessarily ex-post and
should be taken as pointers for areas of future research, rather than strong evidence of the arguments herein.
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the most obvious explanation is that the social realm may entail processes and mechanisms
than those governing political processes. There are theoretical and empirical reasons for this.
As noted in the introduction, the presumption that these two (and other) peacebuilding
outcomes should all go hand-in-hand is prevalent in the mainstream peacebuilding literature,
despite the lack of theoretical grounding and empirical evidence for such a linkage. I draw
on the Liberian case to suggest that social and political outcomes might entail different
governing mechanisms or follow different trajectories, even when subjected to the same
set of inputs, and these differences can help explain the seeming differences in cultural
strength’s saliency with respect to outside interventions in political versus social realms.
As any one who has visited the country during an election season and in off election
season knows, much of the politics tends to play out around elections time and elections
are typically a very high profile affair in which political actors pay an unusual level of
”interest” and ”attention” to communities, even some of the remotest, and local chiefs
get courted in very big ways. Social processes, on the other hand, tend to be low key or
even imperceptible to ordinary citizens. In addition, the two processes tend to attract an
uneven amount of international attention and involvement. While political processes tend
to attract a great deal of international attention–from multiple high level meetings and
diplomatic activities to increased frequency of peacekeeping activities to intensification of
civic education campaigns–the most international involvement in social processes involves
is typically a few workshops or related development activities and usually without fanfare
that tend to accompany political events. These differences do not go unnoticed by the
local population who quickly understand the ”high stakes” of the political over the social.
Consistent with this suggestion, the majority of respondents in the survey reported having
been contacted by a political operative or representative from a major political party seeking
their vote and nearly half of the respondents received a ”small gift”–such as T-shirts or
foodstuff–as incentives.25 Therefore, one can argue, the heightened significance of cultural
strength observed with respect to peacebuilding interventions in the political realm, but
not in the social realm could be a result of these differences. In other words, the suggestion
here is that the uneven amount of outside attention that the political realm (as opposed to
25PBDPL Survey.
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the social realm) tends to garners does cue people about precedence of the politics over the
social and thus the saliency of local cultures for outside interventions in the realm of political
participation, but not in the realm of social cohesion, simply reflects these differences.
As for the security community program’s seeming lack of influence on established set-
tings’ patterns of cooperation with out-groups, an important issue to resolve is whether this
finding reflects persistent parochial tendencies of these settings, suggesting little prospect
for outside interventions to alter patterns of social interactions, or whether the theoretical
explanation may have missed important aspects of mechanisms that govern these settings’
cooperative behavior. It is difficult to believe the former, especially given that these ten-
dencies did not appear to endure in the political realm. I am therefore inclined toward the
latter explanation, but further research is needed to clarify how these settings affect the
evaluation of information supplied from the outside. Some of the literature discussed in the
theoretical section (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 2004) suggest that information mechanisms are
not the only feature that enhances cooperation in established settings. Perhaps reputation
mechanisms that facilitate contract enforcement are as important. One hypothesis from
this is that established settings can have reasonably good information about potential co-
operation partners and yet still prefer not to cooperate if they have insufficient guarantees
about out groups’ ability to commit to agreements. My empirical analysis did not capture
this aspect of the theory, having instead emphasized the information channel. But both ex-
planations are plausible. So how can we find out which, if any of these explanations, is able
to account for the security committee’s lack of influence on the propensity of established
settings to engage in inter-group cooperation?
Unfortunately the available data do not allow me to address these issues directly. How-
ever, I can perform ancillary tests to shed light. Specifically, I suggest that to support the
notion that established settings may be trapped in parochial tendencies it has to be the
case that 1) these settings are disproportionately outpaced by fragmented settings when
it comes to working with other groups; and 2) that outside interventions are not able to
change this pattern, under any circumstances. The PBDPL included self-reported questions
about communities’ involvement in joint projects during the period of the intervention. De-
scriptive statistics do in fact suggest that towns in fragmented settings have slightly higher
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proportion of respondents who reported involvement in joint projects with ”other towns”
than their counterparts in established settings (36% and 26%, respectively). Further, to
see whether the prospects of inter-group cooperation for established settings were hindered
by underlying parochial predispositions or commitment problems, I focus on the subset of
established settings–the 26%–that managed to engage in cooperative activities with other
towns to see whether they in fact were unresponsive to the two strategies investigated in
my field experiment.
My intuition here is that such communities would have overcome any prior commitment
problems they may have had and therefore if the security committee program had the
effects my theory suggested SPs should have in established settings, then this subset of
communities would be good candidates to provide validation.26 But in order to avoid
spurious conclusions, I also conduct the same test for the subsample of communities that
did not engage in joint projects with other towns. Table 6.6 below summarizes the results
of basic regressions estimating the effects of the two primary treatment program on levels
of contributions to other towns, separately for established settings that did and did not
engage in joint projects with other towns during the intervention period. Model 12 presents
estimates for former and Model 13 does the same for the latter. The N is quite small for
the former, but the results are still suggestive.
Interestingly, the results in Table 6.6 show that the security committee program does
in fact have positive effects on established settings’ propensity to engage in cooperative
endeavors with other towns, provided that any prior commitment problems have been re-
solved. This effect seems particularly large (67% increase in levels of contributions) and
is statistically significant at the conventional .05 level. This result provides support to
the intuition that failure to account for potential commitment problems in my empirical
models may account for the security committee’s apparent lack of meaningful influence on
established settings’ propensity to engage in cooperative behaviors with other towns. In
26It is important to keep in mind that focus here is only on the security committee program: why it
did not have positive influence on inter-group social cohesion as my theory had predicted. Obviously, the
civic education program did performed as expected, but I will also include it in my modeling for the sake
of falsifiability of the claims I make here–i.e., these communities also should still be unresponsive to civic
education programs for the same reasons I laid out in the theory.
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Table 6.6: Testing for reputation mechanisms versus parochial tendencies
Established Settings Established Settings
Worked w/ others Never worked w/ others
Model (12) (13)
Security Committee 67** 23
(26) (45)





F= .002 F= .415
Adj. R2 = .78 Adj. R2 = .17
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
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other words, it is likely that information problems were not the most important issue un-
derlying inter-group cooperation for established settings I studied and that commitment
problems may have been an important barrier. For, as the results in Table 6.6 suggest,
communities that may be assumed to have overcome commitment and trust issues seem
to have dramatically improved their ”bridging” social capital stock thanks to the security
committee program, as my theory predicted. These results also further undermine the no-
tion that established settings may have rigid parochial tendencies that are hard to influence
by outsiders.27 Two other findings in the table further support this intuition. The effect of
the security committee does not hold for the other set of established settings that did not
have a history of involvement in joint projects other towns, which suggests that towns in
the latter set may still have commitment problems that hamper inter-group cooperation.
Equally telling, the civic education program does not have meaningful effects on inter-group
cooperation in either subsample, which is what we should expect from my theory.
I now turn to the puzzling results in fragmented settings. The findings that the civic
education program under performed in fragmented settings that my theory predicted should
be most responsive to this intervention and the security committee program’s surprisingly
strong performance in fragmented settings in which it was not expected to perform under-
mine my theory and beg for an explanation. Yet more scrutiny suggests the two can be
reconciled and further investigated. Specifically, it does appear that my theory is correct in
pointing to information problems–both vertical and horizontal–as a key underlying source
of cooperation problems and in suggesting that the most successful strategy to promote
cooperation is one that can help resolve these problems, by providing the local people a
forum to congregate and learn about each other’s preferences and payoffs so that they are
able to coordinate effectively on socially desirable outcomes.28 What seems to be different
in this case here, however, is that the types of forum provided in the context of civic educa-
27These results are only able to vindicate the notion that the security committee program should have
positive influence on established settings’ propensity to engage in inter-group cooperation. They still do not
address the issue of mechanisms through which this effect occurred.
28In chapter five, I provided anecdotal accounts from interviews with Liberians that suggested in frag-
mented settings local people to face informational challenges and take any opportunity offered to them to
learn about one another and to act upon such information to improve cooperation.
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tion campaigns and the kind of information that comes from such forums may be evaluated
differently depending on whether people seek to engage in political action or social action.
Specifically, what I argue is that, while the forum (and information) that the civic education
program offer may adequately supply the information necessary for informed (political) col-
lective action, that same information may be woefully inadequate when it comes to (social)
collective action. Political preferences, especially about national issues such as which polit-
ical party or candidate to support, based on what platform and so so forth, are relatively
easier to get from other people and very hard to conceal. One reason for this may be that
some people believe that pretending to be neutral can actually raise more suspicions from
their political opponents.29 Moreover, political issues and solutions typically come from the
outside, with little input from local communities–established or fragmented. The collective
action, from this vantage point, reside in whether people find politicians’ proposals appeal-
ing and decide which one to pick. This kind of problems require fairly little knowledge
about each other’s preference and perhaps more on the empowerment side to be able to
mobilize successfully (Collier and Vicente 2011).
Social preferences, on the other hand, are difficult to find out about and to reveal frag-
mented local settings due to severe horizontal and vertical information problems I discussed
previously. To really find out whether your neighbor–let alone the rest of the community–
shares in or dislikes a set of ritualistic practices that the elites claim come from the ancestors,
for example, requires more than just showing up to a few human rights workshops, even if
these issues are discussed there. Likewise, in order to engage in cooperation with people
from one’s own town or from neighboring towns requires finding out more about the things
they like, their way of doing business with others, their ability to fulfill commitments–in
short cooperation in the social realm does seem to require genuinely ”social” interactions
to reveal ”usable” information for cooperative purpose. In light of this, one possible expla-
29This was at least the response from one enthusiastic supporter of the Congress for Democratic
Change(CDC)–one of Liberian main opposition party–I interviewed recently in Liberia, as he argued with
a crowd that appeared to be from a rival party, the ruling United Party (UP.) He suggested that he would
be in more danger if the ”other people” did not know, which party he supported because ”they will try to
harass me everyday until they know which party I support. Now they know it, so they cannot harass me
unless our two parties get in a fight.” Author’s Interview. Garnga, Liberia. October 2011.
CHAPTER 6. EFFECTS OF PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES ON SOCIAL
COHESION 160
nation of the negative effects of the curriculum intervention in fragmented settings may be
attributed to the lack of a strong social component in the civic education program that was
carried out.
Indeed, as with many curriculum interventions of this type, the civic education program
studied here were carried out as workshops designed to provide people with specific knowl-
edge or skill sets to enable political action.(Although some deliberations and discussions
were also part of the format.) Thus, while this intervention may have brought community
members in one location fairly frequently, it is possible it may not have provided the type
of social intimacy that may enable private information about each other and about the
status quo to be revealed through social interactions. Furthermore, while the civic educa-
tion intervention contained specific themes that emphasized social issues such as trust and
community mobilization, it placed more emphasis on political matters (as is true for many
other curriculum interventions of this sort) and thus whatever benefits it provided people
in terms of better coordination was limited to the political realm and did not necessarily
carry over the social realm.
Ironically, I suggest, the security committee program may have succeeded in providing
the ”social dynamics” required for successful promotion of social cohesion, where the civic
education program failed, and this may help explain the unexpected strong effects of the se-
curity program on both intra-group and inter-group social cohesion in established settings.
That is, the effects of the security committee may be capturing the same ”social” dynamics
that the discussion module captured–rather than elite socialization proposed in the theory–
and this may have to do with the peculiar structure for this intervention. Because meetings
were organized for several villages at the time, members had an opportunity to interact
much more than usual with people from different areas. Thus, as in the discussion session,
members who came from communities where information was scarce for reasons other than
inherent parochialism may have taken advantage of this opportunity to learn about other
communities, on their own of course; and the effects that we see in the security committee
scenario may reflect this ”social” component that existed through the design of the interven-
tion. In essence, this intervention played, in part, a role that socially-oriented curriculum
intervention are supposed to fulfill in order to influence cooperation. The cross-group inter-
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actions that were created as a by-product of security committee meetings may have arisen
more organically, they did not focus on political or human rights issues, and thus one could
argue that those interactions are more likely to reveal ”socially useful” information that
also has greater effects on social cohesion.
Unfortunately my data do not allow me to test this explanation directly. Nonetheless I
look at other features of the field experiment for insights. One such feature is a discussion
module that was introduced before the beginning of the second round of contributions in the
public goods game is a random subset of study communities. The reasons for introducing
this module are twofold.30 But it is relevant here because it allows me to uncover who really
needs information to cooperate and why it is not just the information–but also the kind
of information–that matters for cooperation. Thus, at the very least, we should expect to
see that the discussion module is useful for cooperative behaviors in fragmented settings,
but not in established settings (this comes directly from the theory’s core assumption.)
But the effects of the discussion module will also help reconcile the seeming discrepancies
between theoretical predictions and empirical results, particularly the poor performance of
the civic education program and the strong performance of the security committee program
in fragmented settings. The idea is that the format of this intervention allowed participants
to interact more intimately, in a decentralized manner, about a specific collective action
problem, and along the way helped reveal useful ”social” information. Such information
generated through a process of social interactions can enable members from settings that
are information-scarce to learn more about their preferences and achieve greater cooperative
outcomes.
To ascertain such effects, I fit a regression equation of the following type (akin to equa-
tion 2, with the difference that the outcome now is contributions to the second round of
contribution in the public goods game. The interest now is to see whether the effects of the
30Among others, this module attempted to make the public goods game process look much more organic
and natural. After all, everyday collection action is not as atomistic as the game implies (e.g., anonymous
contributions). Rather, it involves people coming together, sharing views and deciding as a group the best
course of action. This discussion module was an attempt to get closer to that. At the same time, this
discussion module sought to answer a basic underlying social science question: can improvised deliberative
processes, even brief ones, lead to socially desirable outcomes?
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discussion module varied depending on the strength of culture; thus I only introduce the
new terms):
Yt = β0 + β1St + β2Ct + β3Dt + β4Pt + β5DXPt + γc[t] + δb[c[t]] + ￿t (6.3)
Where:
Yt : is the level of level of social cohesion in town t (measured by contributions in second
round);
Dt : is a dummy variable for wether the community was randomly assigned to a discus-
sion module;
DXPt : is an interaction between the discussion variable with the cultural strength
variable;
The outcome variables is contributions to the second round. The coefficient of most
interest in this equation is that on the interaction between the discussion module and local
settings types (β5). I estimated regressions based on both the full model and on split sample.
There are no meaningful differences between the two and so here I will focus on estimates
from the latter. Table 6.7 presents estimates from regression results. Models 14 and 15 in
the left panel present effects of the discussion on measures of intra-group and inter-group
social cohesion respectively, in local settings that are established. Models 16 and 17 present
similar results with respect to local settings that have fragmented.
As can be seen from Table 6.7, the results suggest very strong effects of the discussion
module on both measures of social cohesion in culturally fragmented settings, but no mean-
ingful effects in established settings. Specifically, in the latter, the discussion effects are
46LD and 43 LD respectively on intra-group and inter-group social cohesion and neither is
statistically significant at conventional levels. By contrast, in culturally fragmented settings,
the effects of discussion on both types of social cohesion were equally large (90LD for intra-
group and 93LD for inter-group), and both are statistically significant at the conventional
.05 level. These effect sizes correspond to a 23% and 35% increase the respective measures
of social cohesion. What we see clearly from these results is that these types of impromptu
discussions do little to improve patterns of cooperation in established settings where infor-
mation is already abundant. But they generate large social returns in fragmented settings.
CHAPTER 6. EFFECTS OF PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES ON SOCIAL
COHESION 163
Table 6.7: Heterogeneous effects of the discussion module
Established Settings Fragmented Settings
Intragroup Inter-group Intra-group Inter-group
Model (14) (15) (16) (17)
Security committee 21 17 96 33
(134) (72) (68) (43)
Civic education 24 32* -135** -119*
(25) (17) (68) (70)
Discussion module 56* 43 99*** 94**
(28) (33) (39) (40)
Constant 431*** 169*** 392*** 266***
(87) (49) (53) (29)
N=619 N= 609 N=495 N=505
F= .07 F= .39 F= .14 F= .34
Adj. R2 = .36 Adj. R2 = .34 Adj. R2 = .73 Adj. R2 = .64
Table displays robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent
confidence levels respectively.
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According to the measure of cooperation employed in this chapter, the discussion module
essentially enabled fragmented settings to close the gap with their established counterparts
with regard to intra-group cooperation levels and even surpass them by far with respect to
inter-group cooperation.
The strong effects of the discussion module on social cohesion in fragmented local settings
are important and telling, especially because the civic education intervention had a more
or less similar structure and format as this discussion module, except that the former was
carried out over a period of nine moths. And yet it badly failed to foster cooperation
of any kind in either setting type, especially in fragmented settings that have pervasive
information programs it is presumed to resolve. But notice that there is virtual ”observation
equivalence” between the performance of the security committee program and the discussion
module in fragmented settings. My interpretation of this is that the two are actually related.
In other words, the fact that the discussion forum has large and consistent effects across
measures of both intra-group and inter-group social cohesion, as did the security committee,
provides further support the afore-suggested ”social dynamics” account. In both cases we
see that people in fragmented settings where information problems are pervasive will take
advantage of any opportunity they find–including brief discussion sessions such as offered
in this game–to learn about one another and to act upon such information to improve
cooperation, as suggested by the results presented here. But the results also show the
importance of genuinely ”social” interactions to reveal ”usable” information for cooperative
purpose. My claim is that both the security committee program and the discussion module
were able to tap into these ”social dynamics” that seem very important for cooperation
and as the result they performed well fragmented settings. By contrast the civic education
program failed to capture this social component and as a result it performed very poorly.
In sum, the foregoing discussion shed light on discrepancies between my theoretical
expectations and main empirical findings in this paper, namely the appearance that cultural
strength does not appear to be salient for social cohesion as it does for political participation;
the seeming underperformance of the security committee program established local settings;
the poor performance of the civic education program, particularly in fragmented settings;
and the surprisingly strong performance of the village security committee in fragmented
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settings. Further explanations and ancillary empirical tests presented in this discussion to
help reconcile seeming discrepancies are tentative.
More research is needed to validate these additional explanations and findings and, gen-
erally, to identify more precise mechanisms that govern the effects of different peacebuilding
strategies in promoting social cohesion within and between groups in different local setting
types. There is particularly an urgent need to have better understanding the various sources
of cooperation problems in different local settings, in particular to understand who needs
information to cooperate, the type of information that local communities may find most
useful for cooperative behaviors and how it is supplied.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter used systematic data from a nine-month field experiment in Liberia and a
public goods game to investigate the effects of two peacebuilding strategies–status quo-
preserving and status quo-transforming–on levels social cohesion, and to investigate po-
tential heterogeneity of effects across different local setting types. It finds no meaningful
independent effects of either intervention program on measures the two types of social
cohesion. Cultural strength does not appear to be salient for social cohesion, as I first
theorized and, as it does for political participation. But deviations from theoretical pre-
dictions pointed to other potential mechanisms (e.g., commitment problems) and dynamics
(differential evaluation of information for political versus social collective action), which are
consistent with my theory. This was well illustrated by the results showing surprisingly
large and strong positive effects of the discussion module and the security committee pro-
gram on intra-group and inter-group cooperation in fragmented settings that are typically
information poor, environments, but none in established settings.
These findings revealed differential informational needs across different local setting
types, highlighted the ”social” character of information that is likely to be most useful
for cooperative behaviors in information poor environments and exposed the inadequacy
the information supplied in common curriculum interventions designed to promote social
cohesion in war-torn societies. These interventions tend to emphasize political matters and
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fail to create genuine spaces in which social encounters can occur more organically. Yet the









This dissertation sought to investigate–both theoretically and empirically–the relationship
between peacebuilding interventions and democratic outcomes at the grassroots level and
to outline testable hypotheses. The main claim was that important features of local con-
text play a key role in moderating the effects of peacebuilding interventions on democratic
outcomes. Specifically, focusing on pre-existing culture–arguably the most salient feature of
local context–the main claims were that when locals strongly value, intrinsically or instru-
mentally, an existing culture, strategies that seek to transform the status quo will likely meet
with local resistance and be ineffective, whereas less intrusive strategies (such as peacekeep-
ing) will tend to have positive effects by working through more subtle channels (e.g., elite
socialization). In contrast, when locals weakly value an existing culture, only the former
will be more likely to have positive influence on democratic outcomes.
I tested these claims empirically using data from a unique randomized control trial
carried out across 142 villages, in partnership with UNMIL and two local civil society
organizations. The trial was designed to mimic as closely as possible two key components
of today’s peacebuilding operations, namely status-quo preserving strategies represented by
a security committee program and status-quo transforming strategies represented by a civic
education program. This dissertation thought to disentangle the extent to which positive
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democratic effects at the grassroots level can be attributed to these peacebuilding strategies,
particularly status-quo transforming strategies, or to interactions between these strategies
and local contexts. The outcomes of interest I measured were political participation and
social cohesion.
Empirical evidence on political participation confirmed theoretical expectations that
the effects of these two strategies depend on local context, measured in terms of cultural
strength. In areas where local cultures are established, the village security committee
program has strong positive effects on the overall measures of political participation; in
areas where local cultures are fragmented, it has no meaningful effects. By contrast, in
those same culturally fragmented areas, the civic education program has strong positive
effects on the overall measures of political participation, and adverse effects where local
cultures are firmly established. However, the results on social cohesion do not support my
hypotheses, suggesting that local culture does not necessarily exhibit the same degree of
saliency or significance when the focus of outside interventions is on social issues. Taken
together, these findings are counterintuitive and have important implications for policy and
research.
From a policy standpoint, the theory I developed and the findings I presented go beyond
pointing out the importance of local context to provide a practical framework for identifying
relevant institutional and cultural dimensions that can help address the dilemmas that so
often undermine peacebuilding efforts. Below I highlight at least three issue areas.
First, this dissertation’s findings confound expectations of those who tend to view local
settings in binary terms: on one hand, optimists who tend to view local settings as malleable
and therefore more amenable to outside influence; and, on the other hand, pessimists who
hold the view local settings as too resilient to respond to any kind of outside interventions.
My findings suggest that the picture is a lot more complicated than that. Democratic
change is possible in different context types, provided the right type of strategies. It is
true that some settings (e.g., fragmented settings) are more predisposed to change than
others (e.g., established settings), depending on the types of existing structures (governing
or otherwise) and the degree to which local people value them. But disposition is just that.
It neither implies that democratic change is self-realizing in favorable contexts nor that
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change is never possible in less favorable contexts.
As I have shown, change is achievable in culturally established local settings on the
same order of magnitude as in fragmented cultural settings and that the key to success
is in recognizing that processes of change in these two setting types are different, and so
should be change-triggering inputs or interventions. The issue here is both about optimal
interventions design as it is about recognizing and making use of local resources to overcome
seeming obstacles. On the intervention side, there is a need to pick the strategy carefully to
match local conditions in specific contexts. This is important because, as noted, the promise
of the current peacebuilding approach lies with transformative strategies, while facilitative
strategies are typically not presumed to have democracy promoting mechanisms. This
dissertation’s findings suggest the precedence given to the former may not be warranted.
Both transformative and facilitative aspects of the peacebuilding strategy can promote
democratic outcomes. The tricky part is to recognize under which conditions their respective
mechanisms may lead to positive democratic outcomes.
Specifically, the severity of information problems and social inefficiencies they lead to in
fragmented settings suggest that bottom-up interventions that engage the citizenry directly
are more appropriate because they can fill the information void and enable coordination
more quickly. At the same time, strategies that rely on local elite to be the intermediary be-
tween outside interveners and citizens may be misguided because in some cases the elite may
not have incentives to solve information problems and may even purposefully manipulate
the available information for their own interest. By contrast, in established settings, where
information networks are much more developed, strategies that target the masses directly
will add little value or be even counterproductive. The other aspect of this is that we need
to properly recognize the role of local actors, in particular traditional chiefs, in contributing
to successful democratic change. This importance stems from the fact that in some cases,
some types of local elites–those that enjoy high legitimacy and/or are accountable–can be
relied up on as allies to promote desired change indirectly, but more organically. Thus
under certain conditions local chiefs can be agents of change and allow interveners to met
their objectives despite unfavorable structural conditions, suggesting the need to engage
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them more proactively in the reconstruction process.1 Thus there is a need to engage these
actors more constructively.
Second, this dissertation’s findings also reveal the variety of ways in which citizens in
war-torn countries engage with political leaders and institutions, thus underscoring the dan-
ger of the current peacebuilding approach, which gives precedence to formal mechanisms
as well as those that are national in their orientation. Many scholars and analysts (e.g.,
Bratton 2013; Lake 2007) have observed that despite the dramatic growth, in recent years,
of programs designed to promote democracy and accountability mechanisms in developing
democracies, such mechanisms remain hopelessly weak, or may even be entirely non-existent
in some scenarios. My findings suggest that one possible reason for this is interveners’ ten-
dency to focus on mechanisms that may not resonate strongly in local contexts. Thus,
one key practical lesson to draw from my findings is that if peacebuilders hope to achieve
the objectives underlying promotion of political participation in the first place–that is, the
kind of participation that creates accountability and responsiveness on the part of political
leaders–they need to take a broader view of political participation, one that encompasses
these different mechanisms of participation that local citizens find meaningful for account-
ability.
Third, this dissertation findings question another central premise underlying the holistic
approach of contemporary peacebuilding interventions: that ”all good things go together”–
the notion that interventions designed to promote outcomes in one domain (e.g., political
participation) will also have influence in another domain (e.g., social cohesion) and that
processes in both domains are mutually reinforcing (Paris 2001)–at least when viewed from
a micro-level perspective. My findings suggested that local culture does not appear to be
salient when interventions target social cohesion, as it did when interventions target political
participation. It is unclear what drives these differences. In the particular case of Liberia,
my finding suggested that while information constraints may be relevant for both social
1This finding does not sit well with the predominant view among peacebuilders that typically portrays
local chiefs as despotic and abusive toward their own people, but it is consistent with a growing number of
empirical studies (e.g., Acemoglu et al;. 2013; Humphreys et al. 2013) suggesting that in some cases chiefs
do in fact play a constructive role in peacebuilding and development processes.
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processes and political processes, different kind of information is needed to address these
constraints. Thus the current approach to rely on the same strategies to promote different
outcomes may not be warranted.
In short, this dissertation’s findings present an optimistic picture about the role of out-
side actors in promoting democracy at the grassroots level. Peacebuilders can help achieve
democratic change only with the active involvement and support of the local population in
whose name the reforms are undertaken. This they also suggest that the process of elicit-
ing support may be different and require different strategies in established settings versus
fragmented settings. Ultimately, successful democratization at the grassroots level depends
on the extent to which peacebuilders are able to leverage specific, targeted strategies to
elicit positive local response, while avoiding strategies that provoke local sensitivities. This
may be a complicated challenge in contemporary peacebuilding interventions, which are in
essence premised on the need to carry out different types of activities in different realms.
But it is not an impossible challenge to overcome, provided that peacebuilders do the hard
work of understanding the internal dynamics of different settings targeted for interventions.
One important caveat is that these results draw on one single case, which means that
they necessarily raises external validity issues that must be acknowledged, even if addressing
them fully is beyond the scope of my dissertation. The question is: to what extent are the
findings presented herein generalizable? There are two aspects to this question. The first
concerns the extent to which hypotheses developed to account for observed heterogeneity in
UNMIL operations are general propositions that can be applied to peacebuilding operations
more generally, at the macro-level, and to related social problems outside peacebuilding con-
texts (e.g., democracy promotion in general). The answer here is relatively straightforward,
however, because the hypotheses were formulated based on insights from social science the-
ories and concepts and were not specific to peacebuilding operations or confined to any
particular level of analysis. Thus, in principle, my theory should apply at the macro-level
as well, and to the promotion of liberal norms and values outside of peacebuilding contexts.
A related aspect is whether ”contexts” matter at the macro-level in the same or similar
way as they do at the micro-level. I submit that they do, as evidence in recent macro-level
studies suggests. As noted, a growing number of studies have stressed the importance of
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context (Ponzio 2011; Colletta and Muggah 2009; Hohe 2002a). While different studies
emphasize different sets of factors, it may be argued that, at the conceptual level, these
different factors tap into preferences of key domestic actors (i.e. decision-makers) vis--
vis status quo conditions. Using a similar logic, I argue elsewhere (Mvukiyehe 2013b)
and provided evidence showing that UN-sponsored postwar elections are likely to produce
outcomes that diverge from peacebuilding objectives (e.g., less credible electoral outcomes,
exclusionary postwar politics) and to prolong political instability in situations when at least
one of the protagonists of civil war prefers status quo conditions (i.e., war) to negotiated
settlements; whereas the influence is likely to be positive when both actors have fewer
incentives to maintain status quo conditions.
Admittedly, testing this dissertation’s hypotheses at the macro-level may not be as
straightforward or even as feasible as it has been at the micro-level due a host of methodolog-
ical problems discussed in the chapters. For instance, there are simply too few observations
and too many confounding factors to establish the effects of peacebuilding operations–let
alone independent effects of their individual components. Moreover, it is debatable whether
contextual factors suggested to be salient at the micro-level will necessarily find counter-
parts at the macro-level. In other words, the proxies used to measure cultural strength
at the micro-level may not be measured reliably at the macro-level or display too little
variation to allow empirical analysis in a precise way. But these issues, while presenting
methodological and empirical limitations to theory testing at the macro-level, would not be
problematic with regard to the generalizability of the theory.
External validity issues aside, this dissertation has left many issues unanswered and we
need to have answers to these issues to have a better understanding of whether and how
local communities can become more democratic. First, more work needs to be done to
better understand the conditions under which local settings matter for positive outcomes
of international interventions. To be sure, the macro-level peacebuilding literature tends to
portray local settings in dichotomous terms: these are either malleable to outside influence
or resilient; obstacles or resources; and so forth. This dissertation’s findings suggest the need
to move beyond these dichotomies and identify more specific conditions under which local
contexts may undergo successful democratic change. One operating condition proposed in
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this dissertation is ”cultural strength” and a measurement strategy of the concept was put
forth. Continued investigation needed to validate the proposed theory and measurement
strategies. For example, it would be interesting to test the implication of cultural strength
separately for each of its dimensions (e.g., institutional, symbolic, etc.) as well as for each
of the suggested sources of variation within it (e.g, variation based on prewar structural
factors versus variation based on civil war-related factors). Further research should also
focus on better understanding the discrepancies between the saliency of local culture for
outside interventions in political and social realms. If in fact cultural strength significance
depends on issue areas, then we need to understand what drives these differences in order
to design more effective interventions.
There is also need to further investigate the long-term effects of the interventions on
which my dissertation is based. There are two aspects to this issue. One, since causal
inference in field experiments is based on comparisons of key outcomes between groups that
did and did not receive an intervention, and as such measurements tend to be drawn shortly
after an intervention is completed, there is a greater chance that self-reported responses may
suffer from ”priming biases,” whereby respondents answers reflect what they have been
taught rather than genuine underlying attitudes or behaviors. A more severe problem is
that intervention effects that take longer to materialize may be completely missed when
outcomes are measured shortly after an intervention is completed. An investigation of the
effects of the interventions on the initial study communities several years after completion
of the original interventions might help address these issues, thereby providing a base of
firmer evidence for long-term effects.
Related to this, further research is needed to better understand the quality and long-
term viability of political participation produced through the different processes and to
ascertain the effects of these seemingly different micro-paths to liberal democracy on the
prospects of successful democratization at the macro-level. Such an assessment ultimately
requires an investigation of long-term prospects for liberal transformations, not just in the
political realm, but also in related realms such as social cohesion and governance. Arguably,
where democracy emerges functionally and is adopted quickly based on costs and benefits
calculations, as likely in culturally fragmented settings, an argument can be made that the
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quality of democracy that emerges therein may be limited, its viability depending on a
continuous stream of external benefits that might have made it appealing in the first place.
The demise of democracy would come the moment at which benefits that made it appealing
disappear, so that the risk of democratic breakdown is greater in culturally fragmented
settings. Where has emerged organically, however, it likely that democratic norms and
values would be reflected in other aspects of social life, laying the foundation for long-term
endogenous sustainability. Answers to this issues may also help clarify the conditions under
which democratization at the grassroots level might contribute to state legitimacy.
Last, but not least, we also need to investigate mechanisms proposed to govern out-
side interventions in social and political processes across different types of local settings.
Some of the research questions that could be asked include the following: When do locals
resist outside interventions for instrumental reasons and when do they resist interventions
for normative or moral reasons? What, precisely, is the nature of cultural threat in the
context of democracy promotion? What range of empirical manifestations does it assume?
What individual and social factors drive it and what are its consequences for social and
political outcomes? Does cultural threat emerge in all issue areas, or does it emerge only
in some and not others? If the latter, what factors explain this variation? Are such factors
intervention-related or context-related? What mechanisms drive cooperation within and
between communities? Are patterns of cooperation in different local settings governed by
similar mechanisms, or do cooperative behaviors in different settings require different mech-
anisms? When are local actors more likely to be effective than outside actors in promoting
cooperation within and between communities?
These questions could be addressed through a mix of methods, including ethnographic
and lab- and field-experimental methods.2 There is also need to further investigate when dif-
ferent mechanisms (e.g., information; commitment problems) matter for social cooperation.
2 With respect to cultural threat, for example, one could design an experiment with two main treatments:
(i) the provision of information on liberal norms and values in a way that specifically threatens or demeans
local cultures; and (ii) the provision of information on liberal norms and values in a way that is threat-neutral
or even supportive of local cultures. Subjects from the communities in my earlier study could be randomly
assigned to these treatments in a lab experiment framework to ascertain whether and how these different
mechanisms influence political attitudes and behaviors in political and social realms.
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Our understanding of these mechanisms is crucial for our understanding of the conditions
under which democratic outcomes can be promoted successfully in different local settings.
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Appendix A
Structures and Contents of
Program Interventions
This appendix provides more information about the main interventions that comprised the
PBDPL project. It provides a brief description of the format and contents of the Security
Exposure intervention as well as a listing of monthly themes that comprised the Civic
Education intervention. More specific information about the issues that were discussed in
each monthly meeting can be provided upon request.
A.1 Civic Education Themes
Every town assigned to a civic education intervention–that is, a community that was ei-
ther assigned to a mixed program or a civic education only program–was eligible for 8 key
themes. As noted, these themes were divided into two broad categories: (i) general themes
that focused on broader aspects of democracy, human rights and governance such as the
importance of political participation and accountability; and (ii) specific themes that em-
phasized either gender issues or peace and reconciliation issues. These themes were covered
in the following order (with alternation between general themes and specific themes).
A.1.1 General Themes on Civic and Voter Education
1. March: Community Mobilization and Empowerment
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2. May: (i) Nationhood, Nationbuilding and State; and (ii) Human Rights and the Rule
of Law
3. July: Democracy and Democratic Governance (emphasize the different ways to par-
ticipate)
4. September: Electoral Process in Liberia
5. November: Review of Electoral Process in Liberia
A.1.2 Specific Themes on Peace Education
6. April: (i) Conflict management; and (ii) Reconciliation
7. June: Who are you?
8. August: (i) Trust and (ii) Cooperation
9. October: Problem solving in peaceful manner
A.1.3 Specific Themes on Gender Education
10. April: (i) Gender equality and empowerment
11. June: Womens Human rights
12. August: Why should women participate in politics and how? (Emphasize the elec-
toral process)
13. October: Women and leadership
Note to field facilitators: When submitting your work plan for the month, you will
also be required to submit an outline of the topic of the month so that we can give some
input and guidance. This outline should include how you plan to approach the topic, lay out
the objectives of the session as well as the key issues that will be discussed in the session.
It should also include real-life tasks of activities that meeting attendees will be given to
practice what they have learned.
A.2 Format and Structure of Security Exposure Meetings
A.2.1 Context and purpose
Within the context of the Columbia University and the Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW)/
Bong Youth Association pilot peacebuilding study, meetings will be organized between 2
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representatives from selected communities and UNMIL military personnel in 8 UNMIL
deployment locations. Specifically, these community representatives will be meeting with a
point-of-contact from the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) section/Military Observers
(MILOB) section on a monthly basis to provide them with early warning or information
about local security problems and related concerns. In turn, these representatives will
be reporting back to fellow residents about response options and other issues discussed
with UNMIL military personnel. These representatives will also serve as fixed points of
contact for UNMIL. Ultimately, the aim of this program is to enhance communication and
strengthen relationship between local communities and UNMIL in the hope that this can
significantly enhance UNMIL’s ability to fulfill some of its mandates, including that of
civilian protection. As such, this program will complement CIMICs ongoing efforts to reach
out to local communities.
A.2.2 Structure and format of the meetings
Eight deployment locations have been selected for this pilot project. Once every month,
representatives from 6 to 9 nearby communities will be meeting with a CIMIC/MILOB
point-of- contact in each of these locations. The meeting will be be divided in two sessions:
• A General briefing session (15-30 minutes): in which the CIMIC/MILOB point-
of-contact will give representatives from the different groups a briefing about activities
such as patrols or CIMIC projects that UNMIL military has conducted (or is planning
to undertake) in the area. We will work with Col. Gore to develop a talking point
memo that CIMIC/MILOB point-of-contact can use for the briefing.
• A Group-specific briefing session (15-30 minutes per group), which will give rep-
resentatives from each community an opportunity to brief the CIMIC/MILOB point-
of- contact about issues and concerns specific to their community. The role of the
CIMIC/MILOB point-of-contact in this session is simply to listen to what these com-
munity representatives have to say and perhaps convey the message to the relevant
UNMIL section/party that might be able to address these issues and/or concerns.
The CIMIC/MILOB point-of-contact doesnt have to do anything else.
• Before each meeting, our field staff will brief the CIMIC point-of-contact about
the key issues that are likely to come up in the meeting so that he or she can consult
with the CIMIC leadership and/or the Company/Battalion commander in advance
to prepare a response (if any). In any event, we will make it clear to community
members that these meetings are an opportunity for them to interact with UNMIL
military and that there should be no expectations that a response will be necessary
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forthcoming.
A.2.3 Time-commitment and logistics
As mentioned, each of the 8 UNMIL deployment bases will host representatives from
approximately 6-9 communities. We will arrange meetings for 2-3 communities at a
time. We will be arranging transportation of community representatives to and from
UNMIL bases ourselves. Each meeting will be lasting between 1.5 to 2 hours. Thus,
we expect the CIMIC-MILOB point-of- contact at each of the 8 locations to devote
3 to 6 hours per month, which can be spent all in one day or spread over different days.
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Appendix B
Sample Pictures from the
Interventions
B.1 Sample Pictures from the Civic Education Program
B.2 Sample Pictures from the Security Committee Pro-
gram
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Sample pictures from exposures from CIVIC EDUCATION PROGRAM 
CIVIC EDUCATION SESSION: GROUP 10 
CIVIC EDUCATION SESSION: GROUP 6 
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Sample pictures from SECURITY COMMITTEE PROGRAM (UNMIL) 
Exposure meeting in Gbarnga, June 2011. From Left to Right, Major Harris, Company Commander for the Pakistani 
Batallion-18, Gbarnga deployment; Colonel Berkley Gore, Chief of UNMIL’s Civil- Military Coordination (CIMIC) 
Section; Major Li, Sector-B CIMIC Officer and Major Nasir. Deputy Company Commander, Pak Bat-18, Gbarnga City. 
Major Mo, deputy CIMIC Chief, also participated in the meeting (not shown in this picture; third from left in next pic.)  
In this picture: UNMIL military posing with community representatives, Exposure meeting in Gbarnga, June 2011. 
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Appendix C
Behavioral Measures of Political
Participation
C.1 Sample Voting Ballot (2005 elections)
C.2 Sample Message Card to Contact Leader
C.3 Sample Anti-violence Petition
C.4 Sample Newspaper Clip
C.5 Fictional Candidates
APPENDIX C. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 202
APPENDIX C. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 203
APPENDIX C. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 204
APPENDIX C. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 205



















































I am Candidate_______________ 
 
 
VOTE FOR ME BECAUSE I WILL 
GIVE YOU A JOB AND MONEY 
AND MAKE YOU RICH! 



















































I am Candidate_______________ 
 
 
VOTE FOR ME BECAUSE WE 
NEED TO TAKE CARE OF OUR 
PEOPLE! 
 



















































I am Candidate_________________ 
 
VOTE FOR ME BECAUSE WE 
NEED TO PROTECT OUR 
RELIGION AND FAITH! 
 



















































I am Candidate_________________ 
 
 
VOTE FOR ME BECAUSE WE 
NEED TO PROTECT OUR 
RELIGION AND FAITH! 
 



















































I am Candidate_________________ 
 
VOTE FOR ME BECAUSE I WILL 
TREAT THIS COMMUNITY GOOD! 
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VOTE FOR ME BECAUSE THIS 
COUNTRY IS FOR ALL LIBERIANS AND 
WE NEED TO PUT IT FIRST! 
 
I am Candidate_________________ 
 
